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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on exploring the myth of “revolutionary marriage”, a popular and
lasting marriage tradition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The concept of “revolutionary marriage” came out of a marriage revolution initiated by the
May Fourth radicals in order to challenge the traditional marriage system. This term was then
borrowed by the early Chinese Communists who used it to depict their socialist marriage
ideal. However, regarding the CCP’s marriage policy, there was always a gap between the
progressive ideals and the conservative realities. In every piece of propaganda the CCP
swore to completely overthrow the feudal arranged marriage system and to give people in
general, and women in particular, the freedom to love and marry. In its mass line practice,
however, the Party had to make compromises with the old system, which was deeply rooted
in Chinese society, by exercising constant restraint on the individual’s marriage freedom. To
fill the gap between ideal and practice, the Party re-interpreted the ideal model of
“revolutionary marriage” as one that demanded people’s unconditional submission to the
Party’s arrangement of their love and marriage for the sake of the Communist revolution.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the “revolutionary marriage” model expanded out
across the party line to become a nationwide practice.
Through a comprehensive examination of the theoretical sources, historical origin, social
context, and practical applications of the revolutionary marriage model, I endeavor to argue
that rather than a static socialist project, this model was actually a flexible social control
program developed by its designers to fit in the context of a transitional China where the old
traditions had been fundamentally challenged and while new practices and customs were still
under construction.

Keywords
CCP, Communist Party, Chinese women, Confucianism, custom, danwei, ethics, legislation,
love, marriage, reform, revolution, social control, socialization, tradition, work unit
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

In the second half of the nineteenth century, China's established arranged marriage
patterns began to be influenced by new ideologies, theories and social institutions that
espoused a marriage model that was variously described by interpreters as “scientific”,
“liberal” and “democratic.” Included among those who took the vanguard in this
'marriage revolution' were the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the
pious followers of Friedrich Engels, these leaders re-interpreted the concept of
“revolutionary marriage” in accordance with the anarchistic socialist ideal, and were
among the first to make a radical rejection of the traditional marriage system. In the
Chinese Communist social revolution agenda, marriage reform was to play a critical role
in persuading Chinese women to participate in production, to gain economic
independence, and to support the CCP’s causes of Communist revolution.
During the Party’s formative years, the marriage question was largely treated as a
problem that would solve itself once women achieved economic independence. However,
the CCP’s interests in marriage reform rose rapidly during the period of the Jiangxi
Soviet (1931 to 1934), as socialist marriage laws were promulgated to advocate a form of
unconditional marriage freedom in accordance with Marxist theories. These regulations,
surprisingly, provoked as much trouble as progress within the Soviet due to unstable
wartime conditions, the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of marriage freedom, the
irrational methods of implementation, and, most of all, the contradiction between the
radical nature of the regulations themselves and the conservative social realities on the
ground in China. Although the focus of the CCP’s marriage reform would gradually turn
from a dogmatic pursuit of Engels’ anarchic marriage freedom to a reserved rejection of
the arranged marriage system, the marriage question would remain contentious for years
after the reforms were implemented.
According to the official histories of the PRC, as the prime successor to the May 4th
revolutionary spirit, the CCP made the greatest contribution to the modernization of
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Chinese marriage through its women's liberation, progressive marriage legislation, and
free-marriage promulgation campaigns. However, in practice there was always a
perceivable gap between progressive ideals and conservative realities. The CCP swore in
every piece of its marriage-focused propaganda to completely overthrow the 'feudal
arranged marriage system' and to give people in general, and women in particular, the
freedom to love and marry. In its mass line practice, however, the Party had to make
compromises with the old system that was deeply rooted in Chinese society by exercising
constant restraint on the individual’s marriage freedom.
To fill the gap between ideal and practice, and to balance the interests of the individual
with those of the masses, the Party re-interpreted the ideal model of “revolutionary
marriage” into one that demanded people’s unconditional submission to the Party’s
arrangement of their love and marriage for the sake of the Communist revolution. After
1949, in the process of establishing a socialist society, the “revolutionary marriage”
model expanded beyond the Party line to become a nationwide practice. The Party
organizations at all levels assumed the traditional role of family head in making marriage
initiations, negotiations and decisions. Marriage, at this point, was not simply a love bond
between two individuals, but also proof of one’s loyalty to the CCP, a sign of passion for
the socialist revolution, and finally, a method of social control that the Communist state
exerted to supervise people’s private lives.
This dissertation will explore the myth of “revolutionary marriage,” a popular and lasting
tradition of the CCP. The period under examination covers the first half of the twentieth
century, from the early 1900s when Chinese intellectuals started to feel the necessity to
reform Chinese marriage, to the 1950s when the revolutionary marriage practice became
an established nationwide social tradition. Through a comprehensive examination of the
theoretical sources, historical origin, social context, and practical applications of the
revolutionary marriage model, I will argue that rather than a static socialist project, this
model was actually a flexible social control program that was developed by its creators to
fit the context of a transitional China where the old traditions had been fundamentally
challenged and while new practices and customs were still under construction.

3

1.1 Approach, Methodology and Chapter Organization
Whether or not the CCP truly liberated Chinese women from their traditional social
inferiority has been an ongoing subject of controversy between Marxist historians and
feminist social scientists for decades. The Party’s marriage politics have been among the
most intensely contested topics in this debate. Few of the many articles and books
dedicated to this topic, however, have gone beyond the official policies, laws and
campaigns to consider the CCP’s day-to-day marriage practices. In neglecting this basic
indicator of the Party’s real attitude towards women, the scholarship examining this
question has never been able to establish an effective interpretation of the contradiction
between the CCP’s policies and its practices regarding women.
This dissertation will address this deficiency by providing a workable model of the
Party’s regular marriage practice through an examination of revolutionary marriage as
being a flexible synthesis of socialist doctrines, feminist ideals, CCP mass line
experiences, and Confucian values. As a vital component of the CCP’s marriage politics,
which had been practiced on a daily basis for several decades, this model was employed
by party officials in order to reconcile the contradiction between the Party’s interests and
the need of each individual woman. On the one hand, the policy theoretically recognized
women as independent, free, individual and equal in terms of the Communist revolution
and economic production. On the other hand, it strategically convinced women that the
paramount qualification of a communist revolutionary was to obey absolutely the Party’s
direction, even when it was regarding matters as private as love and marriage. The
question I seek to answer in this dissertation is how the CCP’s marriage practice was
shaped by Confucian family values, socialist doctrines, and feminist ideals, as well as the
Party’s wartime requirements and experiences. In short, I will consider how marriage was
shaped by the contemporary social context; how these values were interpreted in the
CCP’s discourse; how they were understood, received and practiced in people’s daily
lives; and most of all, how Chinese women’s lives were influenced by the CCP’s
marriage politics.
What distinguishes my approach from previous contributions to the field is that instead of
focusing on the CCP’s marriage legislation and campaigns I will pay more attention to
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the influences of traditional marriage politics on these policies. While tradition is
frequently mentioned in the literature as a part of the background to Chinese marriage
modernization, this study treats tradition as essential to understanding the puzzle of CCP
social reform. On this basis, I will provide a critical discussion of the social context that
created the CCP’s paradoxical attitude towards women and marriage reform. Compared
to the imported socialist doctrines and feminist ideals, the indigenous Confucian
traditions were much more flexible and adaptive. Although the Chinese Communists
intended to completely destroy Chinese social traditions and replace them with the
socialist models within a relatively short period of time, their efforts inevitably led to a
hybrid society that transformed itself to fit in the CCP’s ideal.
Susan Mann suggests that the conventional framework of history needs to be transformed
or even destroyed by bringing women into history for “shifts in gender relations located
carefully in time and space.”1 In the case of China, this transformation is particularly
necessary because it is only by removing the clear-cut boundary between old and new,
traditional and modern, conservative and progressive that we can begin to understand
Chinese women. Helen Young came to this perception through her interviews with the
female survivors of the Long March:
When women are mentioned in standard histories, the usual focus is on the
suffering of the women. However, the women interviewed did not view
themselves as victims but believed that their work on the Long March was
essential. The work they did was the meat of their own stories, a substantial
part of the broader history.2
Following Young’s insight, this study will endeavor to understand revolutionary brides as
they understood themselves. They were neither a small group of radical revolutionary
heroines, in an endless devoted pursuit of Chinese people’s liberation, nor were they
suffering masses, passively waiting to be saved and liberated. Rather, as described by
Ding Ling in 1942, they were lively human beings:

1

Susan Mann, Precious Records: Women in China’s Long Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1997), 8.
2
Helen Praeger Young, Choosing Revolution: Chinese Women Soldiers on the Long March (Urbana &Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2001), 160.
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Women are incapable of transcending the age they live in, of being perfect, or of
being hard as steel…they are incapable of resisting all the temptations of society
or all the silent oppression they suffer…They each have their own past written
in blood and tears, they have experienced great emotions—in elation as in
depression, whether engaged in the lone battle of life or drawn into the
humdrum stream of life.3
This paper contains seven parts. The introduction presents the key issues and conceptual
framework of the piece. Chapter 2 provides an overview of pre-modern Chinese marriage
politics, and the Confucian values by which they were influenced. In Chapter 3, I
examine the marriage revolution launched by the May Fourth radicals in the 1920s and its
impact on Chinese marriage thinking. The focus of Chapter 4 is the CCP’s marriage
policies during the Great Revolution and the Jiangxi Soviet (from mid 1920s to early
1930s) and Chinese Communists’ early efforts to reform Chinese marriage along the
socialist ideal. The CCP’s marriage policies and practices during the Yan’an period (from
late 1930s to 1949) is the focus of Chapter 5, with special attention on the “red love
stories” that demonstrate how the “revolutionary marriage” model had developed into a
fixed Party tradition. Chapter 6 explores how the “revolutionary marriage” evolved into a
nationwide tradition of Communist China through the example of the Marriage Law of
1950. The Conclusion includes a brief review of the theme of each chapter, and an
extended analysis on the paradox of the CCP’s marriage policy and practice.

1.2 Previous Scholarship on the CCP’s Marriage Politics
Few books and articles published in the People's Republic of China (PRC) before the
1990s are dedicated in their entirety to the study of CCP’s marriage politics. Most
marriage discussions are embedded in more encompassing studies of the history of
Chinese women’s liberation, a subject that had been dominated by the official discourse
of the CCP even before the PRC was founded.
The Chinese-language sources written before the 1990s, in the perception of some
Western scholars, “were often concerned less with historical fact than with reflecting

3

Ding Ling, “Thought on March 8”, originally in Jiefang ribao (March 9, 1942), translated in New Left Review I/92,
July-August 1975, 102-105: 104.
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current Communist Party decisions on how the past should be viewed.”4 Marxist
historians, strictly constrained within the prefigured “base-superstructure” framework
provided by Marxist historical materialism, pursued Friedrich Engels’ assertion that “the
emancipation of woman will only be possible when woman can take part in production
on a large, social scale” as an indisputable truth. 5 They universally present the process of
women’s liberation in the form of a history of the women’s movement for economic
independence and equal participation in production: “social class was the ultimate source
of exploitation, and the oppression of women was defined as a problem of social class.
With the success of the Communist revolution and the founding of the PRC in 1949,
leaders assumed that the end of class oppression had also liberated women.”6 In this
construction, women, as a whole, are removed from their gender characteristics, and
treated as merely another exploited group or a potential revolutionary force, which shared
men’s desire, purpose and enthusiasm for the socialist revolution. In this history, there are
more than a few discussions on the CCP’s marriage politics, but they seldom go beyond
the scope of how the Party’s women’s policies, marriage legislation and promulgation
campaigns contributed to liberate women from their traditional burdens of marriage.7
In recent years, as the academic atmosphere in China has become increasingly open,
many Chinese scholars have begun to study the transition of Chinese marriage.8 They
have carefully chronicled every significant change in Chinese marriage institutions since

4
5

6

7

8

Lily Xiao Hong Lee and Sue Wiles, Women of the Long March (Allen& Unwin, 1999), xii.
Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: International Publishers,
1972), 148.
Susan Brownwell and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “The Gender of Rebels”, in Chinese Femininities, Chinese
Masculinities, eds. Brownwell and Wasserstrom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 251.
Zhongguo funü yundong shi 中国妇女运动史 [History on Chinese Women’s Movement in the New Democratic
Era], ed. All-China Women’s Federation (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1989). Also see Liu Jucai 刘巨才, Zhongguo
jindai funü yundong shi 中国近代妇女运动史 [The History of Chinese Modern Women’s Movement](Beijing:
Zhongguo funü chubanshe, 1989).
For example, Fan Jing 樊静, Zhongguo hunyin de lishi yu xianzhuang 中国婚姻的历史与现状 [Past and present of
marriage in China](Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1990); Liu Xinping 刘新平, Bainianshishang:
hunyinzhongguo 百年时尚：婚姻中国[Marriage in China, 1900-2000] (Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe,
2002); Zhang Xipo 张希坡, Zhongguo hunyin lifa shi 中国婚姻立法史 [History of Chinese Marriage Law](Beijing:
Renmin chubanshe, 2004); Chen, Zhongyi 陈重伊, Zhongguo hunyi jiating feichang liebian 中国婚姻家庭非常裂
变[Transition of Chinese marriage and family](Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2005); Wang Xinyu 王新宇,
Minguo shiqi hunyinfa jindaihua yanjiu 民国时期婚姻法近代化研究[Modernization of the Marriage Law of
Republican China](Beijing: Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 2006); Zhang, Zhiyong 张志永, Hunyin zhidu cong
chuantong dao xiandai de guodu 婚姻制度从传统到现代的过渡 [From Traditional Marriage to Modern
Marriage](Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006).
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the mid-nineteenth century, and have examined these changes from various perspectives
with constant references to non-traditional sources such as popular magazines,
advertisements, posters, and oral histories. Unfortunately, few of these contributions have
included a specific discussion of the Communist Party-State’s daily marriage practice.
Most of these approaches continue to adhere to the narrative of the official history,
presenting change as a simple, linear process of modernization. In these works, the CCP
was continuously portrayed as a brand-new political group that had completely broken
with traditional China and, thus, maintained its image as the greatest contributor to
Chinese marriage’s modernization. The obstinacy of the old traditions and the
difficulties of marriage reform were recognized to a certain extent in these studies, but
the problems are identified as a temporary phenomenon that, like the issue of liberation
for Chinese women, had gradually disappeared upon the completion of the economic
transition in China from self-sufficient peasant economy to a socialist, state-operated and
collective economy.9 This kind of universal, linear narrative might easily create “a
predetermined history”, as Christian de Pee insightfully perceived: “Under the historian’s
gaze it disintegrates into a collection of data that are held together only by the historian’s
preconceived framework, which also gives them meaning.”10
In 2001, a high-rating TV series called Jiqing ranshao de suiyue 激情燃烧的岁月 [Years
of Passion on Burning] generated specific public interest towards “the revolutionary
marriage” by portraying a “red marriage” story of a commander of the People’s
Liberation Army and his reluctant young wife. Since then, a number of publications have
told the love and marriage stories of the CCP’s leaders, generals and common soldiers at
various stages of the party's history.11 However, most of these works were published in

9

Zhang Zhiyong, 2.
Christian de Pee, The Writing of Weddings in Middle-Period China: Text and Ritual Practice in the Eighth through
Fourteenth Centuries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 14-15.
11
For example, Huang Renke 黄仁柯, Luyi ren: hongse yishujia men 鲁艺人——红色艺术家们 [The Red Artists in
Lu Xun Art and Literature Institute](Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2001); Yang Wenyu 杨闻
宇 and Ma Xiaoxiao 马萧萧, Hongse Hunyin Dang’an 红色婚姻档案 I, II [The Archives of Red Marriage Vol. 1,
2]( Beijing: Kunlun chubanshe, 2005); Kong Qingdong 孔庆东, “Shida yuanshuai de qingyuan”十大元帅的情缘
[Love stories of the Ten Marshals],in Kong Qingdong, Kuaizhi yingxiong 脍炙英雄[Heroes in Praise] (Beijing:
Chang’an chubanshe, 2009), 212-270 Li Bing 李兵, Junhun liebian 军婚裂变[Military Marriage] (Wuchang:
Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 1993); Lu Yiping 卢一萍, Huangyuan shang de diyidai muqin: Baqian xiangnü shang
10

8

the form of popular literature and lack the foundations of serious academic research.
Under the label of “arranged free love”, these stories of revolutionary marriage were
typically told in a romanticized “hero and beauty” pattern: the educated young urban
beauty falls in love with the brave Communist hero, whom she respects and admires
regardless of any discrepancy in their ages, education level, or cultural background.12
Reluctance and coercion as motivations for the union were either denied entirely or
consciously ignored by most contributors so as to avoid sensitive topics that might attract
unnecessary official attention.
In general, stories of revolutionary marriage are largely beyond the focus of academic
historians of the PRC. On the one hand, the CCP official discourse still dominates
Chinese academia, which therefore excludes any study detached too far from the theme
of “anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism”, not to mention any approach that dares to
question the Party’s established policies. On the other hand, for scholars who are living in
the Danwei 单位[Work Unit] system, the Party’s interference in people’s private lives
has become so common a routine that their research has lost any significance.13
Since the mid-1970s, the dominance of official discourse in the field of Chinese women’s
studies began to face challenges from feminist scholars. These researchers were eager to
question the validity of the Marxist historians’ conclusion that Chinese women’s
liberation was a victory of the CCP’s social reforms. However, it was not until the 1990s
that the local archival sources and oral histories became accessible to Western
researchers. Before then, most contributors had to build their research based primarily on
the official publications of the PRC. The insufficiency of this available data on Chinese

tianshan 荒原上的第一代母亲：八千湘女上天山 [First mothers on the wasteland: Stories About the Eight
Thousand Hunan women on the Tianshan Mountain](Beijing: Shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 2006).
12
Chen Zhongyi, 153-155.
13
Officially, any marriage must be registered and approved in the government marriage registration office. This office,
however, apparently relies almost entirely on approval by the couple’s respective danwei leaders. Applicants without
such approval will not be registered for marriage. See G.Henderson, and M. Cohen, The Chinese Hospital: A
Socialist Work Unit (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 43. Also see Martin King Whyte and William L.
Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 113. About the
Danwei system, see Lü Xiaobo and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., Danwei: the changing Chinese workplace in historical
and comparative perspective (New York: M.E. Sharpe: An East Gate Book, 1997).
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popular society inevitably led to a theoretical paradox: on the one hand, through
examining the CCP’s and governmental archival documents, researchers had to
acknowledge the fact that Chinese communists had done considerable work toward
liberating women and that Chinese women were enjoying a high rate of economic
independence; on the other hand, their personal experiences told them that gender
inequality still permeated every corner of Communist China.
In the past three decades, many research contributions have tried to interpret this paradox
and, as an indispensable part of the Party’s policy towards women, CCP marriage politics
have received unprecedented academic attention. However, few of these contributors go
beyond a general discussion of the CCP’s marriage laws, regulations and promulgation
campaigns to present a critical examination to the CCP’s daily marriage practice. Some
assert from a feminist viewpoint that it is impossible for the CCP to achieve real gender
equality because it is fundamentally a patriarchal organization and is a beneficiary of
women’s subjection.14 Alternatively, others agree with the Marxist theory that real gender
equality for the CCP is an unfinished mission, to be gradually obtained by consistently
encouraging women’s participation in production.15
Although these approaches are faced with certain limitations, they are nonetheless
invaluable to the study of the revolutionary marriage model. An articulation between
Chinese feminism and the CCP’s socialist revolution was first established by those
contributors who built their research primarily on the PRC’s official publications in the
1960s and 1970s. The CCP’s policies on women were variously interpreted in these
works as a synthesis of feminism and socialism, a way to incorporate women’s liberation
into the CCP’s revolutionary and reforming agenda, or as a workable expediency for the
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wartime need to attract more support from peasants. For example, Delia Davin pointed
out that there had been two parallel tendencies in the modern Chinese women’s
movement: the narrow feminist tendency, which concentrated on the struggle for
women’s rights in the belief that true equality was possible without a revolution of the
whole social system; and the socialist tendency, which held that women’s liberation
could only be achieved under socialism and therefore further revolutionary activity was
necessary. It was during the Jiangxi Soviet period (1931-1934) and Yan’an period (19371949) that the feminist approach gradually accomplished its transition toward the
socialist approach. Davin suggested that these periods served as “a laboratory”, arguing
that the social change and experiments that took place there were later to determine the
course of Chinese women’s history.16
This opinion was soon developed by feminist scholars, who identified Chinese
nationalism as the articulating point between Chinese feminism and socialism. In
Elisabeth Croll’s 1978 examination of Chinese feminism, she argued that feminism in
China had never been considered and practiced independently in the same manner as it
had in the Western world. Rather, it emerged initially with Chinese nationalism and
patriotism and then became synthesized with the socialism advocated by Chinese
communists.17 This point was developed by Gilmartin in her 1995 contribution to the
examination of early CCP gender relations. She suggested that the initial Chinese
Communists who emerged from the May Fourth movement were intellectually
predisposed towards feminism. They considered women’s emancipation to be “an
essential component of the revolutionary endeavor to create a modern Chinese nationstate.”18
The CCP is often portrayed by Marxist historians as a brand-new political group, without
any relation to pre-revolutionary China. The party policies, reforming agenda and
practices are all labeled by this group as socialist or communist, all sharing the ultimate
goal of overthrowing traditions and the ‘old ways’. There are no distinctions made
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between the policies of Soviet Russia and other communist parties. However, a sound
articulation between Confucianism and Chinese socialism was recognized by those
radical feminist contributors who presented feminism and socialism as two adverse
approaches. For instance, both Kay-Ann Johnson and Judith Stacey considered the
serious “Confucian family crisis” that emerged in the last years of the Qing dynasty to be
a direct inducement to social vicissitude in the early twentieth century. It is from this
family crisis, according to Johnson, that the earliest Chinese Communists envisioned the
eventual creation of a modern, secularized and relatively egalitarian family system that
would shed many of its functions through the socialist transformation of society.19 The
Chinese women’s movement, Johnson and Stacey argue, was initially a feminist
collective action against the patriarchal repression of the Confucian social system. Its
transition from the feminist movement into the socialist movement was actually a
submission of Chinese feminism to the CCP’s inborn patriarchal tendency, an
unconquerable legacy of Confucian society. A more insightful connection between the
Chinese communists and the Confucian society’s patriarchal nature was offered by
Christina Gilmartin; she pointed out that the CCP was never a typical communist party in
the strict sense, but was rather a political force that emerged from traditional Chinese
society with inerasable patriarchal marks. However, these feminist discourses have one
fundamental flaw in common: by applying gender equality as a universal standard by
which to judge Chinese women’s liberation, they failed to distinguish Chinese women’s
culture and history from that of their European and North American sisters, and
consequently more or less ignored Chinese women’s special requirements for
emancipation.
While considerable academic progress has been made in the field of Chinese women’s
liberation since the 1980s, and despite the fact that Chinese society and historical
resources have became more accessible to the public, the topic of the revolutionary
marriage has still largely been left untouched by academia. The reason for this oversight
is simple: for those living and working outside the PRC, revolutionary marriage was
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completely an “inside story”, generally unknown to those having limited familiarity with
Chinese daily life and popular culture.
In 1981, Elisabeth Croll's Politics of Marriage in Contemporary China presented a
critical socioeconomic examination of the impact of the 1950 Marriage Law on Chinese
marriage patterns in both rural and urban China.20 Based on a prodigious number of
documentary materials, and her limited fieldwork experience in 1977, Croll perceived
that most Chinese marriages, even after the promulgation of the 1950’s Marriage Law,
were still of an intermediate variety: the marrying couple and their parents shared control
and negotiated a compromise between arranged and free-choice marriages, and the terms
of this compromise differed markedly between rural and urban families.21 However, since
Croll’s focus was to examine how parental order retreated from the marriage-decision
making procedure, her discussion on how the Communist state officially interfered with
individual’s marriage was limited to the marriage registration procedure, and the political
associations’ assistance for those facing parental obstruction or intervention.
The discussions on the post-1949 marriage registration were further elaborated on in
studies of the danwei system.22 Through their personal experiences, or the experiences of
their Chinese acquaintances, these contributors discovered a hidden truth about
contemporary Chinese marriage - the consummation of a marriage seemed to rely almost
entirely upon the approval of the couple’s respective danwei leaders. Although approval
was generally forthcoming (excepting when the people were considered too young, or
when one was in some way politically suspect), those without such approval could not be
registered for marriage.23 Circumscribed within the post-1949 period, the researchers of
the danwei system were limited to simple descriptions of the danwei’s mechanism in
terms of marriage control, despite the fact that the “revolutionary marriage model” as a
social control program had started long before the establishment of the danwei system.
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In the mid-late 1990s, the field of Chinese women’s studies saw a significant evolution of
its epistemology and methodology. More and more scholars came to learn that bringing
women into history required that the conventional framework of the discipline needed to
be transformed, or even destroyed, in order to account for “shifts in gender relations
located carefully in time and space”.24 This recognition led to a series of publications
based on the oral historical sources of the female survivors of the 1934 Long March. In
1999, Lily Xiao Hong Lee and Sue Wiles, utilizing exhaustive textual research, published
the remarkable life stories of thirty of the veterans remaining from the two thousand
women soldiers who set out on the Long March.25 In 2001, Helen Praeger Young made a
path-breaking contribution to this topic by presenting the oral histories of twenty-two
female survivors of the Long March.26 By mostly using the veterans’ own words, Young
succeeded in providing the reader with a significant wealth of material about the women
soldiers’ day-to-day lives. It was from the unvarnished image of the significant gulf
between boys and girls, and the examples of individuality in a communal culture,
uncovered by these studies that the Western scholars began to understand the
revolutionary marriage. Unfortunately, neither Lee nor Young focused on marriage as a
subject itself. Instead, they endeavored to break the limits of linear time and space, and
to deliver the relatively complete and real-life experience of each woman without
becoming involved in the ongoing intensive debate between the Marxist and feminist
academia over the CCP’s women’s policies. As Lee and Wiles claimed at the beginning
of their work:
We must make clear at the outset, however, that our motivation to write this
book came not from a desire to defend the Communist Party’s claims of gender
equality, which many Westerners have viewed with considerable cynicism.
Rather, we are motivated by an admiration for those thirty young women of the
Long March…who retained a lifelong commitment to their ideals despite the
disappointments, and sometimes betrayals, of reality.27
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In sum, over the past three decades, rapid progress has been accomplished on the history
of Chinese women’s liberation in both China and North America. There have been many
debates surrounding the CCP’s marriage reform efforts among the scholars of Marxist,
feminist and socialist feminist schools, all of them are striving to make their own
interpretations accepted as universal and objective. Limited by the clear-cut boundary of
“modern”, however, few serious academic efforts have been made to examine the
continuity of Confucian values in post-revolutionary China and the unique problems that
derive from its legacy. Consequently, this neglect has led to a general failure in the
literature to contextualize the contradictions inherent in the CCP’s policy that is
exemplified by the confused revolutionary marriage pattern. Focusing on women’s
economic and political transition in the modern era only, the Marxist and socialist
feminist scholars have consciously or unconsciously ignored the fact that traditional
values still largely shaped Chinese marriage and gender identities. Using solely the
modern concept of gender equality to judge Chinese society, the radical feminist
contributors cannot help but lose sight of Chinese women’s special requirements for
emancipation. Moving beyond these studies, my dissertation seeks to uncover the
common ground among the Marxist, feminist and socialist feminist discourses, and to
shed new light on the role that the CCP played in Chinese women’s liberation.

1.3 About the Major Sources
The primary sources of this paper can be divided into three categories: the Confucian
classics and related literature; the CCP’s official documents and archival sources; and
unconventional sources, including interviews and popular writing.
The first category serves to examine traditional Chinese marriage politics and their
lasting impact on Chinese society. Since marriage legislation and practices in pre-modern
China closely followed the theoretical guidance of the Confucian ethics, I refer to the
Confucian classics such as Liji 礼记 [The Book of Rites], as well as various interpretative
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literature and dynastic legal codes concerning marriage and family.28 I also examine
popular literature, including personal diaries, travelogues, essays, poems and novels as
more personal records of these marriage customs and practices. The second category
contains the published and archival sources about the CCP’s official policies, legislations,
promulgation campaigns and practices regarding women and marriage. Some of these
resources are published, but others are archival documents only circulated within the
party or administrative organizations like the All China Women’s Federation. The
sources in the third category I have mainly used to explore the real practice of the
revolutionary marriage model. This group includes the following three types of sources:
1) Interviews.
Since China has presently entered a more open era, many revolutionary brides are now
more willing to talk about their marriages and lives. This is especially true in cases
where their powerful and much older husbands have passed away, or when the brides
themselves began to reside outside of China. These interviews are an important part of
my research. From May 2007 to December 2008, I held interviews with ten individuals
who were either revolutionary brides themselves, or were friends or relatives of such
women and who therefore had first-hand knowledge of this issue. Considering China’s
political atmosphere and social customs, all of these interviews were held in an informal
and unstructured way at the subjects’ own homes or by telephone. Such care was needed
in order to best relieve the interviewee’s emotional pressure or to avoid the awkwardness
that someone from the senior generation might feel when talking about their love stories
face to face with someone from the younger generation.
All the interviewees appeared very cooperative in telling their life stories and answering
my questions. Although they unexceptionally depicted their marriage as a happy success,
I could still sense the uneasenss and reserve behind their passionate narratives. For
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instant, one of my interviewee became very emotional when telling me about how she got
married to her husband who was a high-rank PLA [People’s Liberation Army] officer and
eleven years her senior, only six days after their first encounter in the Korean front. But
she insisted this marriage was her own choice, and depicted her husband as a very gentle
man and a good father despite her daughter (whom I interviewed later in 2007) said
29

something very different. To certain extent, I believe, it is an inevitable outcome of the
Communist China’s constant political movements and brainwash programs. The people
who survived the Cultural Revolution had learned to trust nobody, and to keep their
hearts, minds and tongues consistent with the CCP’s official discourse.
2) First-hand literature.
In the official documents, both published and unpublished, the love and marriages of
CCP leaders and generals are seldom mentioned, due to its private nature. It is in the
memoirs and biographies of the party leaders and the women veterans that these stories
are more commonly found. The other important written sources in this category are firsthand accounts of events, both in English and in Chinese. The English sources are
primarily the publications of the American journalists who visited China at different
periods, such as Helen Foster Snow’s Inside Red China (1939), Harrison Forman’s
Report from Red China (1945), Anna Louise Strong’s The Chinese Conquer China
(1949) and various others.30 The Chinese-language sources are more varied in type and
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include journals, social investigations, contemporary opinion pieces, and personal
writings.31
3) Media sources.
Although revolutionary marriage couples and their lives have not provoked much
scholarly attention, it has been a favorite theme in popular culture since the early 2000s.
Stories of revolutionary families are told in films, TV series and live interviews and serve
mostly as nostalgia for the early years of the CCP’s rule, when there were fewer divorces
and extra-marital affairs.32 This interest in the revolutionary marriage on screen, and the
widespread public attention and commentary evoked by this boom sheds great light not
only on what happened in a revolutionary marriage, but also why it happened and why it
has become a question for Chinese people today.
As for secondary sources, I must acknowledge my great debt to both the Chinese and
Western scholarship on Chinese women and their liberation. In addition to the broad
perspectives, innovative research methods, and valuable insights that have emerged from
previous academic contributions, the oral memories of the senior CCP members, and the
archival sources these approaches have brought to light through exhaustive fieldwork
have all been especially valuable to my own approach The CCP’s marriage practice, as
revealed by the revolutionary marriage pattern, is a hybrid of Confucian ethics, feminist
ideals, and a communist project of social control, all aimed at articulating the gap
between progressive ideals and conservative social realities, which occurred during a
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transitional period when old traditions started to collapse even as the new ones were
under construction.
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Chapter 2

2

Making a Traditional Marriage

Traditionally, Chinese people married through the arrangement of their parents or family
head and via the recommendation of a matchmaker. Before the mid-twentieth century,
when the vast majority of the Chinese population came to recognize and accept the
modern concept of marriage freedom, this traditional system was the only marriage
pattern known to Chinese society. This chapter seeks to provide an overview of
traditional Chinese marriage politics from which the so-called “revolutionary marriage
model” found its origin.
The arranged marriage system started to take its form during the Shang (1600 BC - 1050
BC) and Zhou dynasties (1050 – 221BC).1 During the Han period (206 BC-220 AD), the
system was universally systemized and customized in accordance with Confucian norms.
As a result of the growing official preference for Confucianism in subsequent dynasties,
marriage law became an indispensable section of the dynastic legal codes that followed,
with stipulations that sought to legitimize parental manipulation of marriages in
accordance with filial piety, and to guarantee conformity to the Confucian doctrine of
marriage and family. Numerous ritual instructions, virtue lessons and legal texts were
also created by Confucian legal minds with the ultimate goal of ethically regulating the
status and gender roles of their subject populations. 2
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However, in China there has usually been a gap between custom and law. The dynastic
state consistently attempted to impose a marriage morality on its people that was in
keeping with the Confucian ideal of harmony. In reality, when a marital decision was
made, the utilitarian considerations for a marriage of convenience usually ran counter to
the moral model described in the official discourse. This tendency was furthered by
another fact: subject to the interest of the patriarchal family, rather than that of the
individual, the mate-selection procedure under the arranged marriage system often
excluded the participation of the principal parties, and was seldom propitious to free
choice, love, and courtship.
Through examining the marital ethics described in the Confucian classics, and the general
marriage mechanism of pre-modern China, this chapter identifies the traditional Chinese
marriage practice as a compromise between Confucian-oriented official discourse and the
temporary interest-driven social reality. In this particular case, the dynastic legal code
served to effectively maintain a balance between law and custom. Similar compromises,
as I will demonstrate in later chapters, were constantly made by the marriage reformers or
revolutionaries between the progressive marriage ideals they were pursuing and the
ingrained social customs they were incapable of eradicating, even long after the arranged
marriage institution was theoretically and legally abolished.

2.1 Marriage and Matrimony
Marriage is called “hunyin”婚姻 in Chinese.3 The various Confucian ethics and ritual
textbooks broadly define this term in several ways.4 Literally, it can mean 1) the wedding
ceremony or “liu li” 六礼 [the six rites of matrimony], a series of ritual procedures by
which men and women get married; 2) the married couple, with “hun”婚 for groom and
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“yin”姻 for bride;5 3) or the affinities of the bride and groom.6 These official
interpretations stated the fundamental duties that a marriage should deliver: to legitimize
sexual relations between male and female, to define the proper biological and social role
of man and woman, and to demonstrate the proper relations between individuals, families
and the state.
The Liji 礼记 [Book of Rites], the ritualistic classic composed in the Han period and
consistently followed by subsequent dynasties, identified the marriage ceremony as the
“root of the other ceremonial observances,” which served to “establish the distinction to
be observed between man and woman, and the righteousness to be maintained between
husband and wife. From the distinction between man and woman comes the
righteousness between husband and wife; from that righteousness comes the affection
between father and son; and from that affection, the rectitude between ruler and
minister.”7 A complete matrimonial procedure outlined in the work included six steps
known as “the six rites of matrimony” (liu li): nacai 纳采 [the proposal with its
accompanying gift], wenming 问名 [the inquiries about the (lady’s) name]，naji 纳吉
[the intimation of the approving divination]，nazheng 纳征[the receiving of special
offerings], qingqi 请期[the request to fix the day], qinying 亲迎 [the (groom) in person
fetching (the bride, bring her to his ancestral home)].8
This ceremonial procedure, however, as purposely designed for the aristocratic class [shi

士], was too complicated and expensive for the commoners to follow.9 Therefore, the
more common performance of the marriage ceremony was a simplification of this ideal.
During the Southern Song dynasty, the Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130-1200)
simplified the ancient six steps into three: nacai 纳采 [proposal], nabi 纳币 [offering and

5
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Ibid.
Chen Peng, 204-205.

22

receiving the betrothal gift] and qinying 亲迎 [fetching the bride].10 With minor variation,
these three steps remained basic features of the customary procedure for acquiring a wife
until the end of the imperial era.11
In her insightful study of traditional Chinese family rituals, Patricia Ebrey elaborates on
the distinctively Chinese mechanisms for achieving social and cultural cohesion:
In Confucian theory, ritual was seen as an alternative to force. People who
routinely performed proper rituals were expected to recognize their social and
ethical obligations and act on them. Yet power clearly entered into the
relationships of rituals, texts, and society. Power is an intrinsic aspect of ritual
itself.12
While simplified and varied in forms throughout dynastic China, the social and ethical
obligations delivered by the Confucian marriage ceremony remained identical: regulating
the natural urges of men and women within the framework of a wedding; distinguishing
the separation between man and woman with a highlighted role of go-between;
emphasizing filial piety with the parental will at the center; confirming the proper relation
of husband and wife within a household; and enforcing effective social control by linking
personal relationships to political order.

2.1.1

The Distinction to be observed between a Man and a
Woman: Sex and Marriage

Gender conception in the sexual orthodoxy of imperial China was derived from the
theory of yin and yang, or qian 乾 and kun 坤. These concepts are outlined in Yijing 易经
[The Classic of Changes]:
The movements of qian (yang) create the male, and the movements of kun (yin)
create the female…The function of the trigram qian is to take charge of the
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origination of the myriad things, and the function of the trigram kun is the
formation and maturity of the myriad things…The myriad things are propagated
when the seminal essence of the male is mixed with the blood of the female…the
relationship of husband and wife is possible only after there are male and
female.13
While sexual relations between male and female were recognized by thinkers as the
beginning of all human relations [renlun zhishi 人伦之始], the Confucian moralists
insisted that marriage is inevitable in the Way of humanity “because among the great
natural urges, there are none as great as those between male and female. The intercourse
between male and female is the beginning of human relations…thus the ritual of marriage
was established in order to emphasize human relations and broaden progeny.”14 Only
after the natural urges between male and female were regulated within the framework of
the Confucian sexual morality of li, could it serve to establish “the righteousness between
husband and wife.” The Liji argued that it is through the purity of this initial relationship
that all other righteousness derives: “from the distinction between man and woman comes
the righteousness between husband and wife; from that righteousness comes the affection
between father and son; and from that affection, the rectitude between ruler and
minister.”15 Expanding on this idea, the Song philosopher Cheng Yi (程颐 1033-1107)
added this annotation to the Yijing: “the sexual intercourse between man and woman
makes the relationship of husband and wife. It is from the relation of husband and wife
that all the other human relations originated”.16
In this sense, the greatest significance of a Chinese marriage ceremony was social in
nature and served to legitimately recognize the “righteousness” of a man and a woman’s
sexual relationship. Only through a marriage ceremony could people’s biological
identities be socially distinguished and recognized by society; only those sexual
relationships that had been sanctioned by the appropriate rites under the social identities
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of husband and wife could be legitimized.17 From this recognition evolved the most
fundamental conceptions of Chinese marriage, as outlined below:
1) Marriage is a virtual social imperative for all people. Every man must be a husband
and every woman a wife, while no one should be left single. Sommer suggests that “ to
be married was (and perhaps still is) the mark of social adulthood in China, and among
the poor peasantry marriage served as an important status symbol for men- one that could
only have gained in importance as the shortage of wives worsened.”18 When a man was
financially incapable of supporting a wife, he would possibly employ some irregular or
desperate marriage politics in order to find a wife and father a descendant. Sometimes,
the social pressure to marry forced an individual to pursue such alternate means, even at
the risk of breaking the law by leasing a temporary wife from the black market,19 at the
expense of his reputation by inheriting a wife from a deceased brother20 or by marrying
himself into his wife’s family as a zhui xu 赘婿 [married-in son-in-law].21
2) Under the tenets of Confucian sexual morality, sex and marriage are inseparable: all
acceptable sexual behavior should happen only within the boundaries of a legal marriage.
All extramarital sex (including pre-marriage sex between future spouses) was considered
illicit and banned. For instance, the Ming code stipulated that whoever commits
consensual illicit sex [he jian 和奸] shall be punished by eighty strokes by the staff. If the
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offending women have husbands, the penalty shall be ninety strokes.22 This article was
copied in full version by the Qing lawmakers.23 Such persistent and strong emphasis on
the illegitimacy of extramarital sex inevitably led to a long-lasting confusion between
marriage and sex, which continued across the borders of time and space into modern
China.24
3) Romantic love is not, and has never been a concern of the traditional marriage system.
Affection or love may be necessary for a respected couple, and it should be an outcome
of a successful marriage, but is in no way a prerequisite. In fact, even in the early
twentieth century “romantic love” was still an exotic conception for Chinese people. In
the Confucian morality of Li, the term “love”, or “ai”[爱] was most often used to
describe a moral sense of responsibility between superior and inferior, such as emperor
and vassal, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother or master
and servant.25 When it was used to describe the relationship between two lovers, like the
love affairs represented in fiction, the term was seldom platonic. Historian Olga Lang
commented that “love in old Chinese fiction is sexual love,” and suggested that the
conscious perpetuation of family line provided Chinese people “a more realistic attitude
toward the human body than Westerners. They do not conceal the physical aspects of
love. But love does not exalt them as it does people in the West, nor do they need a
romantic sublimation in order to accept it. The Chinese found an outlet for their feelings
and emotions in love of nature and friendship; romantic love plays a small role.”26

2.1.2

Righteousness between Husband and Wife: Familial Roles
of Men and Women

A marriage ceremony not only legitimized sexual relations between men and women, but
also highlighted the transition of their social roles from a son and a daughter into a
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husband and a wife, as well as into a son-in-law and a daughter-in-law. According to the
life schedule Confucians designed for the elite class, a man was expected to spend the
years before marriage learning in preparation for a career and attending sedulously to his
filial and fraternal duties. Before marriage, a man was not qualified to teach others even
he might become very learned because “his object being still to receive and not to give
out”. Only after he had a wife, he could begin to “attend to the business proper to a
man”.27 A woman was expected to cease going out (from the women’s apartments) at the
age of ten. The pre-marriage period for the elite female was a stage of training for
household duties. She should be taught (the arts of) pleasing speech and manners, to be
docile and obedient, to handle the hempen fibers, to deal with the cocoons, to weave silks
and form fillets, and to learn women’s work.28
For both men and women, the wedding served as a watershed of their childhood lives.
Only after getting married, could a man step out of the domestic sphere and lead his
public life. For a woman, the ceremony not only brought a residential transition from her
natal family to her spouse’s, but it also confirmed her inferiority and obedience to her
husband and her in-laws. For a woman, marriage was more important than it was for a
man, as it represented a life-long duty she could never escape. Based on her study of
traditional Chinese women’s common fate, Elizabeth Croll concludes: “Within the
secluded quarters of gentry women or in peasant and working households, girls were
reared and trained in anticipation of one single future–marriage. She was reminded that a
girl’s happiness, well-being and welfare depended on marriage and a successful marriage
at that; this was her future and her only future.”29 This destiny doomed most women to a
lifetime sentence, due to the fact that it was impossible for a wife to leave her husband.
The Liji taught people that “faithfulness is (specially) the virtue of a wife. Once mated
with her husband, all her life she will not change (her feeling of duty to him), and hence,
when the husband dies she will not marry (again).”30 Chinese historian Ban Gu 班固 (32-
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92 C.E.) expanded on this principle in Baihu tong 白虎通 [Comprehensive Discussion in
the White Tiger Hall], his official transcript based on a 79 C.E. imperial conference on
the Confucian classics. In it, he argued that “even if the husband’s behavior is evil, the
wife may not leave him, because there is no principle whereby Earth can leave Heaven.
Even if the husband is evil, she cannot leave him.”31 A wife had no legal grounds by
which she could legally leave her husband without proper cause, and from the Tang Code
through the Revised Law of the Late Qing period, there were provisions for criminal
sanctions against wives who did so. The customary law was even more conservative on
the issue of divorce, making it the unilateral privilege of the husband and his family. 32
Man’s domination over woman was interpreted by the Confucian ethicists in the theory
of yin and yang: “yin is lowly, and thus cannot act on its own initiative; one brings it into
contact with yang in order to perfect it as yang takes the lead; yin acts in concert. The
male acts; the female follows.”33 This gender inequality was highlighted in the six rites
of matrimony. The ceremony on the wedding day was especially aimed at establishing
the young wife in her position. From the moment the groom went in person to fetch the
bride, every move performed by the new couple illustrated their fixed gender roles in the
marriage:
The bridegroom himself stands by (the carriage of the bride), and hands to her the
strap (to assist her in mounting), showing his affection. Having that affection, he
seeks to bring her near to him. It was by such reverence and affection for their
wives that the ancient kings obtained the kingdom. In passing out from the great
gate (of her father’s house), he proceeds, and she follows, and with this the right
relation between husband and wife commences. The woman follows (and obeys)
the man: in her youth, she follows her father and elder brother; when married, she
follows her husband; when her husband is dead, she follows her son, ‘man’
denotes supporter. A man by his wisdom should (be able to) lead others.34
Accordingly, the fundamental purpose of positing a wife in her deferential obedience was
to secure internal harmony and thus to secure the long continuance of the family line.
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2.1.3

The Affection between Father and Son: Parental Order

In the Confucian family scheme, the paramount li is filial piety. In this concept, the
meanings of family relationships, duty and honor were all tied directly to the concept of
the patrilineal line, from father to son, son to grandson. Having no care for familial
posterity was considered one of the worst offences to correct filial behavior.35 The
greatest significance of a marriage, in this sense, is in how it served to consciously
perpetuate the family line. As the Liji described, “to secure the services in the ancestral
temple” and “to secure the continuance of the family line” were the ultimate goals of a
successful union.36 Marriage under the empire was an act performed by families, not by
individuals.
One of the most conspicuous expressions of the authority and affection of Chinese
parents was the privilege and duty of arranging marriages for their children. As Mencius
asserted: “when a man is born his parents hope he will find a wife; when a woman is born
her parents hope she will find a husband. All parents feel like this.”37 The arrangement of
a marriage was such a significant family matter that ideally all marriage decisions were
made using extra caution and discretion, and the old generation was worshipped for their
superior wisdom and experience on such matters.
Under the norm of filial piety, which required children’s absolute obedience to their
parents, sons and daughters had no right to refuse the life partners selected by their
parents or the acting family head. This rule was repeatedly reinforced by the dynastic
codes. For example, the Qing code says that marriage should be controlled by the parents
or the grandparents of those supposed to get married. Those who married on their own
would be punished under the charge of disobedience to parental instructions.38 A marital
decision, in the context of filial piety, was not a matter of love or an individual’s choice
of a life partner, but was rather an issue chiefly concerning obligations and
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responsibilities, obedience and disobedience. As Sommer perceives through his critical
examination of the legal cases of the Qing, “in China, marriage rites symbolized not the
free will of individual souls exercised before an omniscient God, but rather the
submission of maturing children to family roles and filial duty.”39
In traditional Chinese literature, there were many romantic love stories in which free love
secretly escaped parental control.40 In the tales, a young man (often a scholar or potential
candidate for the Civil Examinations) and a beautiful girl (often a daughter of a wealthy
or political powerful family) fell in love after a short encounter. With the help of a
servant, often a maiden of the bride, they exchanged love poems, letters and decorative
items, set secret dates in backyards, and even developed sexual relationships. The stories,
presented as tragedies, often ended with the betrayal of one party (usually the male) and
the death of the other. In those rarer examples with happy endings, such as Xixiang ji 西
厢记[Romance of the West Chamber], the two lovers, after a temporary period of
separation and suffering, would finally get their parents’ consent for marriage and live
happily ever after. Such narratives were so popular during the Ming and Qing period that
one might be easily misled into believing that free love was appreciated in pre-modern
China, if one’s opinion were based solely on such accounts.
This kind of story was often the creation of male writers making a living by producing
love fantasies. The readers of these works were mostly young single male scholars. There
were female readers of these stories, but not many. On the one hand, the official support
behind the cult of “women’s ignorance” and their almost universal illiteracy excluded
females from any significant reading group. On the other hand, for the educated elite
women who were literate, such stories were prohibited from their inner chambers, being
viewed by those in charge as vulgar, degrading and misleading. As Jiamu 贾母 [the
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dowager Lady Jia], a main character in Cao Xueqin's (曹雪芹 1724-1764) Honglou meng
红楼梦 [Dream of the Red Chamber] commented: “They abuse people's daughters in
every possible way, and then they still term them nice pretty girls. They're so concocted
that there's not even a semblance of truth in them.”41
Free love between two youths, no matter how fully it was felt by the two parties, could
never trump the parental authority in making a marriage contract. Sometimes, young men
and women were willing to let their parents know of someone they were attracted to as a
potential spouse. Without parental permission, however, this love match would be
blessed by neither law nor custom. Although some parents might consult with their
children, it was more a gesture of affection than a will to transfer filial rights. Education
instilling the spirit of obedience weighed so heavily upon the attitudes of the youth that
children in the early twentieth century were still lacking the courage to reject a marriage
imposed on them by their parents. As Tan Shih-hua, a college student in the 1920s
explained: “It was not in vain that since my babyhood I had been taught good manners by
my uncle, my grandmother, my teachers, and my mother, whose last words were: ‘Never
fight, Shih-hua.’”42
However, students in this field should keep in mind the fact that a parent’s authority in
arranging marriage was accepted by most children as a matter of course. In pre-modern
China, people were not taught to expect to gain love and happiness from marriage. The
goal of any official union was not for personal satisfaction but rather for the continuation
of the family and of the “stream of life.” Under the dual influence of social ethics and
legal jurisdiction, the attitude of children towards this power relationship was generally
not antagonistic. Coercion existed, but only in a few cases.43
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2.1.4

No Matchmaker, No Marriage

Gender separation is an important concept inherent in Confucian ethics. These teachings
demanded boys and girls be separated when they reached the age of seven, on the
understanding that sexual pleasure is one thing that men greatly desire and the natural
urges between male and female are unparalleled after the age of sexual maturity has been
reached.44 People believed “whenever there is licentiousness, it is produced from men
and women not being separated.”45 The ideal pro-marriage gender relation described in
the Liji was “male and female, without the intervention of the matchmaker, do not know
each other’s name.”46 Seeing as the main goal of a marriage for most people was to
produce pure-blooded descendants for ancestor worship, premarital sex and adultery were
considered especially heinous and a threat to the patrilineal family order. Thus, love
without a matchmaker’s interference was illicit under any circumstances. Mencius
suggested “those who do not wait for the command of their parents or the words of a
matchmaker--and instead bore holes through walls to peep at one another, and jump over
fences to run off together—are despised by parents and everyone else in their states.”47
The strict gender separation made the role of matchmaker so imperative that their words
carried import equal to that of the parents in making a marital decision. As Han
Confucians specified in Baihu Tong:
Why is it that males and females do not marry on their own initiative, but defer
to their parents and wait for a go-between? This is to avoid shame and hinder
licentiousness. It is said in the Odes: ‘How do we proceed in taking a wife?
Announcement must first be made to our parents. ’ It is also said: ‘How do we
proceed in taking a wife? Without a go-between it cannot be done’.48
Among the six steps of matrimony, divination was an essential part that decided whether
or not a match was blessed.49 In this way, marriage was viewed as a predestined match
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arranged by a yue lao 月老 [an old man under the moon], a divine matchmaker who tied
the feet of a future husband and wife with “the red cord”.50 This blessing would be
testified to by the matched shengchen bazi 生辰八字 [name and birth time of the two
parties], if their marriage was predestined. The real life matchmaker, who was also called
a go-between, performed a dual role as either ritual performer or marriage negotiator (and
sometimes both). Their duties included initiating a marital negotiation at the request of
the future groom’s parents, going between the two families for opinion exchanges,
helping to prepare and send betrothal gifts when the consent is obtained from the bride’s
parents (or the family head in charge), witnessing the signing of marriage documents,
arranging the wedding date and finally accompanying the groom to fetch his bride. With
full participation in the marriage arrangement, the matchmaker was expected to secure
the separation between man and woman before the wedding and to guarantee a marriage
that conformed to the principle of li and the statutes of law.
The matchmaker’s participation in marriage arrangement had been well-recognized as
early as the Western Zhou period (1100BC-771BC). The response to the question, “How
do we proceed in taking a wife? Without a go-between it cannot be done” from Shijing 诗
经 [The Book of Poetry] 51, illustrates how official positions were set to take charge of
people’s marriage from a very early period in Chinese history.52 Although mei as an
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official position disappeared from the court system following the Han dynasty, some
matchmakers were still required to officially register marriages, especially for those who
acted as go betweens for the royal families and upper social classes.53 The marriage of
commoners largely relied on the simei 私媒, the private matchmaker, who worked as a
go-between on either a full-time professional or part- time provisional basis.
Before the Tang dynasty, the necessity of a matchmaker in marriage was a social custom,
rather than a law. Still, as far as it was promoting ethics, the de facto marriage was
possibly still recognized with the considerations of the continuation of the ancestral line
and ensuring women’s chastity.54 As a result of growing official interests in
Confucianism from the Tang dynasty down to the end of the imperial era, the
participation of a proper matchmaker in making a marriage arrangement was
continuously codified in the dynastic law.55 Even when two families decided on a nuptial
match together, a go-between was needed for formal communication. A marriage
document signed without the presence and witness of a matchmaker was considered
illegitimate by law.56 In this kind of case, the matchmaker would be punished for the
unlawful marriage, along with the principal offenders, under the charge of misconduct.57
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The professional matchmaker, however, was often regarded as unreliable and
untrustworthy. Yuan Cai 袁采 (?-1195), a Song scholar and official, instructed parents
not to put too much credence in what the matchmakers said:
Matchmakers deceive the girl’s family by saying the boy does not seek a full
complement of dowry presents and in fact will help in outfitting the bride. They
deceive the boy’s family by promising generous transfer of goods, and they make
up a figure without any basis in fact. If the parties simply believe what the
matchmaker says and go through with the marriage, each side will accuse the
other of dishonesty and the husband and wife will quarrel. There are even cases
where the final result is divorce.58
It was only if a family could not find a good marriage prospect through personal
connections that they turned to a professional matchmaker and took his (or her) word as
equal to that of the parents, though the matchmakers were almost always described as
greedy profiteers who abused their position for personal gain.59 Until the Republican era,
anecdotes about deceptive matchmakers were still commonplace. One widespread
example was a sensational story of an over-forty-year-old tailor in Suzhou who paid more
than half of his property to a matchmaker who promised to find him a good-looking
young bride. It was only after fetching the bride to his home that this poor groom found
he had actually married a girl made of straw.60 The commonly perceived lack of
credibility of professional matchmakers made many families resort to relying on advice
from friends or relatives who volunteered to play the role themselves. They were always
the most reliable negotiators, who generally knew more about the conditions and
requirements of both families and sometimes even considered the intentions of the
principal marrying parties. In the last years of the Qing dynasty, for instance, it was said
that all the good marriages of the gentry families in the Jiangnan area were made by
matchmakers who were relatives of the brides. 61
Accordingly, considering that free and open cross-sex socialization was impossible or
unavailable to potential matches and that paramount importance was continuously placed
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on the perpetuation of the family line, the unions that a matchmaker made were seldom
based on affection, but rather on the relations of husband and wife. Anxious parents,
looking forward to having grandchildren have been a constant feature of Chinese society
from the earliest times. Therefore, the matchmaker as a social phenomenon instead of as
a profession, transcended time, space and political systems, and became one of the
deepest-rooted social customs in China.

2.2 The Love Bond of Two Families: Criteria and Choice
According to the ritual teaching of the Liji, an ideal marriage should seek to establish “a
bond of love between two families.”62 This goal made marriage decision-making an
occasion for thinking tactically and for balancing many considerations, a process which
involved much more complicated and utilitarian matters than the nature and behavior of
the bride and groom. While affectionate parents often saw themselves as choosing a good
spouse for their children, they had very different definitions from their children as to
what constituted an acceptable match. For the individual, acceptable could mean a
beautiful and virtuous wife, or an affectionate and handsome husband who could bring
marital happiness to the partner; for parents or the marriage-makers of a family, however,
acceptable matches should primarily come from “good families”, from whom they could
achieve political, social or financial benefits in the short or long term. Therefore, the
parents’ search for a talented son-in-law or a bride was naturally a search for a “good
family”.
What was a “good family”? The answer found in the original Confucian text is “a family
that possesses humanity and righteousness.”63 When put into practice, this standard
seems too ambiguous and oversimplified. A “good family” was a comprehensive,
inflexible and conditional conception, which was defined and re-defined constantly in
accordance with the immediate or long-term needs of the marital decision-makers at the
different social levels. In imperial China, where social and economic privileges, wealth
and honor were bound tightly with political power and social hierarchy, the search for a
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“good family” was often utilized by ambitious parents in order to seek improvements in
familial reputation and honor, potential political allies, career promotion or judiciary
protection.

2.2.1

Criteria of “Good People”

Sima Guang 司马光(1019-1086) suggested that people make a marital decision based on
the following grounds: “the first importance is to examine the nature and behavior of the
future bride and groom, as well as the family background of each side. Don’t only think
of the riches and honor.” 64 He argued that no one could predict whether or not a poor but
wise groom could develop his own riches and honor some day, nor could one assert that a
wealthy but arrogant bride might not become the root of a family’s decline. The purpose
of this instruction was to warn people not to be short-sighted in choosing spouses for
their children, and to take talent and virtue of the prospects into critical consideration.
The theoretical criteria for an individual “good spouse” were not as complicated as those
for a “good family.” As Ban Zhao 班昭 (45-117) suggested in her Nü Jie 女诫 [Lessons
for Women], “Man is honored for strength; a woman is beautiful on account of her
gentleness.”65 In general, the ideal bride’s first attraction to her husband and his family
should be her virtue, and then her working capability. She must be a perfect performer of
“San Cong Si De” 三从四德 or “the three obediences and the four virtues,”66 which
ensured that she would be a loyal wife, a wise mother, an obedient daughter-in-law, a
well-trained household manager, virtuous, decent, cautious with words, diligent at work,
and whole heartedly devoted to her husband and his family.67
In daily life, a woman’s obedience was especially appreciated. A good wife should first
recognize her inferiority to her husband, and thus make her husband feel respected and
admired. Obedience in Chinese women was such an attractive quality to men that it
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continued being the most attractive quality in a potential mate for men throughout the
pre-modern era. One man described how he indulged in this superior feeling over his
wife in the early twentieth century:
Accordingly among scholars I cut a poor figure. I am timid, and my voice plays
me false in gatherings of men. But to my footbound wife, confined for life to her
house, except when I bear her in my arms to her palanquin, my stride is heroic,
my voice is that of a roaring lion, my wisdom is of the sages. To her I am the
world; I am life itself.68
Another virtue Ban Zhao suggested was vital for a good wife is in being “middle”, which
she defined as never revealing personal emotions, especially feelings of love, which was
considered a sign of licentiousness:
If husband and wife have the habit of staying together, never leaving one
another, and following each other around within the limited space of their own
rooms, then they will lust after and take liberties with one another. From such
action improper language will arise between the two. This kind of discussion
may lead to licentiousness. But of licentiousness will be born a heart of
disrespect to the husband. Such a result comes from not knowing that one should
stay in one's proper place.69
As for physical appearance, according to Ban Zhao it theoretically should never be an
important consideration in making a marriage decision. It had been long a tradition of
Chinese literature to call beautiful women huoshui 祸水, or ‘the source of trouble.’ The
man who allowed himself to become emotionally involved with a beautiful woman was
often criticized as fatuous and lascivious. Outside of the official doctrine, however, a
woman’s appearance was very important. In fictional stories, a glance at a delicate young
beauty could be enough to make a man lose interest in anything beyond pursuing her. In
real life, being good looking was widely accepted as an advantage for any woman in
marriage negotiations.
Women’s education, however, was never a compulsory requirement due to a general
belief that ‘a woman without talent is a woman of virtue.’ Throughout the imperial era,
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the only works that women were permitted to read were virtue-teaching textbooks.70
While literate women were preferred partners among the elite circle, with the chief
consideration for their role as wise mothers, they were sometimes despised by those who
asserted that “it was easier for literary women to become the subjects of illicit
intercourse.”71
The ideal groom, in theory, should be close to the consummation of his Confucian
learning before the wedding. He would be expected to seek a career that could eventually
bring improved reputation, honor and wealth to his family. He should be a responsible
husband, a strict father, an obedient son, loyal follower of his supervisors, talented,
decent, upright, diligent and strong-minded.72 Many young women, knowing that
marriage was a lifelong commitment and that voicing grievances of an unhappy marriage
would easily gain one a bad reputation for disobedience, preferred to find a husband that
was known to them, such as cousins with different surnames or a boy from the same
neighborhood. For a daughter, marriage with a cousin or someone well known to her
family meant entering a network of women she knew, where her parents might continue
to use their kin relations to monitor her fate and protect her interests.73
Although daughters were often willing to let their parents know when they found
someone they were attracted to as a potential spouse, the divergence between child and
parents in defining “good people” was often sharp. The parents, in favor of hypergamy,
seldom asked whether their daughter would be personally disadvantaged by marrying
into a prominent family far away or by becoming the second wife of a man fifteen years
her senior. They believed that a marriage into a “good family” worked to the betterment
of both child and parents, regardless of the actual match itself. The bitterness of daughters
made miserable through such matches was heard now and then throughout pre-modern
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China. As Qiu Jin 秋瑾 (1875-1907) , the heroine of an anti-Manchu revolution,
numerated:
…when a girl reaches the marrying age, her marriage will be arranged simply
upon the word of two shameless matchmakers. The only concern [of her parents]
is whether the groom’s family is wealthy and powerful enough. [They] care
nothing about the family’s reputation, neither the groom’s personality nor his
education…a bride who unfortunately married a bad guy can do nothing, but
complain of her bad luck… 74

2.2.2

Matched Door: The Politicized Love Bond

In any period of Chinese history, the concept of “matched door” [mendanghudui 门当户
对] was always an indispensable element in making one’s family good enough to become
a marketable commodity. It was generally believed that the best matches could only come
from those families of similar background, property and socio-political status, which
ensured shared common ground and interests between the two families and the two
parties. However, like the definition of a “good family”, the parameters of the “matched
door” were never a fixed conception.
Before the Song dynasty, when the aristocratic elite class had unparalleled privileges in
every aspect of life, a family’s worth was most defined by its ancestry, which was closely
related to its blood and origins. Establishing a “matched family background” was
officially advocated at that time as “a marriage principle that was established by our
ancestors and should not be violated.”75 Marriage, like dresses, costumes, food and
decorations, was a mark of one’s social rank and taste. Studies of marriages from the late
Han to the Tang periods have shown that the highest-ranking families married within
their own ranks as much as possible, and used such marriages as markers of status.76
The enthusiasm for finding a potential family with matched noble-blooded ancestry
gradually faded after the Tang dynasty, when marriages between the old aristocratic
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families were consistently constricted. From the Song dynasty onward, individuals who
scored in the top percentile of the Imperial Examination, who accumulated reputation and
wealth through their official performance and merit, emerged as a new elite class. This
transition contributed to a fundamental change in marriage politics. In the Song and
subsequent dynastic context, a “good family” was defined more by official rank, political
reputation and economic power than by blood and origin. However, the concept of
“matched doors” was still popular among elite families, although ancestry had stopped
being a primary concern. This tradition continued until the end of the Qing dynasty. In
Wuyuan xianzhi 婺源县志 [Gazetteer of Wuyuan county] record keepers recorded that in
the Guangxu years (r.1875-1908), the gentry families in Jiangnian “emphasized ancestry,
ignored betrothal gifts and dowries…there was no luxurious wedding feast.”77
For ordinary people, the most symbolically desirable catch for one’s daughter was a
talented young man who had potential for doing well in the Civil Examination.
Conventionally, it was the duty of the groom’s family to initiate a marriage negotiation.
However, when the image of the ideal son-in-law transitioned from a man of noble blood
into a man who would rise to hold an important government office, the bride’s family
often took the lead in initiating a marriage proposal; this initiative was especially true
when the bride’s family had certain economic advantages over the groom’s. More than a
few stories were told about how a poor but intelligent scholar was fortuitously chosen to
become the son-in-law of a rich man. For instance, one such narrative was recorded in a
Qing short stories selection entitled San Yi Bi Tan 三异笔谈[Notes on the Strange
Stories]. In the tale, Wang Shiyu 王侍御, poor and without family lineage, was a private
teacher of a rich family of Yao. One night, the Yao master accidentally found that there
were two lanterns in front of Wang when he was walking alone in a field. The image of
two lanterns was regarded by Yao as a portent of a bright future, so the master
immediately sent his matchmaker to initiate a marriage negotiation with Wang’s uncle.
Although Yao’s proposal was declined at first due to the excuse of “unmatched doors,”
and attracted mockery from his neighbors, he persisted and finally won Wang as his son-
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in-law. Yao’s foresight was proved valid in later years by the fact that Wang succeeded in
the Civil Examination and became a high official as shiyu 侍御[imperial censor], which
led to the Wang family’s lasting prosperity.78
A perfectly matched marriage was often praised as “a beautiful bond of Qin and Jin”
[qinjinzhihao 秦晋之好]. This idiom was derived from a frequent martial alliance made
between the two states of Qin and Jin of the Eastern Zhou period.79 In fact, this saying
testified to the tenet that a perfect marriage was in the first place a political marriage that
managed to establish a love bond between two political groups. In the context of late
imperial China, highlighted by the constant bloody feuding between different political
factions, binding two groups through marriage was widely employed as a strategy by
ambitious politicians in order to cement allied powers. Marriages among the members of
a political clique became a precondition of the formation of such a clique and
subsequently a confirmation of political dependence among the clique members. As
Chinese historian Chen Peng concluded in his cornerstone work on Chinese traditional
marriage, “throughout China’s marriage history, most upper-level marriages, ranging
from royal family members to the scholar-official [shidafu 士大夫] class, were made on
political motives.”80
Certainly, not all families demanding “matched doors” were pursuing a marriage of
convenience. Many less ambitious parents were actually inclined to find prospects among
their existing relatives, such as the paternal sister’s children or maternal brother’s or
sister’s children, for sake of kinship expansion. Such marriages probably occurred at all
social levels. Both the Ming and Qing legal codes included an article that banned
marrying daughters of one’s own paternal aunts or the daughters of one’s maternal uncles
or aunts. In such cases, the punishment for violating the law was 80 strokes of the heavy
stick.81 However, disobedience of these laws was so common that the Qing government
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had to assent to a compromise. The Qing code includes a comment in the legal statute
next to this article instructing the local judges that “in dealing with the case of a marriage
between different-surname cousins, it is better to follow the common custom [and leave
the offenders unpunished]”.82
For affectionate parents, expecting happiness for their children, matching family
background and social status often indicated parallel education and economic conditions
that might constitute the common ground and interests of the two parties, which were
recognized as critical to a family’s harmony.

2.2.3

Monetary Marriage: The Commercialized Love Bond

The arranged marriage pattern is called “monetary marriage” [caihun 财婚] in many
sources due to the role economic concerns played in making a marriage contract. At the
ritual level, people were taught that “unless the marriage presents have been received,
there should be no communication or affection between [the two parties].”83 The
presentation of betrothal presents was then a universal practice that marked the final step
of the marriage negotiation. In general, the betrothal gift was considered more essential
than a dowry because it served as both proof of the credit of the groom’s family and also
as a bride price paid to the bride’s family as compensation for meeting the expense of her
upbringing and now losing her labor.
Confucian scholars always frowned at people’s natural greed, especially when talking of
marriage. For example, Sima Guang saw greediness for transient wealth and rank running
rampant among prospective parents-in-law and identified negotiating dowries as a
distinctly vulgar act. He criticized families for “treating their daughter as an item in a
sales transaction” by drawing up “a contract saying ‘such goods, in such numbers, such
goods, in such numbers,’” pointing out that “these were actually the methods used by
brokers dealing in male and female bondservants.”84 Unfortunately, for those parents
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with no long-term expectation for family harmony, ethical doctrines were much less
attractive than the economic profit promised by a prudent match. By the Qing dynasty,
this tendency had developed into social custom. Qing scholar Zhao Yi 赵翼 (1727-1814)
observed how the value of the betrothal gifts and dowry were often the central issue
discussed in a marriage negotiation: “all marriages concerned and bargained with
presents and money, it is a rather common phenomenon that surprised nobody.”85
Behind the Confucian doctrinal loathing for economically motivated marital choices was
the practical realization that an over-charge of betrothal or dowry prices generally
prevented people who could not afford the expense of a wife from continuing their family
lines. The demand for a wife and then male descendents sometimes pushed the monetary
marriage pattern into an extreme form, such as the case of leased wives [Dianqi 典妻],
which formed a major black market for wives of the lower classes. For a poor family,
desperate for food and life supplies, leasing a wife to another man was sometimes
perceived as the only choice of the husband. Most renters were single poor men who
could not afford the price of a normal betrothal. To rent a temporary wife in order to
continue the family line was their only choice for fathering a male descendent. In these
situations, a lease was necessary and the term could range from a half-year to three years,
according to the first husband’s will. When the term was expired, the wife would either
be returned to her original husband or the term could be extended if the second husband
requested and the first husband agreed.
Wife leasing had a long history in China from the Southern and Northern dynasties into
the Republican era,86 although the custom was theoretically a direct violation of neoConfucian ethics, which taught that “starving to death is a very minor matter; losing
one’s chastity is a matter of the greatest importance”.87 On legal grounds, it was in fact
considered a situation of de facto bigamy. From the Yuan to Qing periods, it was
continually banned by the legal codes. The penalty for violating this law varied from a
verbal warning to a beating and betrothal confiscation. However, the weight of legal
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concerns was negligible in the face of the more heavy filial piety custom: compromises
had to constantly be made in the juridical practices of pre-modern China.88
The considerations of political and economic interests constituted the two major elements
of thinking on arranged marriages, which both required precise calculation and coolheaded negotiation. They were always closely linked. When a marital decision was made
on the basis of matched political grounds, a great deal of money was presented by each
side in the form of betrothal gifts and dowry respectively. This was done for both sides as
a display of political and economic strength, a declaration of the credit and loyalty
towards the marital bondage and as a requirement of the public recognition of the
alliance. For those families seeking to match based on economic grounds, a marriage
arrangement was conducted more like a commercial trade between seller and buyer than
as a love bond between two families; economic profit and reproduction concerns were at
the center of such negotiations.

2.2.4

The Marriage Age: Ideally, Legally and Practically

In order to enlarge the population of the Chinese empire, and to reasonably balance the
needs and supplies of the source of women in their populations, dynastic rulers kept
urging parents to be “diligent in [arranging] marriages for your children.”89 Commonly,
the approach started when a son or a daughter came close to reaching the marriage age.
However, there have always been perceivable gaps between the ideal age, the legal age
and the actual age. According to the ideal life course described in Liji, a man is ready for
marriage at the age of twenty, after he is capped, and should obtain a wife before turning
thirty. A woman is considered ready at fifteen, after being hair-pinned, and should be
married out before she is twenty-three.90 However, the legal marriage age adopted by the
dynastic law-makers seldom kept up with this ideal. In general, the earliest marriage age
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once officially declared was fifteen for a man and thirteen for a woman; the latest ages
individuals could marry was legally set at thirty for man and twenty for a woman.91
In actual practice, people’s marriage age varied widely in accordance with their social
and economical status. Both late and early marriages were common. Although the
dynastic governments from the Yuan to Qing periods consistently banned people from
engaging their children at a very young age (or sometimes even before they were born)
by establishing the legal age for man and woman to organize a marriage, this article was
largely considered a mere scrap of paper in most cases. 92 The custom of child betrothal
and adopting daughter’s in-law was the most common method employed by rural families
to locate a wife when the source of potential women was not sufficient. Many adopted
girls were sold by their natal families in return for food and money, despite the wellknown recognition that an adopted-daughter’s status in her future husband’s family was
sometimes little better than that of a slave. Child betrothal was also popular among the
upper classes as marriages among the members of a political clique became a
confirmation of the political interdependence of the clique members. In such cases, some
ambitious politicians in need of an ally could not wait for their children to grow up or
even to be born before purchasing loyalty in such a manner.

2.3 The Rectitude between Ruler and Minister: Marriage in
the Official Policies
In imperial China, political order was complimentary to the hierarchy of the patriarchal
family. When a ruler received the Mandate of Heaven, he became the symbolic parent of
his people and the sovereign of all under the sky, who ruled the state as the family head
ruled a household.93 Like all parents, it was a ruler’s responsibility to broaden his
people’s progeny. From a very early period in history until the late Qing period, Chinese
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rulers promoted policies that urged parents to “be diligent in [arranging] marriages for
your children” for the sake of population growth.94 These edicts followed the Confucian
admonishment toward rulers, “it would be a great shame for a superior man if he be
charged with the care of a large territory, and the people be not correspondingly
numerous.”95 This responsibility was applied to all similar parent-child relations. The
Qing code, for instance, stipulated that the master who failed to marry out his maid at her
proper age would receive 80 blows of the heavy stick.96
In the same spirit, a local magistrate who was respected as a fumu guan 父母官 [parental
official] might possibly overrule the parental authority in arranging marriages for singles
within his jurisdiction, if he felt the necessity to enhance population growth. This kind of
act would be considered as an important achievement in his political career by the
dynastic court. In China’s historical records, marriages initiated by county magistrates
were numerous.97 Sometimes, a superior official would volunteer to play matchmaker for
his subordinates or their children, which was considered a gesture of father-like affection.
A marriage proposed by a superior or by the emperor himself was never easy to decline
or dissolve, just as it was almost impossible for a child to refuse a parent-arranged
marriage. Furthermore, in the context of late imperial China, which was highlighted by
constant bloody feuding between different political factions, a marriage proposed by a
superior official was seldom a simple matching of two mates. Under most circumstances,
when a superior proposed a marriage with his subordinates, what he actually expected
was a political deal for their loyalty, support, and military power.98
Sommer identified that the framework of sexual orthodoxy throughout the imperial era
was an ideology of social control that was inclined to link personal relationships to
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political order. 99 Marriages in this kind of link worked to connect an individual to the
family, a family to the community, and a community to the state, within the Confucian
morality of li. In this spirit, marriage was seldom considered by the Chinese as solely a
personal issue between two individuals, but was rather an issue that affected families,
communities and even the nation.
This conception, at the core of Chinese marriage thinking, was subjected to various
expansions and re-interpretations in accordance with contemporary contexts. It is not
uncommon throughout Chinese history to see that women were used as pawns, to be
moved into position in order to strengthen political lines at various levels of society.
Tributary brides of the Zhou dynasty were sent to allied states for the sake of hegemonic
competition, consolidation of alliances, and military protection from powerful affinities,
as a military strategy, as a move of surrender or as a measure of appreciation.100
Princesses from the Han to Tang periods were frequently sent to hostile ethnic tribes or
states as generous peacemaking gifts from the central authority.101 The daughters of highranking officials were married into the families of allied powers as a confirmation of the
alliance or into hostile families of opposing political standing in order to serve as either
spies for the natal family or as a peace-making envoy seeking temporary armistice. The
stories of these sacrificed daughters were often told in highly patriotic tones in the official
discourse, which portrayed them as exemplary national heroines and paragons of loyalty
and piety. For a woman, sacrificing personal happiness in order to obey parental
arrangements to marry a barbarian for the sake of national peace or cultural
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communication might be the maximum contribution she was capable of to making to her
society. Sacrifice, in this sense, was mandatory and was considered a great honor.

2.3.1

The Lawbreaking Marriages

In making a marriage decision, marriage-makers always had to keep in mind the need to
avoid making matches that broke the law. The first rule of a matchmaker was to
guarantee that the marriage he (or she) made did not violate laws. Otherwise, he (or she)
would be subject to severe legal penalty. Lawbreaking marriages fell into two broad
categories: marrying to the wrong people and marrying at the wrong time.
The wrong people, in this case, included those with the same surnames, with debased
identities, bigamists, adulterers or adulteresses. It was traditionally agreed that people
should not marry even remote patrilineal relatives who shared the same surname
[tongxingbuhun 同姓不婚]. A marriage within the kinship relationship or between close
relatives was considered a serious violation of the principle of gender separation. This
was considered abhorrent from both a moral and a genetic perspective: marriages of those
with the same surnames might possibly produce unhealthy descendents or sterility
because the two parties of such marriage were theoretically born with the same patrilineal
ancestor. Since the Ming dynasty, even marriages between cousins with different
surnames were announced as illegal. Those men who were found guilty of taking in
marriage the daughters of their patrilineal aunts or the daughters of their matrilineal
uncles or aunts received 80 strokes of the heavy stick.102
The ban on marriages between commoner [liangmin 良民] and debased people [jianmin
贱民] was another fixed rule that repeatedly appeared in the dynastic legal codes. Two
groups in this category were usually seen in the legal records concerning marriage: unfree
people such as slaves and bond-servants and registered prostitutes such as courtesans and
singing girls. The Qing code specified that any household head who arranged for his
slaves to marry daughters of commoner families would be punished by 80 strokes of
beating with the heavy stick, the marriage would be dissolved and any change in status

102

The Great Ming Code, Article 114, 85. Also See the Great Qing Code, Article 108, 129.

49

would be corrected.103 Furthermore, Qing officials were legally prohibited from taking a
courtesan (prostitute) as wife or concubine. Convicted wrongdoers in this case were
punished by 60 strokes of beating and divorce.104
The imperial code put extra emphasis on the proper timing of marriages. In general,
people were not allowed to marry under two circumstances: during the mourning period
and during a period when parents were imprisoned. The mourning period varied
according to the relationship between the deceased and mourner: for the death of a parent
or a husband, in the case of the remarriage of a widow, the standard mourning period was
three years. In case of the death of an emperor or empress, a special edict would be issued
to announce the mourning period and whether marriage would be banned or not during
this period. For example, when the Guangxu emperor (光绪 1871-1908) and the Empress
Dowager Cixi (慈禧 1835-1908) died simultaneously on November 15, 1908, the ritual
department announced that no marriage would be permitted for officials within one
year.105 As the traditional Chinese marriage was centered around filial piety, and served
primarily parental demands, a marriage could not be arranged and held without the
presence of the grandparents, parents or any other official family head. Therefore, getting
married at a time when the paternal grandparents or parents were in prison was
considered seriously unfilial behavior, and any offender was subject to a punishment of
80 strokes with the heavy stick.106
All of these prohibitions, whether they were official or customary, served “not to ban a
certain kind of conduct per se, but rather to regulate that conduct in such a way as to
make the performance of distinct moral standards as a definitive mark of different levels
of status.”107 If the nature of marriage in pre-modern China was to continue the ancestral
line, to distinguish gender separation, to legitimize sexual intercourse between husband
and wife as well as to assert the righteousness of human relations, then the particulars of
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exactly how to create and sustain a marriage was a matter worthy of high-minded legal
concerns.

2.3.2

Concubinage: The Gap between Law and Custom

Although Confucian ethics preached the virtues of monogamy, the practice of having a
concubine was allowed in a pre-modern Chinese household. The relation between
husband and wife was interpreted through the classics as akin to that between the sun and
moon.108 As there is only one sun and one moon, there should be only one husband and
one wife in one marriage. Only a wife could officially be married to a husband. Thus,
the formal term used in the taking of a concubine was “to buy”. Liji distinguished
between wife and concubine with the betrothal process: “if there were the betrothal rites,
she became a wife; and if she went without these, a concubine.”109 Zheng Xuan explained
“why use the word ‘buy’ when a man is taking a concubine? Because a concubine is as
humble (priced) as any other thing”.110
In both the domestic and public spheres, a wife and a concubine were in legally divided
social roles which one was not allowed to confuse. The Qing Code specified: “wife
means [husband’s] equal. Honored [gui 贵] as she is, she should be treated equally to her
husband. Concubine, however, is only a sex servant whose status should be humble.”111
Within the inner chamber, if a concubine arrogated the wife’s role in managing the
household or performing ancestor worship without the family head’s or the wife’s
authorization, she would possibly be charged with disordering the house.112 As only one
wife was allowed to one husband at one time, both in custom and in law, when a man
married two wives, the later married one was automatically degraded a level to a
concubine.
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While taking a concubine was never favored in the Confucian orthodoxy, few dynasties
actually legally banned this tradition. In China’s literature and historical records, it is
actually not uncommon to see cases where a husband took two wives at the same time in
different places, especially for those who held distant posts or traveling merchants. The
only exception was The Great Ming Code, in which commoners were not allowed to take
concubines, excepting only those who were 40 years of age or older and had no sons.
Any violation of this law was punishable by 40 strokes of beating with the light stick.113
Still, neither ethical teachings nor legal bans efficiently prevented poor families from
selling their daughters for money or rich people from buying concubines. It had been so
popular a practice in the Qing period that the lawmakers had to abolish this article from
the legal code. At the end of the imperial era, taking concubines had become a fixed
social custom in some areas of China. Hu Puan, a contemporary writing at the end of 19th
century commented on this:
“…polygamy is prevalent in Guangdong, people’s wealth was judged through
counting how many wives and concubines he has. For many, taking concubine is
only a way to earn reputation. It is said one plutocrat owned one hundred and
eight pepper trees, which provided him with great annual fortune. So he took one
hundred and eight concubines and supported each with the profit of one pepper
tree. And those who had three wives and four concubines were more common.
Only in this way did the middle class feel capable of maintaining their dignity”.114
The case of concubinage illustrates the distant gap between law and custom in premodern China, which existed because much about people’s real lives was dominated by
survival logic quite different from, and often at odds with, the priorities and pretensions
of the state. When a law was proved unacceptable to people, it was either deliberately or
unconsciously neglected, compromised through judicatory flexibility or simply deleted
from the code altogether. As Sommer perceived, the laws of imperial China were made in
order to regulate people’s performance according to their social status and roles. When
certain customary practices ran across the status boundaries and were performed by the
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people from upper to lower strata, the related law lost its regulating strength and thus
became subject to abolishment.115

2.4 Conclusion
Marriage, following Confucian ethics and ritual textbooks, was a socially sanctioned
moral norm for all Chinese people; it was a fundamental human relation that served to
identify and confirm man and woman’s biological and social roles. The ideal marriage
pattern, according to these guidelines, should be a predestined marital bond made
between two families that possessed “humanity and righteousness” for the purpose of
continuing the patrilineal line of descent.116 A credible matchmaker would initiate the
marital negotiation at the will of the groom’s parents, under the assumption that the
groom and bride did not know each other’s name before the wedding. After they got
married in a proper performance of the six rites of matrimony, the couple was expected to
fit into their respective roles within the household.
Throughout the imperial era, marriage served as the pivot of a network of social control
that inclined to link personal relationships to political order through asserting the
“righteousness” between parents and children, husband and wife, rulers and subordinates
as well as the state and individuals. The dynastic state imposed control over its people by
repeatedly claiming its supremacy in the realm of interpreting this “righteousness”.
In this discourse, marriage is not about the romantic and passionate love developed
between two matched souls, the individual’s free choice of a life partner or the matching
of two equals. The people in charge of a pre-modern marriage were not the bride and
groom, but were rather any number of other interested parties: the parents, grandparents,
other relatives who served as family heads, the indispensable matchmaker and, in some
cases, rulers from different levels of society, acting in their role as ‘social parents’ of
their subject populations. Marriage, in this definition, was a rational approach to a
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common situation that parties undertook seeking the best interest and mutual-benefit of
all concerned.
Marriage, in the social context of hierarchal China, was also a symbol of one’s social
status. Ideally, a prospective couple should be matched first based on their ancestries. In
real life, however, with the decline of the aristocratic elite and the rise of the meritocratic
elite, the pursuit of finding partners with noble origin was replaced by more utilitarian
motives in making marriage arrangements. The tendency to transform the marriage
arrangement into a commodity became more and more perceptible in post-Tang period
marriages. A great deal of money was invested in locating a talented son-in-law, who
then was expected to gain a bright official career through the Imperial Examinations.
Money, in forms of betrothal gifts and dowries, became the dominant consideration in
making a marriage arrangement at this time. As a result, poor families had to discover
irregular ways to get access to females in order to father male descendants. They did so
by taking in adopted daughters-in-law, stepping into an uxorilocal marriage or by renting
another man’s wife. Another theme of the traditional marriage was political interest,
which applied mostly to upper-level marriages. Marriage, in this case, was largely used as
a political strategy in order to seek national security, political alliance or a desired career.
While the dynastic law-makers tried to enact detailed marriage prohibitions in order to
regulate people’s marriage practices according to the Confucian ethical model of li, the
influence of tradition and custom was always beyond the control of state power.
However, in the process of promulgating laws and making compromises, transitions did
occur in Chinese marriage thinking, though such arrangements were slow and for the
most part invisible to contemporaries. As will be discussed in the next chapter, it was
only in the past two centuries that such transitions have become perceptible.
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Chapter 3

3

Making a Marriage Revolution

Through a systematic examination of the transformation of Chinese marriage thinking
from the late-nineteenth century to the May Fourth era, this chapter seeks to illustrate
how “free marriage” was learned and practiced by the Chinese at a time when old
traditions and customs were still holding a predominant position over new thoughts; it
will expand on how Chinese thinking on marriage differed from Western models, and
how it was re-interpreted to match Chinese social context. What I argue in this chapter is
that the modernization of Chinese marriage was not a transient event, but was rather a
process that mixed gradual and progressive, old and new, traditional and modern,
Chinese and Western, urban and rural; a development that was at the same time curious,
romantic and challenging but also difficult, slow and requiring a lot of consideration,
patience and compromise. In examining the process of revolutionizing Chinese marriage,
charting the adoption of Western models is only half of the story: the other half is in
looking at the evolution of tradition.

3.1 Serving Marriage for the Country: Marriage Transition in
the Late-Qing Era
When the first group of Chinese officials arrived in Europe in the late 1860s, they were
shocked to find that “the marriage of the western man and woman was self-determined.
Before getting married, they were like friends.”1 They were also surprised at the fact that
“when making the marital decisions, parents played minor roles and could not forcefully
marry their children without their own willingness.”2 These discoveries informed the
nineteenth-century Chinese, who had previously believed that arranged marriage was a
universal practice, about the existence of another option: the self-choice marriage. Before
the weixin 维新[reform]reformers rose to power and began to implement constitutional
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reforms in the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, most policy-makers in
China considered that the ideas of love and self-choice in marriage were exotic and
dangerous. They argued that this kind of practice in China would lead to family collapse
and social disorder by arrogating parental authority in marriage arrangements and thus
violating the paramount rule of filial piety and breaking down gender separation. For the
vast majority of Chinese, who were generally ignorant about the outside world, the
arranged marriage pattern was still the only marriage system they knew and practiced.

3.1.1

Baozhong: Reforming Marriage for Better Wives and Wiser
Mothers

The earliest attempts at reforming Chinese marriage came from the late-Qing reformers’
pursuit of baozhong 保种[improving the Chinese race]. Led by Kang Youwei 康有为
(1858-1927) and Liang Qichao 梁启超(1873-1929), the weixin reformers used official
propaganda in order to ascribe China’s defeats in the second half of the nineteenth
century to a perceived racial weakness in the Chinese.3 Recognizing the self-choice
marriage as “a necessity of China in the future,” they proposed that it was only when a
young man was allowed to choose his own marriage partner that he could possibly marry
a good girl on the grounds of age, appearance and education. 4 Conversely, they argued
that only under such a free choice system could an educated and physical healthy girl
marry a man that she would love and then act as a genuine help-mate to her husband and
an intelligent mother to her sons. They further argued that only under the roof of a
peaceful and harmonious family could a man devote himself wholeheartedly to the
national salvation cause and a woman produce physically and mentally healthy sons who
might be the future members of China’s national defense force. 5 Therefore, they
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suggested that elite parents should adjust their mate-selection politics in order to marry
their sons to those girls with the potential to become a “good wife and wise mother” in
terms of natural feet and school education.6
Initiated by the weixin reformers, and later supported by the Manchu court, the antifootbinding movement and the wide establishment of girls’ school in China brought the
first perceivable wave of the transformation of China’s marriage conceptions. 7 On the
eve of the Xinhai Revolution, it had been a fact that more and more Chinese elite parents
had come to realize that an educated, physically-healthy daughter might not only increase
the family income, but also gain more advantages in finding herself a suitable husband.8
This realization primarily came from some social celebrities’ publicly known preference
for well-educated girls. For example, in 1900, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868-1940) lost his
first wife at the age of thirty-two. Being from the top percentile of the Imperial
Examination system, and holding the post of supervisor in the Zhongxi School of
Shaoxing[Shaoxing zhongxi xuetang 绍兴中西学堂], he became a new favorite potential
son-in-law of the elite families. In front of the various matchmakers crowding into his
home he declared his criteria for his future bride: she had to have natural and unbounded
feet and had to be well-educated. One year later, Cai married Huang Zhongyu 黄仲玉, a
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girl known to be talented at calligraphy and painting, who also had unbound feet.9 Zhang
Taiyan 章太炎 (also known as Zhang Binglin 章炳麟, 1868-1936), a master of guoxue
[traditional Chinese learning], also married a career woman with “freedom and equality
of thoughts,” who had been a newspaper editor.10
Considering that social transition was a gradual process, to be undertaken step by step,
marriage reform was always a matter of necessity, but not one of urgency in late-Qing
China. According to Kang Youwei, who went so far as to suggest a total rejection of the
marriage system because “people can merely vow to be united, but find it very difficult to
hold to their union for long,” the process of women’s emancipation had to go through
three stages of social evolution: the Age of Disorder, the Age of Increasing Peace and
Equality and the Age of Complete Peace and Equality. 11 He argued that any precipitous
change unmatched with its proper stage could cause great disorder. For this reason, his
progressive and utopian marriage plan was kept unknown to the public until 1935, when
his Datong shu 大同书 was published in a full version.12
Joan Judge believes that in the Chinese world view, rights were not natural and inherent
in individuals but rather were contingent, to be granted in accordance with the
individual’s demonstrated ability to exercise them effectively. The right to free marriage
was also presented by officials as contingent on a certain level of education.13 One
textbook in the early 1900s explained why the free marriage pattern that was so popular
in the West was impossible for China: in the West, it suggested, “both men and women
were learned and literate”; whereas in China, the masses of illiterate women would be
easily deceived by profligates, and the practice would degenerate into “dissolution and
debauchery.”14 Yan Fu also thought that there was no feasibility in a plan for a self-
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determined marriage system before Chinese women were completely released from their
seclusion and illiteracy.15 This precondition to change meant that the late-Qing officials’
marriage reforms would largely remain in the form of written proposals rather than
effective actions.
When proposing his free-marriage idea, politician Tan Sitong 谭嗣同 (1865-1898)
emphasized that “no family should coerce another family into a marriage bond.”16
Marriage for the weixin reformers was continuously defined as a bond between two
families instead of two individuals. The purpose of a marriage in their general view was
to create an encouraging family atmosphere for the national salvation movement, for
which both husband and wife should subordinate their personal needs for the greater
good of the nation. This was, in fact, merely a nationalist version of the traditional
marriage conception outlined above: a bond of love between two families to secure their
services for the Chinese nation and to secure the continuance and improvement of the
Chinese race. The individual needs and feelings of the people were still largely excluded
from marriage considerations.

3.1.2

Individual Happiness Vs. Public Welfare

The revolutionaries who were devoted to overthrowing the Manchu’s rule over China
seemed to go a little further at this point by recognizing marriage as a social contract
between two individuals in love. For example, Jin Yi (金一 1874-1947), the author of
Nüjie zhong 女界钟 [Women’s Bell],17 believed marriage should be a ritual of love spirit,
an expression of the “burning point of love power.”18 However, like the earlier reformers,
few revolutionaries applied this theory to their revolutionary movement due to the belief
that all social transformations could only occur under the auspices of a new republican
government. The case of Qiu Jin 秋瑾 (1875-1907) is an example of the most radical
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woman of her time. Qiu Jin bravely stepped out of an unhappy arranged marriage and
successfully encouraged many other educated women to do the same by speaking out
about their displeasure with the marriage arranged for them by their parents and by
helping women gain financial independence through education and training in various
professions. However feminist and radical Qiu Jin was, she was also convinced that all
the solutions for women’s problems lay in the establishment of a new republican
government in which women could acquire equal political participation, rights and an
equal voice in making their own life decisions.19
Subordinating one’s personal interest to the greater needs of society has been an
important characteristic of Chinese society throughout the nation’s history.
Fundamentally, it is a heritage that evolved from Confucian ethics, which requires that
followers adhere to proper hierarchical relationships, from high to low and from top to
bottom. As Sun Yat-sen (孙中山 1866-1925) emphasized repeatedly, the individual
should subordinate his personal interest to the group and devote his talents to seeking
public welfare: “[the] individual had no freedom, only the group had freedom.”20 For the
late-Qing elite, saving China from crisis by peaceful constitutional reform or by violent
national revolution was of primary importance. Marriage alone was too personal an issue
to be directly related to the public interest and the general feeling was that peoples efforts
were better served in aiding the rapid change of China’s fate.
A more traditional concern that caused most male reformers and revolutionaries to
deliberately shy away from the marriage problem was the established division between
the public and the domestic spheres. According to the Confucian classics, a gentleman
[junzi 君子] should never speak publicly of inner chamber affairs, especially not of
emotional feelings from relationships as private and personal as those between married or
unmarried couples.21 At a time when most of the population was still dominated by
Confucian ethics, for an individual to address his or her desire for self-choice marriages
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and free love in public would have been considered mixing up public affairs with
domestic issues, and encouragement to broach others’ privacy. Before they could
establish a new government that could provide ethical and legal support for marriage
reform, neither reformers nor revolutionaries dared to challenge popular social ethics for
fear of risking their own reputations and reliability among the masses.

3.1.3

The “Civilized” Marriage Practice

During the first decade of the twentieth century, when the conservatives and radicals
were debating over whether or not the arranged marriage was a bad social custom, a few
young people took the initiative by arranging their own marriages.
The first public marriage advertisement was posted in Dagong Bao 大公报 [L'impartial]
on June, 26 of 1902 by an anonymous man who called himself nanqing zhishi 南清志士
[a man from Nanqing of ideals and integrity]. He provided a list of criteria for his
prospective bride: 1) natural feet; 2) having basic knowledge of Chinese and western
learning; 3) following a wenming jiehun 文明结婚 [civilized marriage ceremony]22; 4)
having the freedom and willingness to choose her own groom.23 He especially
emphasized that physical appearance, age, ethnicity (Han or Manchu), personal beliefs
(new or old), social status and personal property were not important to his decision. On
the Zhongwai ribao 中外日报[Chinese and Foreign Daily] of July 27, 1902, this
advertisement was praised as “the most civilized marriage advertisement of the world.”24
Although there is little known about the actual result of the advertisement being posted, it
is obvious from the particulars that things like unbound feet, education and independence
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had already been accepted by at least some of the young elite as the new basic conditions
for a successful marriage.
As the first public personal ad for a marriage partner in China, it is not surprising that this
advertisement immediately came under attack from numerous social groups. One
somewhat unforeseen critique came from the radical female activist Lin Zongsu 林宗素
(1877-1944), who described it as “treating civilized woman like a slave, taking for
granted that women would crowd to him whenever he demanded,” and decrying the
advertisement itself as “a way dealing with the prostitutes in Shanghai.”25 The oversensitive tone in this critique insinuated that on the one hand, the first batch of Chinese
'new women' felt deeply insecure with their newly-achieved independence and respect,
and were confused by the fear of returning to the traditional marital situation of being
selected and traded as little more than commodities. On the other hand, it shows how
these women, like most other Chinese, no matter how civilized or modernized they
labeled themselves, still deeply believed that marriage or direct social contact between
the two sexes was too much of a taboo issue for any public address. No true gentleman
would openly speak out about his need for a wife and any public display of love properly
existed only between a prostitute and her client. An advertisement for marriage like this
could also possibly be nothing more than a dandy’s public flirting with all the educated
young women. Of course, as Lin pointed out, part of the embarrassment came from the
anonymity of the author: “even if there are women who are willing to contact this ‘man
from Nanqing’, without his name and address, how can they get in touch?” 26
Learning from this lesson, Wang Jianshan 王建善, a student who returned to China from
Japan, posted his own marriage advertisement in Shibao 时报 [Time newspaper] on July
5 of 1905. He provided his real name, address and profession, and requested that his
prospects contact him by letter. Wang was also the author of Tongxin dinghun fa 通信订
婚法 [Correspondence Pre-contract of Marriage], a booklet that introduced a novel
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“decent” method for educated young people to search and find a desired match.27 Wang
suggested that young men and women should first come to know each other through
correspondence, and even eventually sign their marriage contracts by mail. The booklet
was rather profitable at the time: according to Shibao, “the first print was sold out
immediately and people required a quick reprint.”28 Finding a life partner among pen
pals became a fashion among the urban youth, who were eager to find a lover by selfchoice but who dared not break the barricades of gender separation.
While most Chinese women halted at the stage of refusing to be a party to an arranged
marriage rather than taking the next step in choosing 'Mr. Right' for themselves, a few
heroines started to publicize their own marriage demands. Da Gongbao 大公报
[L'impartial] published such a report on June 28, 1909:
Zhang Weiying 张维英 is a lady from Zhejiang. She studied in Japan and
currently resided in Jiangxi. Now she is working as a teacher in a girls’ school,
teaching painting and handcraft. She is also a founder of a forum for free
marriage…At an age of twenty-one, single, and aspiring for free marriage, this
lady attracted so many suitors to ask for her hand in marriage that she had to
hold a series of tests to examine their health and knowledges. She declared, if
someone could meet her criteria, she will marry him with a civilized
ceremony.29
In this case, it was the woman’s turn to set marriage standards for the man: she listed
physical health and academic performance as the most important two standards for her
'Mr. Right'. As with most of the marriage advertisements posted at that time, little is
known about the result or even the validity of Ms. Zhang’s advertisement.
Early marriage advertisements almost universally demanded a marriage match that was
natural, educated, healthy and independent. On the one hand, these common
characteristics reflected the transition of the mate-selection standard from seeking a
match for the family to seeking a match for the individual. On the other hand, although
these advertisers set marriage as the ultimate goal of all their subsequent communication,
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they seldom mentioned the word ‘love’, nor did they discuss what kind of personal
feelings they were expecting to develop with the candidate in the course of courtship.
Furthermore, under the circumstances of the early twentieth century, when “freedom and
modernity” became a dominant theme, such advertisements, whether true or false,
worked as a showcase for modernity. They served to position progressive youth who
wished to cut themselves off from the old family system, announced the arrival of an era
of social transformation and challenged old traditions. The content of these
advertisements shows how the theory of “marriage as a social contract” had been
accepted by advertisers and editors. The marriage partner was not yet being constructed
as a love match, but now had to be a candidate that met certain requirements who was
thus qualified to sign the contract.

3.2 From Marriage Reform to Marriage Revolution
As a response to the cultural confusions provoked by the turbulent post-1911 political
situation in China, and also as an effort to avoid sensitive political topics that could
possibly provoke the ruling warlords, enthusiasm for marriage revolution and gender
equality subsided dramatically in the second decade of the twentieth century.30 Still,
Chinese intellectuals devoted themselves to a wide debate on marriage reform. In the
beginning, late-Qing reformers continued to gain recognition from intellectuals for their
efforts to re-interpret Chinese traditions and customs in order to match the new political
context. The moderate marriage reform proposals, however, soon met severe challenges
from the radical proponents of the New Culture Movement (New Culturists) as a part of
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their crusade against the “fengjian” 封建 [feudal] traditions.31 In the subsequent May
Fourth Movement, a marriage revolution was launched so rapidly and impetuously that
ideas of marriage reform were almost completely eliminated from public opinion
thereafter.

3.2.1

A Middle Course between a Parent’s Order and a Child’s
Choice

The question of whether or not elders have the authority to arrange their children’s
marriage became a topic that attracted broad public attention and debate in the pre-May
Fourth era. Funü zazhi 妇女杂志[The Ladies’ Journal], which was first published by the
Commercial Press in Shanghai in January 1915, became one major forum that hosted
such marriage debates.32
Before the New Culturalists’ crusade against tradition was fully deployed, public opinion
on marriage reform was dominated by a mixture of expectation for China’s quick
modernization and anxiety over the disorder caused by a too rapid social transformation.
For example, at the commencement of the Henan Women’s Normal School in 1915, the
minister of Education Shi Bao’an 史宝安, delivered a public defense of the tradition of
parental authority arranging marriages for their children. He utilized the Confucian
reverence for elders, arguing that the senior generation was more socialized and
experienced in the matter of marriage than the younger one. He argued that a life partner
arranged by parent(s) must be better than a partner arranged by oneself, due to the fact
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that people in love are generally short-sighted and blind to the negative aspects of their
mates, whereas parents would be more considerate and far-sighted in their choice, owing
to their natural love for their children. Therefore, Shi concluded “it is impossible that the
marriage of our country's men and women could not be decided by their family heads [家
长 jiazhang].”33 Further, Shi attributed the fact that there were many unhappy couples in
China to the early marriage custom and public distaste for divorce. The problem for
China, according to Shi, was how to dissolve the marriage or engagement of mismatched
couples, rather than how to deprive parents of their marriage decision-making authority.
The solution, he argued, was to regulate people’s marriage (or engagement) age and to
prolong the waiting period between the engagement and the wedding. Like the cautious
late-Qing reformers, Shi suggested a gradual social reform process: “If we acted with
undue haste,” Shi warned, “we would meet greater resistance. It is necessary to know that
haste will make waste.” 34
Along with the rise of the New Culture Movement after 1915, the readers of Funü zazhi
read about a more comprehensive and controversial debate over how to properly combine
the free-choice marriage practice with the traditional parental arrangement. The
consensus opinion that arose from such discussions was that young people should be
given the right and freedom to choose their own lovers, but for the final marriage
decision they should gain the consent of their parents. This theory was exemplified by
two articles in 1917: “Jiehun gailiang shuo”结婚改良说 [Discussion on Marriage
Reform] by Qu Li 趋礼35, and “Lun hunzhi”论婚制 [Discussion on Marriage System] by
Ding Fengjia of Wujiang 吴江丁逢甲.36
Both articles were published in the “Shelun” 社论[Social discussion] column, which
hosted discussions based on the hottest social problems from the front page of the Funü
zazhi. Both Qu and Ding agreed that the traditional arranged marriage pattern was

33

Shi Bao’an , “Henan nüzi shifan xuexiao biye xunci” 河南女子师范学校毕业训词[Speech on the commencement
of Henan Women’s Normal School],Funü zazhi, no.1 (1915): 1-9, 4.
34
Ibid., 9.
35
Qu Li, “Jiehun gailiang shuo” [Discussion on Marriage Reform], Funü zazhi, no.5 (1917): 2-9.
36
Ding Fengjia, “Lun hunzhi” [Discussion on Marriage System], Funü zazhi, no.7 (1917): 1-8.

66

obsolete and did not fit in the social context of a Republican China that complimented
individual rights and personal freedoms. Based on the observation that mutual feelings of
love were often absent in the arranged couple, the critics admitted that free love and premarital communication were necessary and important elements for happy marriages.
Ding in particular called for more public attention to be given to the reform of the
marriage system than to that of the political or educational institutions. From the
perspective of national salvation, he claimed “people trapped in unhappy or unhealthy
marriages are often depressed and weak, incapable of producing healthy offspring. This
posed great dangers to the Chinese race…Therefore, Chinese marriage should be
reformed ahead of the political system and education, otherwise, the root of the Chinese
nation would gradually deteriorate, and then there would be no hope for China to
resurrect itself.”37
Considering China’s conservative social realities, however, both Qu and Ding believed
that the family’s supervision and opinion were still necessary factors to consider
whenever contemplating a marriage match. Qu claimed that the acquisition of parental
approval for one’s own love choice was in fact not only in order to show respect to one’s
parents, but also to pay deference to love. 38 Ding believed that true love only existed
between two people who were matched on specific grounds such as “blood and gene,
family background, potential for future development, personalities, age and
thoughts…[and] the best way of getting married is to select the marriage subject by the
free will of two parties, but the final decision of marriage should be left to the parents
after a careful examination on the subject (with the criteria given above).”39
In their search for accommodation between the two extremes of parental consent and
children’s free choice, Qu Li and Ding Fengjia demonstrated typical Confucian thinking
by resorting to “zhongyong zhidao”中庸之道 [the doctrine of mean], or the middle
course. Zhongyong 中庸 comprises the elements of “equilibrium” [zhong] and
“normality” [yong]. The translation of these two words as the Mean suggests the
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fundamental moral ideas of moderation, balance and suitability.40 In the 20th century, this
policy was adapted by various reformers and scholars in order to find a middle point in
the intersectional area between Chinese tradition and foreign culture, and henceforth to
concoct conciliations in order to reach equilibrium and harmony.41
New mate-selection criteria were made in accordance with these new marriage politics.
In his 1918 “Zefu zhi yanjiu”择夫之研究 [Studies on Husband Selection], Wei
Shouyong 魏寿镛 provided women with a criteria list for a potential husband that
included nine conditions: 42
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Family background [mendi], appearance, intelligence and education.
Age
Profession
Property
Family members
Physical health
Mental health
Daily living habits
Temper

With regards to age, Wei believed the best age for marriage was from 20 to 28, with the
man being two or three years older than the woman. This list was a combination of old
and new marriage politics: it juxtaposed individual qualities such as appearance,
intelligence and education with traditional conception of mendi [family background] as
being of the first importance; postponed marriage age to an appropriately 'modern'
standard; emphasized economic potential; stressed the role of an individual’s health for
the sake of family line continuation; and required matched personality traits such as
habits and temperament. Although more personal interests were added into the selection
criteria, love was seldom evaluated as a crucial element in making a good match. On the
contrary, love was described as more like an unstable emotion that might easily lead to
wrongdoing. Parental supervision and examination of potential matches were thus invited
in expectation that they would neutralize any harm caused by impulsive love emotions.
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This is the other side of the “doctrine of mean”, which demands that an individual
constrain his/her self and deny personal feelings for the sake of remaining in a state of
moderation.43
The contributors of these moderate opinions met radical critiques from anti-arranged
marriage crusaders. Lu Qiuxin 陆秋心, the female chief editor of Xin Funü 新妇女 [New
Women] and a devoted Marxist, questioned their loyalty to democratic principles. She
argued that the so-called consensual arranged marriage was in actuality parallel in
political terms to the Constitutional monarchy system, which had proved to be a failure in
China.44 Lu compared three marriage systems with three political systems in order to
illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of each. She suggested that a marriage completely
arranged by the parents without the consent of the children was analogous to a monarchy,
under which the masses were largely deprived of the right to speak; in the same manner,
she noted that a marriage arranged by the parents with the consent of the children was
parallel to the constitutional monarchy system, under which people’s freedoms were
limited and under the control of authorities; in an ostensibly democratic state, such as the
new Republic of China, Lu concluded, it was essential to allow free marriage between a
man and a woman without any interference from a third party.

3.2.2

The Anti-arranged Marriage Crusade

These moderate marriage reform proposals met severe challenges from the radical New
Culturists, beginning with Chen Duxiu’s (1879-1942) assertion in 1904 that “nothing
about Chinese marriage is reasonable.”45 In his “Kongzi zhi dao yu xiandai shenghuo”孔
子之道与现代生活 [The Way of Confucius and Modern Life] published in 1916, Chen
went further in claiming that it was ridiculous to force gender separation on modern
people when cross-sex socialization was practiced worldwide. The difference between
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open socialization and gender separation, according to Chen, paralleled the difference
between feudalism and modernity.46
The next heavy blow to traditionalists came from Lu Xun (1881-1936), who quoted a
letter from an unknown young man in his “Random Thoughts” as an example of how
people suffered from arranged marriages. This young man called himself “a wretched
Chinese …[who] doesn’t know what love is.”47 The core of his complaint was about his
arranged marriage: when he was nineteen, his parents had found him a wife and while
they got along quite well together he complained that “this marriage was arranged and
brought about by others [just like] two cattle under the master’s order.”48 Lu Xun made
no personal comment in his article and only replied to the question of what constitutes
love with a simple “I do not know either”.49 This response was not surprising,
considering the fact that Lu Xun at that time was himself still trapped in an unhappy
arranged marriage to wife Zhu An 朱安, and had not yet met his true love Xu Guangping
许广平.50 From Lu Xun’s point of view, this letter demonstrated that “the son of man is
awake. He knows what sins have been committed by the old and the young. So he feels
distressed, and opens his mouth to make this cry.”51 Furthermore, Lu Xun asserted that
loveless arranged marriages caused other social problems such as prostitution and
concubinage. At the end of this article, Lu Xun concluded that “freeing our children
completely” was the only way to “settle old scores.”52
On November 15, 1919, a reluctant arranged bride named Zhao Wuzhen 赵五贞 killed
herself in her bridal sedan on her wedding day. This incident pushed the public crusade
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against arranged marriages to its zenith. The Shanghai newspaper Da Gongbao
[L'impartial] opened a special column on the subject and invited people from all walks of
life to comment on the incident. Mao Zedong established his initial fame in the circle of
literati through his series of comments on this issue from November to December of
1919.53 He asserted that Miss Zhao had “died for love of freedom”, identified the
arranged marriage as a crime and claimed that “all parents who are like the parents of
Miss Zhao should be put in prison.” 54 Like many other new culturists, Mao identified
China’s 'evil feudal society' as the principal offender in this tragedy.
Tao Yi 陶毅 (1896-1931), an editor of Nüjie zhong 女界钟 [Women’s Bell], presented
her own comments on Miss Zhao’s suicide from a comparative basis:
A young man has complete freedom to decide whether to marry his betrothed or
to break off the betrothal. But a young woman has no freedom to decide anything
other than whether to hang herself; she had no possible answer besides the words
‘I would rather die’. No matter how strong she is, she cannot resist those timehonored bright lights of Confucianism and paternal authority.” 55
Tao identified Miss Zhao as a martyr “who sacrificed herself to reform the marriage
system.”56 No matter how Miss Zhao’s death was interpreted, the New Culturists
delivered an identical narrative of her plight: as one of the most basic institutions of the
feudal society, the arranged marriage system was the origin of unhappiness and death
and, therefore, it should be destroyed together along with the society in which it had been
growing and developing.
Following the May Fourth tradition, it was clear to reformers that employing a foreign
mouthpiece was of central importance to effecting change on Chinese marriage practices.
One such individual was Ellen Key (1849-1926), a Swedish feminist writer who argued

53

Mao wrote more than nine comments on the incident of Miss Zhao’s Suicide from November to October in 1919, all
of them were first published in Da Gongbao.
54
Mao Zedong, “The Question of Miss Zhao’s Personality”, in Women in Republican China, 86.
55
Tao Yi, “Commentary on Miss Zhao’s Suicide”, originally published in Women’s Bell Special Edition, no.1, under
the name Si Yong, in Women in Republican China, 84.
56
Ibid.

71

that “love is moral even without legal marriage, but marriage is immoral without love.”57
Another foreign influence on the movement was Dora Black (1894-1986), a British
feminist writer and the second wife of the eminent philosopher Bertrand Russell. Black
had accompanied her husband to China in 1920 and lectured in Beijing for a one year
period, during which she gave two lectures addressing questions on marriage and
women’s economic independence.58 Joining these influential women was Edward
Carpenter (1844-1929), an English socialist philosopher who analyzed the negative
effects of the institution of marriage and argued for sexual and economic freedom for
women.59 Although most of these discourses were established in accordance with the
European social context of the early twentieth century, they were contextualized by
Chinese students in the process of implementing their own marriage reform programs.
For example, to legitimize her demand for a free marriage system, Lu Qiuxin, an early
member of the Chinese Communist Party, borrowed the stages theory of Socialism and
correlated the marriage institution with the economic infrastructure on which the whole
social system was built. She believed that marriage practice would change in accordance
with the transformation of the economic infrastructure. As a traditional marriage
institution, Lu argued, the arranged marriage was built on the foundations of an
agricultural infrastructure, as part of the ‘big family system’ that worshiped parental
authorities. However, in contemporary China, the agricultural economic foundation was
being gradually replaced with industrial infrastructure and the ‘big family system’ was
being dissolved. Lu concluded that the marriage institution, in turn, should be
transformed from the arranged pattern into a free pattern in order to meet the
requirements of such a transition.60
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During the May Fourth movement, as more and more intellectuals changed from
progressive to radical stances in order to embrace the cause of the New Culturists, the
middle-course theory was soon overwhelmed by more clamorous demands for
unconditional consensual relationships and a momentous nationwide anti-arranged
marriage campaign. The 1920s witnessed a passionate marriage revolution in China’s big
cities, where urban youth struggled to release themselves from their excruciating filial
duties. The arranged marriage was termed a “mechanical marriage” and recognized by
these young people as a product of a patriarchal family system in which the children were
manipulated by their parents in the same way that machines were operated by workers.
The lack of love as a factor in the process was generally nominated by critics as the first
and original sin of this marriage pattern.61 Sometimes, the attack went to extremes in
applying an oversimplified equation to the custom: arranged marriage = loveless sex =
rape + prostitution. In a brief article published in 1922, Ke Shi 克士 claimed that “the
loveless couple in an arranged marriage, even if they have lived their whole life together,
could not possibly escape God’s final judgment for the sin of leading a life of rape and
prostitution.”62 As a result of such fierce attacks, and in spite of the continuing
predominance of arranged marriages throughout China, the theories of free love and selfchoice marriages had become tenets few dared to challenge in public.

3.3 Love Revolution
With the anti-arranged marriage crusade that started with the New Cultural Movement
and peaked in the May 4th era, came a growing public demand for free love and selfchoice in marriage partnerships. Indoctrinated with such ideas as “love is the only basis
for marriage” and “loveless marriage is immoral”,63 the urban youth who were struggling
to release themselves from filial duties became the leading force of the marriage
revolution of the 1920s. While filled with the radical desire for freedom, love and
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romance, people often felt inexperienced and confused when confronting the
unprecedented freedom of making their own choices in a partner. At the same time, while
positive changes like open socialization, free love, romantic courtship, premarital
cohabitation and self-choice marriages were all becoming common urban phenomena,
more negative aspects of modern relationships like facile breakups, illegal love affairs,
and divorces appeared 'like bamboo shoots after a spring rain'. As a contemporary
observer perceived in 1924:
In these years, the customs of our society experienced a sudden change under the
Western influence. Once the traditional ethics was sentenced to its death,
marriage became the issue calling for the widest concerns…Many young people
of our country are too hasty to catch on to the real meaning of marriage before
taking actions, and therefore suffered painful failures…This cannot be
considered good for society…64
In response to the social disturbances provoked by this radical transition of marriage
conceptions, the open debates on marriage moralities were again raised by a group of
elites. These men and women sought to fully reconstruct Chinese marriage norms in an
attempt to clarify the confusion surrounding love and marriage and to provide correct
guidance and effective solutions for the issues that had arisen.65

3.3.1

Defining Love

Agreeing with the observation that the “Chinese have no love; Chinese do not know the
meaning of love; so it is impossible to discuss love with Chinese”, marriage advisors in
China at the time often began their advice with an introduction on the nature of love. 66
Although 'love' [ai 爱] was defined broadly in the Confucian classics, the word was more
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often used to describe a moral sense of responsibility between a superior and an inferior
(such as the relationships between emperor and vassal, father and son, elder brother and
younger brother, master and servant) rather than to describe the affectionate feelings and
intimate behavior between two lovers.67 When they did refer to this kind of intimacy, the
classics often indicated illicit sexual involvement.
How to interweave the Western conception of “love” with Chinese marriage discourse,
without provoking strong opposition from both conservatives and radicals, had been a
critical intellectual concern of the May 4th era leaders. Although the Western
interpretation of love was familiar to the Chinese urban youth of the 1920s through early
feminist and New Culturalist advocacy, the marriage moralists represented by the
contributors of Funü zazhi felt it necessary to establish a uniquely Chinese interpretation
of the concept.
To distinguish modern love from its traditional conception, the new cultural elite created
a discourse of “lian’ai” [恋爱 amativeness] to specify the practice of lovers. According to
one well-accepted definition given by Wu Juenong 吴觉农 in 1922, love was “the lust
that originated from the nature of two sexes, restricted by reasons and self-control power,
following free minds and worshiping mutual respect, joining two parties’ souls and
bodies to fulfill the mission of individual and race.” 68 While recognizing love as the
natural and inevitable lust that was driven by man and woman’s biological-chemical
mechanism in response to the demand for racial continuation, the marriage reformists of
the May Fourth era unanimously put their emphasis on humankind’s mental control over
sexual desire and took spiritual love as an absolute prerequisite for any sexual behavior.
They argued that it was the human being’s capacity to restrain from sexual desire that
distinguished human procreation from animal mating and, thus, made human love unique
and sacred. 69 Sex, while being accepted by analysts as a necessary part of the process,
was actually viewed by most of them as the dark side of love, in opposition to the
brighter, spiritual side. People were repeatedly warned by these authorities about the
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dangers of sexual indulgence and were called upon to use their mental powers in order to
constrain their lust before the spiritual love connection was consummated. Otherwise,
pure, sacred and virtuous love would be degraded as dirty, unsanctified and unprincipled
licentiousness.70 Similar to the traditional Confucians, who agreed upon the inevitability
of marital sex, these new moralists recognized engagement and marriage as the only
procedures that could legitimize and purify sexual behavior through the ritualized
confirmation of the love-based relationship.

3.3.2

Confused Love Practice

The traditional love practice, as described by one free-love advocate, was like playing
“hide and seek” - people were asked to close their eyes and try to love anyone he or she
could catch.71 What most worried the social reformers of the 1920s, however, was what
would happen when people were allowed to open their eyes. When free and
unconditional love was upheld to a paramount position, contemporary observers easily
perceived the unrest that could be caused in big cities from the exposure of illegal love
affairs to neighborhood gossip, sexual indulgence between young lovers, breakup notices
in newspapers and competitive boasts from economically-motivated ladies about the
generosity of their lovers or husbands. These concerns consequently provoked a newround of fears about moral decline in China.
Part of the misunderstanding surrounding modern love came from general confusion in
society about the latest available socializing opportunities between the opposite sexes.
Under the strict regulation of traditional gender separation, the only open socialization
allowed between men and women was that between a prostitute and her customer. For
most couples, the wedding day was the first time a bride and groom met. It was not until
the 1920s, after female students were officially admitted onto university campuses, that
face-to-face communication in public between the two sexes even became a possibility.
Even then, public tolerance for socialization between the sexes was still rather low. Girls’
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school students, for example, constantly complained about the school administrators
reading and confiscating personal letters from their likely boyfriends under the excuse of
protecting the innocent, unmarried girls.72
Marriage reformists and female activists were especially disappointed by the fact that
many men and women ignored the significance of gender equality behind open
socialization, and instead assumed that love and marriage were the only purpose of crosssex socialization.73 This misconception was caused partly by the general lack of
experience among the Chinese people in dealing with the opposite sex due to the long
history of gender separation, partly by the natural law of sexual attraction and most of all,
by the contemporary social context of the 1920s. Because most commoners had not yet
been exposed to modern ideas, wherever and whenever a young man and a young woman
were seen spending time together, it often attracted public gossip and attention. As Yang
Zhihua 杨之华 (1900-1973) perceived in 1922, people developed a tendency to identify
any public communication with love, which therefore deliberately pushed them to
develop the “business of love”, which subsequently led to meaningless sex, easy
breakups or frequent divorces. Yang felt that that this kind of love was “caused by
outside pressure”, took it as an objective obstacle against individual freedom and true
love and blamed those people “who have been steeped in the old tradition to resent and
make a fuss about socializing between men and women” 74.
Like “open socialization”, “courtship” was another term that was traditionally interpreted
by Confucian thinkers as an immoral expression of illegitimate love, most often used to
describe the relationship between prostitute and patron.75 Love stories such as “Xixiang
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ji”西厢记 [Romance of the Western Chamber] and “Qiangtou mashang”墙头马上 [By
the wall, on the horse] are the only traditional sources of such affairs. In these tales,
practices that defined “courtship” include the hero and heroine falling in love at first sight
during a chance meeting, exchanging secret poetry, engaging in secretive nocturnal
meetings and having hasty sexual encounters. These popular stories became the only
available texts that could provide the Chinese youth of the 1920s with an example of
courtship. Sometimes, courtship methods employed by inexperienced young men were
awkward. It was said that female students often received love letters from unknown
admirers and sometimes a girl could get several dozen love letters from one person within
a few months. Those who were misled by sexual instinct and the popular misconception
of cross-gender socialization found it difficult to distinguish friend from love subject. An
accidental exchange of words, a letter or even eye contact between a man and a woman
was easily mistaken by one or both inexperienced parties as an expression of love.76 It
was common to see two young people rushing into a love affair or engagement after only
exchanging letters or poetry, and even before their first formal date.77 It is no surprise that
many such rash love affairs ended with a quick breakup or short term marriage, which
attracted fierce critiques from conservatives as it confirmed their worst fears.
Another source of the disturbances caused by changing conceptions in China about love
concerned a growing interest in money among urban educated young women.
Considering that there were still very few formally educated women in China in the
1920s, there was a tendency among critics to suggest that young, educated ladies were
“trading their identities as women students for rich husbands”, “voluntary play toys of
men” or “parasites of man”.78 Their perceived money-worshipping tendency and greed
for material luxuries led to the complaint that “free-love is a luxury only available to the
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rich.”79 However, in a society where women were theoretically and practically
discouraged from having an independent life, no matter how hard the ideas of
“independent love” and “unconditional love” were pushed, it was difficult for a woman to
find a decent, easy and well-paid career after graduation. In speaking of Nora, the heroine
of Henrik Ibsen’s iconic A Doll’s House, Lu Xun predicted that after she left the
dollhouse, in a society that offered her no psychological support and no means of
financial support “she can hardly avoid going to the bad and returning…Dreams are fine;
otherwise money is essential.”80 Finding a decent lover or husband was no doubt much
easier for a Chinese ‘new woman’ than trying to find gainful employment.81
The mania of a few young people for “unconditional free love” became a source of public
disturbance in the 1920s. For instance, in 1922 Yang Zhihua published an article
criticizing a male suitor who tried to press her into a romantic affair with him without
considering her unwillingness and the fact that she was happily married. This man, who
labeled himself as an advocate for unconditional love, alleged that “as long as two people
know and care about each other, love does not depend on the amount of time they have
spent together.” When his advances were refused by Yang, he “spread the rumor that he
and she were romantically involved”, and “kept writing her intimate letters, asking her to
divorce her husband and marry him.” In one letter, he said: “love is a necessity of life and
an indication of life force. Just as when one worships and prays to God or Buddha, one
has to continue to do so even if one’s prayers are not answered…One cannot stop loving
simply because one’s love is not requited.” Love, in his interpretation, was simply a
flirting game: “in society there are some young men and women who try to seduce the
opposite sex by wearing fancy clothing and using specially rehearsed language. That is
what people call ‘flirting.’ But wealth, fame, erudition and personality could also seduce
people. So ‘flirting’ is nothing but a bad name a few old moralists and intellectuals gave
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to the proletarian underdog’s expression of love.”82 Here, love was interpreted as not only
absolutely unconditional, but also selfish and vulgar. Since the enthusiasts of absolute
and unconditional love insisted that “true love is a pure and forever thing that never
changes no matter what happens” and the belief that “faith will move mountains”, their
self-wills produced more than a few cases like the one Yang encountered. 83
Sometimes, a man’s persistent infatuation with a woman, like the man in Yang’s case,
was more of an issue of ‘face’ than that of love. Edward Alsworth Ross (1866-1951), an
American sociologist who traveled to China in 1910, perceived that in the early twentieth
century “a class of Chinese students was horrified to learn from their teacher that in
America a young man proposing marriage to a maiden might be refused. To them the
rejection of a man by a mere woman implied a loss of ‘face’ too dreadful to
contemplate.”84 For a man obsessed with men’s superiority over women, establishing a
love relation with a woman he desired is like a game between a hunter and his prey. The
more beautiful and dangerous the prey, the more exciting and challenging the hunt would
be and the more powerful and strong the victorious hunter would be proved.
Pushing the idea of love freedom to its extreme, some radicals went so far as to advocate
free sex. For example, a respondent to a marriage survey of 1927 added his comment on
the questionnaire: “we do not need useless monogamy… Our opinion is to abolish the
marriage system and replace it with men and women’s free union (not marriage). This is
a union based on love. Free sexual behavior should be advocated.”85 This notion, of
course, was cause for alarm from the marriage reformists. Addressing this bold claim, the
surveyor Pan Guangdan 潘光旦(1899-1967), derided: “although monogamy is not an

82

Yang Zhihua, “Love and Socializing Between Men and Women”, July 1922; “The Debate over ‘Love and Open
Socializing Between Men and Women’, August 11, 1922.” Collected in Women in Republican China, 44-49.
83
Xi Ling 西泠, “Bu Yanmie de Lian’ai”不湮灭的恋爱[Endless Love], Funü Pinglun, in Zhongguo funü wenti taolun
ji, vol.4, 4.
84
Edward Alsworth Ross, The Changing Chinese: the conflict of Oriental and Western cultures in China (New York:
The Century Company, 1911),188.
85
Pan Guangdan, “Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti” 中国家庭问题 [Questions on Chinese Family], Xinyue Shudian, 1928.
Collected in Li Wenhai, ed., Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian, 259-359: 296.

80

unalterable principle, in current and the closest future, it is impossible to be ‘useless,’…
in this way Chinese family problems would never ever be solved.”86

3.3.3

Programmed Love Practice

In order to address the public disruption brought about by changes to traditional policies
regarding open socialization, courtship and free love, marriage advisors designed several
'love programs' for youth to follow. These programs followed three fundamental tenets:
first, free love should be established on the basis of economic independence, to the
exclusion of all monetary considerations; second, the two parties in love should be
monogamous, so as to be spiritually and sexually loyal to each other;87 third, love should
be the union of matched bodies and matched souls. 88
One such love program was designed by Zhou Jianren 周建人 (1888-1984), the editor of
Funü Zazhi, and the younger brother of Lu Xun. In this program, a complete love process
should include three phases: first, a friendship period when a man and a woman socialize
and communicate like friends; secondly, a courtship period when a man and a woman
who have been friends deliberately develop love feelings between one another; third, a
consummation period when the procedure of lian’ai [corporeal and spiritual
incorporation] takes place. Taking the idea of matched souls as the basis of any life-long
love relation, Zhou emphasized the importance of a long duration for the friendship
phase, in pursuit of the best understanding of each other’s personalities and interests. He
asserted that the breakup of a love relation was a possible outcome of undeveloped love
caused by the lack or insufficiency of the friendship period. 89
Many love programmers took cross-gender socialization as a dangerous shortcut to
forming meaningful relationships and therefore attempted to design a program that might
avoid wrongdoing while adhering to the principles of free love. A program published in
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1923 introduced three policies that were intended to prevent such false steps. The first
policy was to avoid unnecessary social contact between the sexes in general. The second
policy required the two parties to keep a cool head and not broach the issue of love too
easily. Once love had occurred, this second policy called for a precautious selfexamination in order to assess the compatibility and marriage suitability of the couple.
People at this stage were instructed to ask themselves four questions: 1) Am I satisfied
with his or her level of education and knowledge? 2) Do we have matched personalities?
3) Will he or she accept my love? 4) Is it possible for us to get married? The program
insisted that if any of the above questions could not be answered in the affirmative then
the 'love sprout' should be terminated as soon as possible. The third policy set a general
age limit against adolescent love with the suggestion that one should talk about love only
after he or she had entered university.90 Like the designer of this love program, these
marriage advisors generally tried to relieve the public’s uneasiness about cross-sex
socialization by advocating a “marriage-tracking” socializing manner based on critical
thinking, mutual willingness and compatibility. Marriage here was set as both the premise
and the goal of love. Just as sex was allowed only under the condition of marriage, love
was allowed to occur only under the consideration of marriage.
This love program was exemplified in the love story of wife Gu Qizhong 顾绮仲 and
husband Zhang Mianyin 张勉寅 published in 1922.91 At the beginning of the story,
Zhang was introduced as a friend of Gu’s brother. He and his future wife did not know of
each other until one day when Miss Gu mistakenly opened a letter that had been sent to
her brother from Zhang. The letter evoked Gu’s interest, so she tried to acquire more
information about Zhang from her brother and subsequently asked for a formal
introduction. After a few correspondences, the two got engaged through exchanging
photos and started to see each other. Their courtship, which actually began after the
official engagement, included face-to-face talks two or three times per week and frequent
correspondence. In a five-day trip to Hangzhou, a couple of months before the wedding,
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they slept together for the first time. They got married with a simple tea-party wedding on
July 9th, 1921, and reportedly lived happily ever after.
The lian’ai process in the story of Zhang and Gu revealed the hybrid nature of the love
practice in China in the 1920s. Like most of their conservative countrymen, the couple’s
pre-engagement contact was limited to indirect knowledge and the exchange of a few
letters. Photos were exchanged only after the engagement was made. Although the match
was formally arranged by Gu’s brother (their parents had passed away years earlier), her
eagerness to settle on a marital engagement illustrated not only the activeness and
autonomy a Chinese ‘new woman’ was able to use in pursuit of her own marriage
freedom, but also the social reality that the self mate-selection opportunities available for
women were so few that she had to take a quick and decisive move in order to seize the
opportunity when it arose.
It is evident that Zhang and Gu's relationship was still relatively conservative, in that
marriage was the goal from the outset and that they only became lovers after they had
become engaged. This example is consistent with the moderate marriage reformers’
proposition that engagement and marriage were the only procedures that could legitimize
and purify sex behavior through the ritualized confirmation of love relations. In the
progressive minds of urban youth, love and marriage were identical and served each other
in a causal manner. Only under the guarantee of marriage could love be allowed to
develop freely between the contractors.

3.4 Marriage in Revolution
The gap between the radical theory and reserved marriage practice was further revealed
in a series of surveys conducted by sociologists and educators in the 1920s. With students
as the main group of respondents, many such surveys were carried out in schools at
various levels in form of questionnaires. The surveys utilized here are: Chen Heqin’s 陈
鹤琴 marriage investigation of students in the Jiangnan area (Zhejiang and Jiangsu) in
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192192; Gan Nanyin’s 甘南引 broad survey in 1924 on students from 26 provinces of
China studying in Beijing93; Pan Guangdan’s 潘光旦 survey in 1927, which included
participants from all walks of life94; Chen Lilan’s 陈利兰 marriage survey of 200 women
students from Beijing in 192995; and Zhou Shuzhao’s 周叔昭 investigation in Yanjing
University in 1931.96 With the exception of Chen Lilan’s all-female survey, only a few of
the other studies involved women respondents: Pan Guangdan’s survey involved 44
women and Zhou Shuzhao’s study included 45 female participants. Considering the
issues of marriage and family, these surveys provided first-hand statistical data on how
marriage thoughts were transformed and practiced in the May Fourth era by the most
privileged societal group that was in the closest contact with Western social institutions.
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3.4.1

Why Marry?

Why do people get married or what is the goal for people in a marriage? These are
questions that often appeared at the top of the questionnaires. The decline of the
traditional family conception following the May 4th movement led to a significant
transformation of marriage goals among the urban elite, who were then engaging in an
enthusiastic pursuit of modernization. In Gan Nanyin’s 1924 survey, among the 249
single male respondents who gave explicit answers to “why marry”, 213 believed that
marriage should serve individual purposes. These purposes could vary from finding a
good helpmate at home, satisfying a human’s sexual needs, giving spiritual comfort, or
pursuing domestic happiness. Only 36 respondents (14.45%) considered the purpose of
marriage was to continue the family line. Zhou Shuzhao’s 1931 survey at Yanjing
University yielded similar results: 56 out of the 143 male students who participated
agreed that the first priority of a marriage should be to enjoy romantic love and live
together with one’s love. Producing children remained in second place as a priority, with
54 supporters.97
Compared to men, educated women seemed more idealistic regarding the subject of
marriage. Chen Lilan’s marriage survey in 1929 revealed that while women played a
relatively active role in pursuing their own marriage happiness and considered marriage
an individual matter, they also felt it concerned social responsibility and human duty. The
sublime goal of marriage, Chen concluded from the answers she collected, “is to match
the souls of two, which is not only a physical match, but also a mutual attraction of spirit
and intellect. The goal of marriage is to increase mutual happiness, to serve the country,
to fulfill the mission of producing capable and quality citizens for the country.”98
For most urban commoners and the rural population, however, producing male
descendents in order to continue the family line was still the dominant purpose of
marriage. This tendency was primarily revealed in Pan Guangdan’s 1927 survey. Pan
utilized the answers of 317 respondents, whose educational background ranged from
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university to home-educated. Most of the respondents chose “producing good children”
as the first goal of a marriage, followed by “romantic life with a life partner.” The option
of “serving parents” ranked third in importance while “sexual desire” was the last.
Among Pan’s 116 respondents with university degrees, 48% chose romantic love as the
first goal of a marriage. Contrary to the most educated cohort, none of the 24 participants
with an elementary school education cited romantic love as being of primary importance
in a marriage.99
Pan Guangdan, as one of China’s most distinguished sociologists and eugenicists with a
Master’s of Science from Columbia University, showed uneasiness with Chinese young
people’s overemphasis on “romantic life”. His experiences in America (1922-1925) led
him to consider the growing demand for romantic life in China as a sign of overdeveloped individualism. He believed that the spread of this kind of thinking might lead
to a marriage crisis in which men and women were irresponsible, sexually indulgent, and
ignorant of their familial duties.100 Pan believed that the primary duty of a marriage was
to produce and raise children and that this duty was particularly vital for Chinese society
where family was the basic social unit. His argument was that it was the children, instead
of the couple, who should be the center of a family. Once this center was removed, he
feared, the family would collapse, which would then create social disorder.101

3.4.2

Who Decides on a Marriage?

After the May Fourth mania for personal freedom faded, there was a general return to
conservative marriage thinking in China. Social surveys of the 1920s demonstrated that
most people investigated were married by third party arrangement. Gan Nanyin’s
marriage survey in 1924, for example, shows that of the 395 married subjects, 341 were
married to arranged partners and 91 out of 130 subjects were engaged by arrangement.102
Although more and more people believed in individual autonomy for marriage decisions,
few youths actually had enough courage to entirely exclude their parents’ opinions from
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the process. When Pan Guangdan conducted an investigation at two universities in 1926,
most respondents (78.2% at one school and 79.7% at the other) agreed that there were
benefits in making a joint decision between the individual and his or her family.103 Pan’s
survey the following year yielded a similar result: although 312 out of 317 respondents
disagreed with total parental control of marriage decisions, 253 of them considered that
parents acting in a consultant role was necessary and suggested that children listen to
parental opinion. According to Pan Guandan, the final decision for a marriage should be
left in the hands of cautious and objective parents, rather than those of hot-headed youths
in love.104 Zhou Shuzhao's survey shows that among his 188 respondents at Yanjing
University, 63.29% supported this kind of joint decision process for modern marriages.105
Compared to men, female students were more active and autonomous in making marriage
choices. Chen Lilan’s 1929 survey of 80 married or engaged female students showed that
most participants (52 out of 80) were married or engaged under their own free wills or
from a joint decision made with their families.106 Among her 120 single subjects, 75
expressed preference for a self-determined marriage, while 45 preferred making the
marriage decision with their family. Thus, at the same time the arranged marriage
practice was fading from urban life, the co-decision pattern was gaining rising support.
Among the 45 female participants of Zhou Shuzhao’s 1931 survey, 38 chose the “codecision” option that combined parental consent with the daughter’s free choice.107
While the language of free marriage called for a total rejection of the interference of third
parties, completely excluding parents from marriage considerations was a process filled
with guilt for those young Chinese who grew up under a conservative family system. In
1923, one young man with the pseudonym “Mr. M” provided his personal experience as
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an example of how painful this move was. In order to escape from his arranged marriage
to an illiterate woman, Mr. M went to another city against his parents’ will. When he
learned that his father was legally sued by the fiancé’s family for breaking off the
engagement without grounds, he could not help feeling guilty. He only felt better when
his action was encouraged by his New Culturist friends. However, his guilty feelings
returned and redoubled upon receiving a letter from his father, in which he was told that
his ex-fiancé had become a spinster, sworn never to marry. Although their engagement
had been cancelled, she continued to look after Mr. M’s sick mother. Touched by her
behavior, Mr. M in return took an oath of life-long celibacy and painfully broke up with
his pen-pal girlfriend. His letter ended with a sigh of “now what is left to me is only
penitence.”108 Cutting off the family and chasing personal freedom was easier said than
done. Parental affection, the devotion of traditional female virtue and the responsibilities
of filial piety were all parts of an ethical network that were woven into the fabric of
Chinese society. These traditional notions could not be broken by the individual without
losing part of one's humanity. This might partly explain why respondents to the 1920s’
surveys largely preferred the moderate consensual solution over the more radical total
rejection of parental opinion. As Chen Heqin suggested, “under the present circumstance
that the knowledge and morality of Chinese have not been completely constructed, a full
copy of the Western marriage institution might cause wrongs; the best solution is a
combination of old and new.”109 In general, urban areas in May Fourth era China saw the
popular existence of three types of marriages: traditional arranged, radical free-choice
and an eclectic mix of parental order with children’s consent. The third type was
considered by many contemporaries the best for a transitional period, although it ran
against the principles of free love.110 The tendency was to increase individual autonomy
in order to assert one’s own leading role in marriage decision, while limiting the parents’
roles to being advisors and consultants.
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3.4.3

How to Find a Prospective Marriage Partner?

As more and more parents and matchmakers were excluded from the mate-selection
process, the problem of finding a prospective marriage partner fell entirely upon the
shoulders of the eligible youths themselves. Open cross-gender socialization certainly
provided many more opportunities for men and women to get to know each other, but as
the moralists had warned, social intercourse oriented by mate-selection could easily lead
to moral decline and many other social problems. Nonetheless, for many post-May 4th
youths, any intervention from a third party was considered a violation of their “natural
love”.
When Chen Heqin’s single male respondents were asked “what will you do to find
yourself a marriage partner”, more than half (70 of 132) chose that the process “started
with daily socialization and purposeful observation”. Only 38 respondents expressed their
preference for introduction to potential partners from third parties (friends or family
members).111 In 1924, when the same question appeared in Gan Nanyin’s survey, among
the 313 single males, only 21 (6%) agreed on the need for the intervention of a third
party. Friends, teachers and relatives were cited as the respondents’’ most favored
initiators. While generally rejecting a third party’s intervention, many youths were
confused about how to meet girls in a proper way. Almost half of Gan’s respondents (153
of 313) considered open socialization was a viable way to meet and develop love with
future marriage subjects. The other half (139 of 313), however, either left inexplicit
answers or simply answered “I don’t know.” 112
Still, inch by inch, the old customs were yielding to more modern ideas. Courtship might
not have been as commonly seen, but young people sill conversed under parental eyes on
occasion. Even under circumstances when they might not talk together directly, young
people were now permitted to see each other across a room or to exchange photographs.
The new youth in China increasingly insisted on knowing what kind of a person was
proposed for them. More than half of the engaged respondents in Gan’s survey had met
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their fiancés before the wedding. Furthermore, among those who claimed they had never
seen their fiancés in person, many had still seen photos of their betrothed.113 Chen Lilan’s
1929 survey further revealed that among highly educated girls, it had been the fashion to
marry someone one already knew well, though there was no obvious pattern of broad
objections to the matches arranged for them. Among the 80 married and engaged female
respondents, 71 knew their husbands or fiancée well before the marriage contract was
consummated.114 In a society where most families still considered women’s education
unnecessary and wasteful, those families that did allow girls to acquire higher education
were typically more enlightened and generous in dealing with their children’s marriages.
The 1920s saw a radical transition in the way people picked their mates. Although the
morality of mate-selecting socialization was still in question, developing free love from
relationships made in open cross-gender socialization had been recognized by reformers
as an ideal method for youth to find life partners. Generally, the educated youth were not
satisfied with having only limited familiarity with their partners before marriage, while
many parents felt that this was the border where their compromises lay. What the youth
was really expecting from open socialization was not only the freedom to find love, but
also the right of choice in partner. For those who utilized this kind of open social
intercourse, the process was a matter of both love and freedom.

3.4.4

When to Marry?

Pan Guangdan’s survey in 1927 revealed a tendency for later marriage ages among
intellectuals. Among the 317 participants, the earliest marriage age was 21 for men and
20 for women. More than half of those surveyed remained single after 25.115 Chen Lilan’s
1929 survey of female students indicated that the early marriage tradition had already
been considered outdated among the “new women” circle. Most of the married women
under her investigation got married at the later ages of 23 or 24.116 Zhou Shuzhao’s
survey in 1931 further confirmed this tendency. About 53% of his male respondents
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considered the ideal marriage age was 25-30 for men and 20-25 for women; Most of his
female respondents preferred ages 30-35 for men and 25-30 for women.117
The fundamental reasons behind people’s preference for late marriages may have
involved the new concepts of marriage explored above, but they also depended on
economic realities. When marriage became a matter of choice in China, people began to
enjoy the process of mate selection and experiencing longer pre-marital romances.
Moreover, for those who managed to enter high school or university, the earliest
graduating age was 18, only after which could an individual find a job and gain his/her
own economic independence. For both men and women, later marriages meant more
guaranteed individual freedoms, more promising careers and more economic support.
As for the age gap between genders, the surveys demonstrated that both men and women
preferred the matches of an older husband to a younger wife.118 The reason for this
preference, as cited by respondents, was largely cosmetic: biologically, a woman often
looks older than a man of the same age so it was considered safer for a woman to marry
an older husband. Chen Lilan confirmed this point by asserting that “for present women,
age is such a critical matter that it will decide the fate of marriage.”119 This kind of
uneasiness about age was so deeply rooted in women’s minds that it was still perceivable
among those who had obtained the more important potential of economic independence.

3.4.5

Whom to Marry: Mate-selection Politics

As these social surveys revealed, utilitarian concerns such as wealth, political power and
appearance had been theoretically excluded from the public marriage considerations of
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the post-May Fourth generation, if not necessarily in private considerations. For many
young people, mate selection became a rational thinking process with a straightforward
purpose: finding an ideal wife or husband as quickly as possible. Criteria lists for
potential partners that were recommended by marriage consultants thus often included
categories for personality, education, profession, physical condition, interests, family
120

background and moral consciousness.

According to the surveys, men’s criteria for an ideal wife included personality, physical
condition, education, household managing ability, appearance, sexual morality, family
background, profession or economic capability, thoughts on motherhood and dowry.
Although the data for women’s criteria is less complete, the available statistics suggest
that women were most concerned with personality, physical condition, ability to handle
affairs, education, sexual morality, appearance, profession or economic capability, family
background, thoughts on fatherhood and property.121
In comparison, we find that men and women were identical regarding their top two
priorities: personality and physical condition, with the former trait being considered
critical for compatibility and the latter for reproduction. The first divergence between the
genders appeared with respect to the third issue: where men expected more educated
women, women sought men who were more capable managers (i.e. reliable). The second
divergence appeared over issues of appearance and sexual morality: where men attached
more importance to appearance, women felt that men should be morally conscious and
constrain their sexual behavior.
In general, both men and women seemed to care less about family background, wealth
and political power than personal compatibility. Having a good personality ranked at the
top of all the criteria lists (for both men and women), as presented in the social surveys.
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Investigators used the word “xingqing 性情” for the English word ‘personality’, which is
a synthesis of the characters disposition and temper. Although it may appear contrary to
the expectations of the ostensibly liberated May 4th generation, the surveys from the
1920s demonstrate that possessing a mild temperament was still considered by educated
young men as the most desirable trait in an ideal wife. For example, in Chen Heqin’s
survey, approximately 87% of the participants (223 of 257) chose “mild temper” as the
most important personality trait in an ideal wife. A college student writing about his
illiterate wife in 1924 commented that “her mild temper is the only thing I appreciate
about her. She adores me so much that she obeys every word I said. Therefore I can
possibly transform her to meet my expectations (for a modern wife).”122 The surveys
from the later period yielded a similar result, suggesting that in spite of the gains of the
women’s rights movement in China, the typical husband still sought a “mild tempered
wife” that could be more easily dominated and manipulated.123
As for the women in the surveys, who customarily had little chance to speak out about
their expectations for a husband, most appeared awkward and inexperienced when asked
to comment on the subject.124 Among the few who did respond to Chen Lilan’s survey,
most respondents desired a man who was gentle.125 Although few discussed the
motivation behind this choice, it is safe to assume that in a society where a woman had to
marry into her husband’s family with little or no regard for love or her own arrangements,
finding a passionate and gentle husband not only meant more affection and love, but also
less pressure from her future in-laws. Whereas men were expecting a wife of mild
temperament to follow their orders, women made the same choice in order to find more
romantic and affectionate family circumstances.
The physical condition of potential partners that were discussed in the surveys often
comprised two aspects: health and appearance. Although both men and women ranked
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physical health as second in importance only to personality, physical appearance was less
a concern for both men (ranked 5th) and women (ranked 6th).126 Under the influence of
eugenics theory, Chinese intellectuals were of the opinion that the weak physical
condition of parents was to blame for the production of unhealthy babies, and ultimately
made for a weak nation. For most women, however, marriage was still a singular
business, and the value of a married woman lay primarily in her reproductive capabilities.
Whether or not the husband was healthy enough to inseminate her would decide the fate
of the latter half of her life.
The image of a physically healthy woman in China changed in accordance with the
transition of people’s aesthetics. In the 1920s, the term ‘natural’ came to be defined as
healthy, and this definition applied specifically to women’s physical appearance, with the
condition of their hair and feet being of particular importance. In China, appearance had
never ranked high as a factor in choosing an ideal wife, even after the decision-making
rights had been transferred from parents to children. The investigations of both Pan
Guangdan and Zhou Shuzhao showed that appearance ranked fifth among the male
respondents’ wife-selection considerations, next to personality, health, education and
household management ability.127 However, excluding appearance from the top three
marriage considerations did not mean that Chinese men did not care about their wives’
appearance at all. For example, Chen Heqin’s 1921 report indicated just how much these
men did care about a woman’s looks. Among his 257 respondents, only 24 men (9.34%)
claimed that they did not care at all about their wives’ appearance. Conversely, more than
half (54.28%) expressed expectations for a good-looking wife and about one third
(35.74%) claimed a preference for simple looking women.128
It is not unusual that men would be attracted to beautiful women, but it is unusual when
they are not. A couple of considerations may help explain this result. Firstly, it had been a
tradition of Chinese literature to call beautiful women huoshui 祸水 - the source of
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trouble. The man who allowed himself to become emotionally involved with beautiful
women was often criticized as being fatuous and lascivious. This belief led to the popular
saying “marry a wife for her virtues, take a concubine for her beauty.” Secondly, the
traditional belief that the simpler a woman looks, the more obedient and virtuous she is
was further validated by the growing concern for money among contemporary urban
ladies. Many women spent freely on luxuries such as makeup, clothing, jewelry and
accessories. This new trend prompted the public belief that beauty ‘cost a fortune’,
which was in contrast to the continuing value placed on hard work and simplicity.129
Conversely, a woman without thick makeup, expensive clothes and jewelry often left the
impression of a person who led an austere life, which was suitable for a good housewife.
Lastly, according to the free-love discourse, two people who truly love each other should
not care about the other party’s appearance. An open claim of one’s preference for
simple-looking girls would be the best demonstration of one’s belief and support for true
love. Considering the slight probability that a woman would be both virtuous and goodlooking, men had to make the moral choice of putting virtue above appearance in order to
avoid public criticism.
As for what constituted a physically attractive female in 1920s China, hair and feet were
of primary importance. With the exception of a few fashionable female students,
professionals and radical activists who dared to cut or curl their hair, most women still
combed their hair into traditional styles: plaits for single women or buns for married
women.130 The surveys revealed that “dark long hair” was still an indispensable part of a
single man’s dream-girl image.131 Girls’ feet were also represented as a serious
consideration of male thinking on potential partners in the surveys prior to 1930. As more
and more educated young men became infatuated with women who had unbound feet, the

129

In Gan Nanyin’s survey on single men’s preferences for women’s disposition, most respondents (207) checked the
option “advocating thrifty and simple lifestyle.” Comparatively, far fewer respondents checked the options
“beautiful looking” (139) and “dandified” (17). Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian, 190.
130
According to Gan’s survey, among the 397 husbands, only six managed to have their wives cut their hair.
131
Gan Nanyin’s survey revealed that women’s hair was still a matter in consideration as late as 1924. Among the total
842 respondents, 57 left no answer, 396 (47%) agreed that their wives or future wives could cut their hair, while 389
(46%) disagreed. Most male consenters to women’s cutting their hair were married men (213 of 396), and dissenters
were mostly engaged or single men.

95

custom of footbinding rapidly retreated from urban life.132 Gan Nanyin sorted out a direct
correlation between men’s affections and their wives’ feet. In his married cohort, 242 of
397 men had wives with bound-feet but only 34% of these men said they had affection
for their wives. Among the 40 men whose wives’ feet were 'liberated', however, 46%
showed affection for their wives. This rate was improved to 53% for the 96 men whose
wives had never bound their feet.133 In summary, men’s aesthetic judgment in the May
Fourth era evolved to appreciate more natural looks in women: feet without the distortion
of traditional binding, natural hair without artificial styling and a natural face without
over-applied makeup all made up the definition of a modern and attractive woman. For
Chinese men, their wife’s appearance still ranked next to her virtue and reproductive
ability.134
Compared to men, women’s expectations on the issue of physical appearance were much
simpler. In Chen Lilan’s investigation, only 15% of the single female respondents were
concerned about whether or not their future husbands would be good-looking.135 This
trend is not uncommon, considering the popularity of finding a “talented groom and
beautiful bride” [langcai nümao 郎才女貌], a common phrase used to describe an ideal
match. Although men had pledged to focus more on women’s virtue and talent than on
their appearance, women generally stuck to the traditional emphasis on men’s talent,
since it would fundamentally decide the living condition of their married lives.
In the 1920s, the theory that ignorance is a woman’s virtue had been reversed through the
full development of women’s education. Educated girls were now ‘selling like hot cakes’
in the matrimonial market. This tendency was testified to again and again in the social
surveys. For example, Chen Heqin’s survey in 1921 showed that more than half of the
respondents (131 out of 219) not only expected educated wives, but also preferred
women with a higher education. Gan Nanyin’s survey further demonstrated that illiteracy
and a lack of formal education had become a dominant problem that endangered existing

132

Dorothy Ko, Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding (Berkeley , Los Angeles, and London:
University of California Press, 2005), chapter 2.
133
Gan Nanyin, 154-155.
134
Pan Guangdan, 326.
135
Chen Lilan, 233-234.

96

marriages. Among the 395 married male respondents, 64% had wives who had never
entered school. 233 of these men said that they were dissatisfied with their wives’
ignorance and illiteracy, many of them thereby expressed resentment for their marriages
and some even wanted to sue for divorce as a result. Where illiteracy had once been a
woman's virtue, it was now a liability and female education had become one of the most
important quantities in a potential marriage partner. As many families started to realize,
“at present, it is very difficult for a girl without school education to find an intellectual
husband even if she is wealthy.”136

3.4.6

To Marry or Not?

While most Chinese social theorists were concerned with reforming the institution of
marriage, more than a few radicals and anarchists sought to abolish it altogether, or even
to adopt lives of celibacy. The advocates of marriage abolishment, or feihun zhuyi 非婚
主义 introduced Russian-born American anarchist Emma Goldman (1869-1940) as their
mouthpiece. In 1897, Goldman openly spoke out in favor of “the independence of
woman, her right to support herself; to live for herself; to love whomever she pleases, or
as many as she pleases.”137 Goldman’s article “Marriage and Love” defined marriage as
an economic arrangement and an “insurance pact” that sucks away a woman’s soul by
making her a parasite and an absolute dependent. Therefore, she proposed a situation
born out of love instead of from marriage.138 Although Goldman accused the marriage
institution mostly from a feminist perspective, her male Chinese followers put more
emphasis on achieving the unlimited freedom of love. As Zhe Min 哲民, a contributor of
the journal “Juewu”觉悟 (Awakening), argued in 1920:
“It is the existence of a marriage system that leads to the division of husband
and wife; this division then becomes the source of all kinds of gender
inequalities, and discriminations towards women...a marriage system not only
causes family tensions, and constraints between father and son, but also
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provokes a lot of inheritance problems. Without a complete rejection of marriage
system, there will never be brightness and happiness in China...”139
Labeling themselves as lovers of freedom and opponents of the 'feudal family', many
young men took marriage abolition as a panacea to all social problems. Through rejecting
arranged wives and cohabitating with younger, prettier and better educated lovers, these
radicals saw themselves as cutting off feudal bonds and challenging patriarchal
authorities, though this behavior was socially criticized as simply loving the new and
loathing the old’.
Again, like with other changing perceptions, men and women had diverse grounds for
supporting marriage abolition. While men preferred to look for unlimited free love, many
women chose to adopt celibacy. Employing celibacy as a political tactic against
unwanted arranged marriages, dangerous and endless childbearing and the demanding
duties of motherhood was not unusual in Chinese history. As early as the1900s, there had
been celibate women groups known as “zishunü”自梳女 [self-wedded women], who
lived together in communities in Southeastern China. However, in the first two decades
of the twentieth century, women’s celibacy began to win more widespread public
attention. In 1916 the Shanghai shibao 上海时报 [the Shanghai Times] reported that
“fifteen young girls from rich families in Nanjing organized a society named ‘Not
Marry’. The members of this society swore not to marry and advocated simple
appearances.”140 Similar societies or associations were reported to have been established
throughout China in the 1910s. On May 11, 1920, twenty-year-old Chen Ciduan 陈赐端
committed suicide when her parents declined her plea for adopting celibacy and arranged
for her marriage against her will. In a letter left to her family, Chen imagined she would
have a miserable married life and claimed that she preferred death to such an existence.
This case was similar to Zhao Wuzhen’s, the above mentioned bride who committed
suicide in her wedding sedan. Chen Ciduan was labeled a martyr for women’s celibacy,
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and as a heroine who sacrificed herself in a battle against the traditional marriage
system.141
Celibacy, originally considered a personal choice, was proposed as a kind of “ism”
during the May Fourth era. When educated groups of men and women were given the
privilege of pursuing a professional career, one women had never been granted before,
love itself was considered by many of them to be a distraction from one’s whole-hearted
devotion to his/her career. Zhang Ruoming 张若名 (1902-1958), the first Chinese female
to obtain a PhD. in France and a co- founder of Juewu she 觉悟社 [Awakening society]
in 1919, believed that life-long devotion to one’s career was necessary for Chinese
women’s emancipation:
To contribute to "women's liberation", some of us have to take it as a life-long
career, and devote herself into it wholeheartedly... According to the present
condition of China, for those who are willing to be the vanguard of women's
142
liberation, the best choice is to remain single.
Among a few highly-educated professional women like Zhang, life-long celibacy or
marriage at a later age became a social trend that openly testified to women’s desire for
gender equality, freedom of love and rejection of feudal duties. What should be noted is
the fact that the real number of life-long celibate women was small, although their voices
were loud. Most of these women eventually gave up single life due to various personal,
social or economic pressures. The lack of economic independence and social recognition
for these women were the biggest barricades against widespread adoption of life-long
celibacy. Women without a stable income and strong minds often ended up either
returning to the traditional domestic domain, or escaping into a nunnery.143
Most people, of course, did not agree with the choice of celibacy. According to Gan
Nanyin’s 1924 investigation of marriage, among 835 respondents, only 13% agreed with
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the concept of celibacy, and most of the supporters were those already engaged by
arrangement but who did not dare to cancel. Fear of lifelong loneliness and boredom and
going against human nature and evolution were the main reasons the respondents cited
for their opposition to celibacy.144

3.4.7

‘Love the New and Loathe the Old’

Although it was not uncommon for educated men in the May Fourth era to reject their
arranged spouse in the name of anti-feudalism and free love, most people were confused
over how to deal with their unsatisfactory matches. When Gan Nanyin’s married cohort
was asked about how to deal with an unwanted wife, they were given four options:
divorce, concubinage, inhospitality and expecting early death. However, most of the
respondents (215 out of 390) refused to answer this question because they thought it was
impossible to solve this problem under the contemporary social context.145 Although
there is no record of how women thought they would deal with their unwanted husbands,
it is certain that they would have been more confused and desperate at the prospect than
men, who still had choices other than suicide to deal with the issue.
Divorce was not an entirely new idea in twentieth century China: it had long been
possible for a man to divorce his wife based on the traditional 'Seven Grounds'. These
included disobedience to one’s parents-in-law, failure to bear a son, lascivious conduct,
jealousy, malignant disease, loquacity and theft.146 In the modern age, these grounds
shifted from an emphasis on the faults of women to an emphasis on love. However, it was
still the norm in the modern period to regard divorce as being a result of a woman's failed
virtue. Moreover, legal, social and economic protection for divorced women was slow to
develop. How to deal with the dissolved marriage was a major social controversy. Both
divorced parties would have to confront a series of social pressures; while the husband
was criticized for disrespecting women, ‘loving the new and loathing the old’, the wife
might face poverty, a bad reputation and life-long loneliness.
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Caught by the contrast between their thirsts for free love and their guilt over betraying
their spouse and acting in an unfilial manner, many men embraced bigamy. Under the
recognition that an arranged marriage contract was a life-long commitment of the
groom’s family to the bride, and that the life of a divorced woman might turn out to be
very hard, some professional marriage advisors suggested that formal divorce was not
necessary.147 Although it was the husband who decided whether or not to separate from
his old-style wife, his spouse could decide not to agree to divorce and remain with her
parents-in-law even after her husband had established another family outside the natal
household. Among the upholders and followers of this theory were many great names,
including Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892-1978) and Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石
(1887-1975).148 Their marriages, however, were either erased from the official histories,
marginalized in their biographies, or presented in the form of romantic stories that were
full of admiration for their revolutionary spirits and passion for true love and male
charisma.
The practices of bigamy and polygamy in China had been a big concern of women’s
rights activists and moralists until the 1920s. It was not uncommon for one man to have
more than one wife simultaneously in different cities in the form of either cohabitation or
actual marriage. In most cases, the women involved were mutually ignorant of the others,
and were incapable of preventing such developments when they were not: the wife who
was restrained inside the domestic sphere by the traditional gender division had no
authority to interfere with what her husband was doing outside of her own household.
Only under conditions where women could step out of the domestic sphere at will could
they gain equal respect in a marriage, or get rid of an unwanted marriage.149
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From these surveys and forums, one can perceive the confusion and disturbance that
surrounded the changing conceptions of love and marriage in China during the transition
period. Four issues were commonly attributed to these changes: moral decline caused by
the temporary lack of ethical principles during the transition; a lack of clarity over the
real meaning of love and confusion between sexual desire and emotional love; unequal
educational opportunities for men and women, which led to women’s inability to gain
independence, inflated vanity and consequently openness to temptation from men; and
ineffective legal legislation prohibiting the practices of bigamy and polygamy.150 In a
society where women’s professions were not fully developed and supported, the
increasing calls for free love and independent spirit could only become a burden on those
women who could not economically afford independence. 151 In the 1940s, what had
been primarily an urban marriage problem turned into a more widespread economic one,
as more and more young women had to trade their marriages or sexual freedoms in return
for temporary or even life-long sustenance. The fundamental solution to this love unrest,
in this sense, lay more in the achievement of women’s emancipation than in any other
factor.

3.5 Rural Marriage: Renewed Traditions
Speaking broadly, the marriage reforms outlined above had not reached farther than the
cities and the upper classes until the third decade of the twentieth century. In the
countryside, people continued to live in more traditional, pre-modern, ways. Although the
prestige of Li was slowly declining, its function, especially within the family dynamic,
was still very strong and even tended to become stronger as other social relationships
were affected by the changes of the modern era.152 Much of the population of rural China
was not yet aware of the existence of choices such as free love and self-determined
marriages. Based on her field investigations among the rural population of the Liuquan
柳泉 area in the early 1930s, scholar Pan Yumei 潘玉梅 concluded that in this area
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marriages were still largely arranged.153 Having a matched family background, the
groom’s bread-winning ability and the bride’s appearance were the three primary general
principles for consideration in mate selection.154 Parental orders and a matchmaker’s
words were also still imperative in making a marriage decision:
Parents’ order and matchmaker’s words remain the most important elements in
rural marriages…When a girl reaches her marrying age, her parents will discuss
her marriage with relatives and matchmakers whenever they meet… if her
family is poor, one word of her parents might decide her whole life. It is not
until the eve of her wedding that the bride came to be informed on how her
marriage was arranged.155
Among the 233 married women under investigation, all were married under the
arrangement of their parents, matchmakers, relatives or neighbors. Most of them were
engaged by the age of 15 and married by 17. The investigator made particular note of a
unique phenomenon: those girls from rich families often married much older husbands.
This trend is evident in popular saying from that area: ‘bad for the first, better for the
second, and best for the third’ [头房苦，二房香，三房赛娘娘]. The meaning behind
the expression was that a new husband did not know how to treat his wife when he was
first married, while in his second marriage he began to know how to treat his wife well
and, if he had a third chance, he would know how to treat his wife like an empress. One
rural woman who married at the age of twenty four told the investigator:
I was married out so late because my natal family was very picky. It was not
until I passed my twenty-fourth birthday that they found a man good enough for
me. Although he is 24 year older than me, he is wealthy. Owning house and land,
we never worried food and cloth. This is very precious. We have been married
for six years. Now I am the mother of two daughters. Everything in this
household goes well. Although I married late, all my neighbors admired our
happy marriage.156
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At the same time, rural China experienced a growing demand for betrothal gifts and
dowries. Continuous natural disasters and warfare during the early twentieth century
caused a rapid decline in rural living conditions. Marriage, therefore, became a
convenient way for a family to accumulate wealth. For many poor parents, exchanging a
daughter for cash became a strategy for survival. For example, in the Lechang 乐昌
county of Shandong, a peasant family generally did not ask for betrothal cash in the early
Republic era. After the 1920s, however, the family of the groom was often asked for
betrothal gifts ranging from one hundred to three hundred yuan.157 According to one
investigation of 1530 households in northern, central and eastern China conducted in
1920, the cost of marrying in a daughter-in-law accounted for 25% of a family’s annual
cost of living in the north, but almost 40% in the central and eastern regions.158 In 1930,
in Jiangcun 江村, a village in Anhui province, the total cost of a betrothal gift, dowry and
wedding banquet was about 500 yuan, which was almost the same as the living expenses
of an average family for an entire year.159 This rapid increase in marriage expenses
caused men’s ability to afford a wife to drop steeply on the one hand, and the popularity
of adopting a daughter-in-law to rise on the other. The latter fact was supported by the
work of sociologist Qiao Qiming 乔启明 (1897-1970), who conducted an investigation of
22 villages in 11 provinces in China during a period from 1929 to 1931. Qiao uncovered
that the custom of adopting a daughter-in-law was practiced in most areas as “the most
economical strategy” by both the bride and groom’s families, neither of which could
afford the betrothal gifts and dowries,”160

3.6 Legalized Love and Marriage
Before the Nanjing government was established in 1928, there had been no real official
effort made to rationalize the legal structure along the lines of the societal changes that
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were then taking place in China. The marriage laws used and practiced before 1930 were
basically a synthesis of the Great Qing Code and the legal precedents of daliyuan 大理院
[The Supreme Court] from the pre-modern era. Although law-makers kept instilling new
elements into their legal practices in order to meet the new judicial requirements that
were emerging after the 1910s, they could not effectively solve the marriage problems
that arose due to the hybrid nature of the legal institutions themselves. 161 For example, in
the 1920s the Qing stipulation that any marriage required the express permission of the
parents was still legally retained and the written legal code on divorce was still largely
based on the “seven grounds” mentioned above. No article had ever officially
contemplated marriage as being a matter of free choice for men or for women. When the
Nationalist Party (GMD) established its regime in 1928, marriage laws had lagged too far
behind people’s actual thinking on marriage practices to provide effective solutions to the
complicated issues of modern Chinese society.
On May 5, 1930, the Nanjing Nationalist government officially enacted the Marriage
Law (under Book IV- Family). Referring to legal codes on family from other modernized
nations, especially those of Germany and Japan, the 1930 Code marked a radical
conceptual departure from the past. Where the Qing code viewed the patrilineal family as
the basic social unit, the new code placed the individual, male or female, at the center.162
Keeping in mind that a civil code could not disregard the cultural and social context in
which it was to operate, the Nationalist law-makers undertook the adoption of the foreign
laws onto existing Chinese customs. They did so by the adoption of a syncretic vision for
China’s reformed legal system, which “combined what they considered the individualist
emphasis of the West with the familial emphasis of Chinese tradition, into something new
that was ‘social’ in its emphasis.”163 Their guiding concern, in fact, became no longer just
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to copy the West but was instead to work out accommodations between the Western
model and Chinese traditions and realities.
This desire to synthesize especially dominated the formation of articles concerning
marriage. Every effort was made by these lawmakers to avoid unnecessary contradictions
between codified laws and customary practices. Even though the first article under the
“Marriage” category clearly stipulates that “An agreement to marry shall be made by the
male and female parties of their own accord” (Article 972), many compromises can be
found in the articles that followed. For example, the parental authority over marriage
decision-making was legalized through the specifications in the following articles:
“where a minor makes an agreement to marry, the consent of his statutory agent must be
obtained” (Article 974) and “A minor must have the consent of his statutory agent for
concluding a marriage” (Article 981). However, the code also provided the principals
with full grounds to cancel any unwanted engagement that had been arranged by their
parents (Article 976).164
As for divorce, mutual consent was made possible, and the only required formality was a
written document signed by two unconnected witnesses (Articles 1049-1050). Any
children were to be brought up by the father, unless it was provided otherwise by
agreement (Article 1051). Divorce by judicial decree after ex parte application was
granted based on the following ten grounds: bigamy, adultery, ill-treatment so as to
render life altogether intolerable, ill-treatment of the husband’s parents by the wife or of
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the wife by the parents-in-law to such an extent that life becomes altogether intolerable,
continued desertion in bad faith, attempt on the life of one of the spouses by the other,
malignant disease, serious and/or incurable mental disease, uncertainty of the
whereabouts and mortality of a spouse for at least a three year period, when a spouse has
been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years or when a sentence to
imprisonment has been passed for an infamous crime (Article 1052).
Sun Yat-sen’s spirit of group freedom is evident throughout the Civil Code of 1930: His
assertions that the “individual had no freedom, only the group had freedom” and his
belief that the individual should subordinate his interests to the group and devote his
talents to the benefit of it, seeking public welfare were the ideological background to the
new laws.165 Meijer points out that “law was therefore a machine that would restrain antisocial acts and promote things beneficial to society such as security, organization,
morality, production, economic enterprise, culture, etc. Law should aim at the stability of
society, the maintenance and development of economic enterprise and the adjustment of
social interests.”166 In particular, the function of this new law was to abolish the old Li
and replace it with a strengthened feeling of national solidarity and rehabilitation.
Confronted with a disturbed social environment, moderate moralists and legalists
attempted to chart a middle course between progressive modernizing expectations and
conservative social realities in order to achieve a peaceful transition from old to new,
from traditional to modern and from customary to legal.
In China, there has long been a substantial gap between practiced customs and written
laws. This gap was even more distinct in the case of the 1930 Civil Code. Its impact
never reached farther than the populations in cities and among the upper classes. Aside
from the fact that Chinese people in general were traditionally very weak in
understanding laws, two factors accentuated this general inefficiency: conservative social
realities in China and the chaos of almost constant warfare. Although the law-makers had
made as much concession as possible to social customs, they were blamed by their
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contemporaries for ignoring the social situation in China and for blindly copying Western
laws.167 Besides warlord regionalism, the constant fighting between the Nationalists and
the Communists, and eventually the Japanese invasion, retarded the central government’s
efforts to establish effective legal enforcement at all levels.168 When Liang Qichao was
reviewing the Reform of 1898, he concluded that “if only changing things without
changing laws, and only changing laws without changing people, there will be no
difference between change and no change.”169 This conclusion might also be applied
here: although the government tried to reform Chinese society through making new laws,
popular reluctance to change made all its efforts vain.

3.7 Conclusion
In the marriage history of China, the May Fourth era marks a significant turning point
during which the traditional arranged marriage pattern was supposed to be completely
overthrown and the Western free-choice pattern was supposed to be admitted as a modern
model for people to follow. Instead, what this marriage revolution brought to the
contemporary Chinese was not only unprecedented freedom of choice, the radical desire
for freedom, love and romance, but also confusion, disturbance and worry.
Confronted with the evils that accompanied the granting of freedoms in matters of love,
the marriage reformists sought to construct a new series of marriage norms in order to
regulate people’s behavior. On the one hand, they emphasized humankind’s mental
control over its sexual desire and took spiritual love as a prerequisite for sexual behavior;
on the other hand, they advocated that love and marriage were identical and served each
other in a causal term. They asserted that it was only under the guarantee of a marriage
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promise that love could be allowed to develop freely between the contractors. These
theories composed the basic content of the pre-1949 Chinese marriage discourse.
A series of social surveys, media debates and legislation from the 1920s and 1930s
exposed the fact that people’s thoughts on love and marriage were in a hybrid condition.
While the Chinese urban elite publicly declared their preference for a postnuptial
romantic life over reproduction as the main point of a marriage, claiming this was a
function of modernization, for most urban commoners and the rural population,
producing male descendents in order to continue the family line still dominated marriage
preferences. While the language of free marriage spoke about a total rejection of the
interference of third parties, most young Chinese chose to embrace parental supervision
and consent, since completely excluding parents from marriage considerations was a
painful process that inevitably caused guilty feelings. While expecting a passionate and
romantic love experience, many youths were inclined to use a criteria checklist in order
to select their partners more efficiently and rationally. While traditional family-interestoriented mate-selection politics had evolved into an individual-compatibility-oriented
pursuit of personal happiness, the traditional power of the family in China persistently
imposed constraints on marriage decisions, both ethically and economically. While more
and more husbands preferred educated, natural-looking and mild tempered urban wives,
how they were expected to deal with their old-style traditional wives was still a cause for
public concern. While a legal code was established by the government in order to
legitimize people’s freedoms in love and marriage, compromises were simultaneously
made to relieve the tensions between modernizing expectations and conservative social
realities.
At the same time that urban intellectuals were engaging in controversies of love and selfchoice marriages, people in the countryside continued to live in traditional ways. How to
launch an effective marriage revolution in the rural area became a major concern of the
Chinese Communists in the 1940s, when they tried to mobilize the peasant population in
support of their cause. This struggle is what will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4

4

Making a Socialist Marriage

This chapter examines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) early marriage policies and
practices, from the 1920s to the 1930s. The marriage issue attracted a great deal of
attention in the formative years of the Chinese Communist Party, since many of the early
leaders labeled themselves as being in the vanguard of the marriage revolution. As the
pious followers of Friedrich Engels, they re-interpreted the concept of “revolutionary
marriage” in accordance with anarchistic socialist ideals, and tested the new
interpretations on themselves through a radical rejection of the traditional marriage
system.
During the Great Revolution of the 1920s, the Chinese women’s rights movement and the
more specific marriage problems that had arisen alongside it were theoretically
marginalized by the CCP as issues that would be naturally solved along with the
achievement of economic independence for Chinese women. In actual practice, however,
whenever a women’s association was founded, it immediately became the local women’s
asylum from unhappy marriages. The CCP’s interests in marriage reform rose rapidly
among the radical and mostly urban-born Party leadership during the Jiangxi Soviet
period of the early 1930s. Pro-women marriage laws were promulgated by these leaders
in order to not only destroy all the “fengjian” [feudal] marriage practices but also to
construct unconditional marriage freedom for the individual, in accordance with Marxist
ideals. These regulations, however, evoked as much trouble as progress within the Soviet
due to the chaos of wartime conditions, the misunderstandings or misinterpretations of
the Code itself among the populace, the irrational methods of implementation that were
used by the CCP and, most of all, the contradiction between the Regulations’ radical
nature and the conservative social realities on the ground in China.
The first generation of “revolutionary marriages” appeared alongside the formation and
development of the Chinese Communist Party. Some of these marriages were consensual
love unions between radical “fanfengjian”反封建 [anti-feudal] intellectuals and
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progressive 'new women' who were eager to replace the traditional family system with a
socialist consensual union. Others were temporary partnerships between two secret
communist agents serving in the CCP underground. Another group of parings were
arranged or semi-arranged matches between an elder party leader and a younger partisan,
for whom the nuptials were more like a duty of the revolution than a true marital union.
Although such marriages were often essentially common-law relationships and were
sometimes only temporary, their consummation or dissolution were generally subject to
the Party’s consent. Despite the fact that the free will of the two participants in a marriage
was frequently stressed in the CCP’s written policies, Party interference in the love
affairs of its membership became something of a party tradition during the Soviet period.
Class background, the requirements of the revolution and loyalty to the Party all emerged
as primary explanations for Party decisions to either arrange or prohibit a match.
Through a careful examination of early CCP marriage theories, policies and practices,
this chapter demonstrates that although CCP rhetoric possessed the May-Fourth spirit of
freedom and socialist ideals about marriage freedoms, its actual efforts to act on these
principals were frequently frustrated by the patriarchal social traditions of the Chinese
people and their wartime expediencies. To meet these demands, women were asked to
subordinate their personal freedoms, individual interests and even marriage choices for
the greater good of the revolution. In general, the Party's marriage policies were defined
more by the need for women to serve the revolution than by its stated ideal of achieving
their liberation.

4.1 Socialist Marriage Ideal: Marxist marriage theory
Marxist theories first began to circulate amongst the Chinese elite in the early twentieth
century. In 1905, Zhu Zhixin 朱执信 (1885-1920) translated parts of The Communist
Manifesto and published them along with brief introductions to the lives of Marx and
Engels in the Minbao 民报 [People’s Newspaper].1 However, it was after the Russian
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Revolution in 1917, and China’s diplomatic humiliation at Versailles in 1919, that
Marxism started to gain the full attention of certain Chinese intellectuals. In May of 1919,
Li Dazhao 李大钊 (1889-1927) devoted a full issue of Xin Qingnian 新青年 [New
Youth] to Marxism. And from this point forward Marxist study groups were established
nationwide. By the mid-1920s, New Culture leaders such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao
had wholeheartedly accepted Marxism-Leninism as a scientific form of socialism that
could easily explain the complicated concept of social progress and simplify the
confusing events of history. In July of 1921, twelve delegates attended the founding First
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai. The twelve delegates, including
a young Mao Zedong elected Chen Duxiu as the first Chairman and General Secretary.
Thereafter, Chinese Communists started to apply Marxist theory toward the reformation
of Chinese society.
The primary theoretical source underpinning socialist views on marriage came from
Friedrich Engels’s Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Though the
complete translation did not appear in China until 1929, the gist of his argument was
conveyed in partial translations and summaries that arose beforehand and was echoed in
the translations of August Bebel’s writings.2 Engels defined the monogamous marriage
system “as the subjugation of the one sex by the other,” from which developed the
antagonism between men and women and the male sex’s oppression of the female.3 By
identifying the problem of traditional marriage as a class problem, he concluded that “the
marriage is conditioned by the class position of the parties and is to that extent always a
marriage of convenience.”4 This kind of marriage of convenience, according to Engels,
“turns often enough into the crassest prostitution- sometimes of both partners, but far
more commonly of the woman, who only differs from the ordinary courtesan in that she
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does not let out her body on piecework as a wage worker, but sells it once and for all into
slavery.” He conclusively categorized all marriages from before the industrial revolution
as being in line with prostitution, which was essentially a condemnation of the marriage
institution of the Western world: “Marriage according to the bourgeois conception was a
contract, a legal transaction, and the most important one of all because it disposed of two
human beings, body and mind, for life.”5
Achieving women’s economic independence was considered by socialist theorists to be
the only way to truly liberate them from their lifelong work as prostitutes: when “largescale industry has taken the wife out of the home into the labor market and into the
factory, and made her often the breadwinner of the family, no basis of any kind for male
supremacy is left in the proletarian household.”6 Once wives gained financial rights that
were equal to their husbands, Engels continued, “the proletarian family is therefore no
longer monogamous in the strict sense, even where there is passionate love and firmest
loyalty on both sides and maybe all the blessings of religious and civil authority…The
wife has in fact regained the right to dissolve the marriage, and if two people cannot get
on with one another, they prefer to separate.” 7 In summary, the fundamental solution to
the marriage problem, according to Engels, was to replace the old and oppressive
marriage system with a free and consensual union, based on women’s access to the work
force and their achievement of economic independence.
Engels glorified marriages based on mutual love and proclaimed that they were a human
right that equally belonged to both men and women. His work suggests his belief that any
marriage that does not rest on mutual sexual love and the true and free agreement of both
husband and wife is immoral. However, he recognized that full freedom of marriage
rights could only be established for the people in general when all of the economic
influences on an individual’s choice of a marriage partner were removed.8 Following the
theory that “only the marriage is moral in which love continues,” and the fact that “the
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intense emotion of individual sexual love varies very much in duration from one
individual to another, especially among men,” Engels again argued for the abolition of
marriage altogether; he suggested that a mutually agreed upon separation would benefit
both partners, as well as society, when affection had come to an absolute end or was
supplanted by a new passionate love, which would then spare people from “having to
wade through the useless mire of a divorce case.”9
For the Chinese Communists, the major difficulty in applying Engels’ theories to Chinese
society lay in how to conquer the major gaps that existed between Socialist ideals and
Chinese cultural realities; specifically, the issue was in determining exactly how to adjust
the theories in order to fit into a Chinese social context. This problem was especially
essential regarding issues of marriage and love, since Engels' ideas were in direct conflict
with Chinese conceptions on gender, love and marriage. In fact, the problems of marriage
reform in the Chinese context, were often problems of adaptation and implementation.

4.2 Liberating Marriage Through Women’s Liberation: The
Great Revolution
The first generation of the Chinese Communist leadership demonstrated great interest in
offering Chinese women’s emancipation in return for their support of the Communist
revolutionary cause. As devoted students of Engels, these leaders attributed all of
women’s societal problems to their absence of economic independence and argued that
socialism was therefore a natural elixir.10 Chen Duxiu, for example, identified the general
lack of independent personalities in Chinese women as fundamentally an economic
problem, asserting that it was only under the socialist context that women could be given
equal access to work opportunities and thus become their own masters. Otherwise, he
continued, “she would just go from slave of her family to the slave of the capitalist.” 11
Chinese Communist theorists argued that women’s economic independence should be the
essential premise upon which all other rights (such as the right to vote, to marry freely, to
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divorce and to take paid maternity leaves) would be received.12 They warned that any
attempt to reverse this sequence of premise and consequence was incorrect and
misleading.13 The Resolution of the 2nd National Congress in 1922 set the basic tone of
the CCP’s women’s movement: “women’s liberation must be accompanied by the labor
liberation. The real liberation of women can only be obtained after the establishment of
the proletarian regime.” 14 In this spirit, the CCP’s women’s movement during the Great
Revolution (1924-1927) focused primarily on the nationwide establishment of women’s
departments, as well as on the struggle of urban female workers’ for equal work
opportunities and equal payment.15
How were contemporary Chinese working women and their marriages changed by their
newly available economic independence? Was it actually an elixir to the suffering of
Chinese women? An investigation in the 1930s, performed by the American sociologist
Olga Lang in Shanghai, Wuxi, and in the villages of Jiangsu, demonstrated that their
working experience in factories did help some women gain power at home. Of the 46
wives she examined who were either then employed in factories or had been previously,
36 acknowledged that they had growing power at home. They were more often consulted
by their husbands on daily affairs, and their advice carried much more weight with other
family members.16 One woman explained to her interviewer why her husband always
came to her with problems: “I have worked in the factory since I was very young and I
know more of the world than my husband, who never left his native village.”17 The wife
of a Jiangsu peasant said, “Since I earn money, my husband asks my advice.” Another
young female worker in Tianjin declared, “My husband cannot beat me now and I can
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spend my money as I please.”18 Therefore, some wives did attribute their improved
domestic situation to their economic independence.
Contrary to Communist expectations, however, among the women workers whom the
CCP assumed to have the greatest revolutionary spirit, few really believed that their
bread-earning abilities could reverse their traditional gender roles at home and gain them
complete equality with men. Lang observed that although many informants answered
affirmatively when they were asked whether they believed in equality between men and
women, “it seems that most referred only to equal opportunity in education and work.
Only a few believed in equal authority in the family.” She pointed out that these women
generally still clung to traditional thinking on gender, such as: “Men are stronger than
women and therefore they should rule” and “Men should rule outside the house, women
inside.”19 A few of the women Lang interviewed even complained about their husbands’
incapability and looked forward to the moment when they would cease working. Lang
therefore came to the conclusion that “the women workers had not sought to change their
position, the change was imposed on them by their new economic role.” Instead of
feeling liberated, these independent women suffered because their relations with their
husband seemed to them to violate traditional Chinese ideas on gender and property.
“The best-adjusted marriages,” according to Lang, “are those where the women do not
dominate their husbands but are equal to them or at least exercise their domination in a
traditional tactful form.”20
The CCP’s emphasis on economic independence did not mean that the marriage issue
was shunned completely. The immediate solution to the problem of arranged marriages
that was suggested by early female communist workers was to establish women’s
associations and to collectively oppose the arrangements. For example, Xiang Jingyu 向
警予 (1895-1928), the founder and first Chief of the Women’s Department of the
Chinese Communist Party, believed that the low social position of Chinese women was
caused by a backward social system. She postulated that the emancipation of women
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could only be achieved by a change in this social structure, which would thereby free
men and women alike. As for the solution to the Chinese marriage problem, she pointed
out that the arranged marriage institution had long been a tradition in China and,
therefore, it was not something that could be overthrown by individuals. For Xiang, the
only solution was to set up a mutual aid association for self-determined marriage, through
which young women looking for marriage freedom could fight against the old custom
together.21 Xiang’s confidence in the power of women’s associations found support in
Mao Zedong’s “Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement”. In this
article, Mao claimed that apart from the traditional systems of political authority in China
(such as clan and theocratic authorities), Chinese women were also dominated by the
authority of their husbands. Agreeing with Xiang, Mao suggested that women’s
organizations were an effective solution to their suffering, noting that since “the women
in many places have now begun to organize rural women’s associations, the opportunity
has come for them to lift up their heads, and the authority of the husband is getting
shakier every day.”22
Like the female revolutionaries who before the Revolution of 1911 believed that
women’s liberation could only be possible after the founding of the new republic, many
women workers during the Great Revolution period were convinced that their secured
liberties and equal rights could only be available after the establishment of a new social
system. When American reporter Anna Louise Strong interviewed women’s rights
activists in Hubei in 1927, her respondents unanimously gave answers to her questions
about women’s liberation that were in line with the position of the CCP:
…this injustice cannot be overcome by goodness and submission but only by
fighting. We think you must first overthrow the old economic system and make
a new society where people can be good. It is not possible for women to be
equal with men just because the law says so; but if the new society is organized,
then all people get true liberty and women also can be equal.23
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While union organizers expected women to join their organizations for the collective
struggle against capitalist exploitation, most union members, as acknowledged by the
Dean of the Hubei Women’s Union of 1927, initially came to the union in order to ask for
protection from abusive marriages. Compared to the issue of women’s economic
independence, the issue of marriage freedom was more sensitive and paradoxical to deal
with. As the Dean told the reporter:
During the period of transition until law and courts get properly established, the
women’s unions have taken a certain power in such matters (divorce). If we do
not grant the appeals of the women, they lose faith in the union and in the
women’s freedom we are teaching. But if we grant the divorces, then we have
trouble with the peasants’ union, since it is very hard for a peasant to get a wife,
and he has often paid much for his present unwilling one.24
Under such circumstances, she reported that skirmish or conflict was inevitable:
There was in one district a peasant woman who begged for divorce from her
husband and got it. Thereupon all the members of the local peasants’ union, in
number about a thousand, said: ‘If even a woman can put away her husband,
how much more can we men.’ They all began sending their wives home to the
parents as a strike against the women’s union. This caused such a scandal in the
neighborhood that at last the women’s union went to the first woman and
begged her to go back to her husband in the interests of the peace of the
neighborhood.25
Strong came to the conclusion that the fundamental difficulties faced by the Women’s
Union when dealing with the marriage problem lay in its lack of legal or social
authoritative power.26 These difficulties were further complicated by the deep-rooted
contradiction between individuals and families, or individual women and patriarchal
kinship. This issue had been the biggest obstacle hindering most efforts at marriage
reform throughout Chinese history. Until individuals took over the place of patriarchal
families and were recognized as the basic social unit by Chinese society as a whole, the
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authorities had no choice but to concede to the demands of families for the sake of social
stability.

4.3 Idealized Marriage Freedom: the marriage legislation in
the Jiangxi Soviet
After the breakup of the first united front in 1927, and a series of futile uprisings that
followed, the Communists retreated to the Jinggangshan 井冈山 revolutionary base
comprising parts of Jiangxi, Fujian and Hunan. During the five-year period that
Communist armies held this area, they politically organized the peasant population and
instituted various social policies. Women’s work throughout the Soviet period was
focused on rear-area support for the war effort, necessitated by the continuous need to
fight against the Guomindang (GMD) encirclement and annihilation campaigns.
The peasant women in Jiangxi were recognized by the CCP as more advanced in a
communist sense than their rural sisters in other parts of China. The Party claimed that
these women had great potential to be reformed into a revolutionary force because they
“directly participate in the economy of the villages, occupy an important place among the
troops of the poor peasants in the villages, and have enormous influence in the life of the
peasants.”27 Chinese Communist leaders were looking to win over women’s support for
the Communist revolution, as well as to utilize their influence over men for army
recruitment. On the advice of the Russian-led Communist International (Comintern) the
CCP enacted a series of polices that aimed to “abolish and destroy the legal norms of the
old society, to oppose the relations of oppression and exploitation of the feudal family
and to guarantee the participation of the masses of women in the political power by the
exercise of their rights of election and being elected, to guarantee their economic
independence and ownership of land.”28
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4.3.1

The Marriage Code of 1931

At the first Congress of Chinese Soviets, held in November of 1931, the provisional
constitution was promulgated. Article II of this constitution provided the guidelines for
later marriage legislation:
The purpose of the Soviet Government is to guarantee the fundamental
liberation of the women. Freedom of marriage is recognized and measures for
the protection of women will obtain the material basis to enable them to cast off
the bonds of the family by gradual stages, and to participate in economic,
political, and cultural life.29
Following Engels’ prediction that the traditional family would cease to exist as a social
unit, the Communist constitution established that the state would take direct charge of
individual affairs and provide total freedom on issues of marriage and divorce to each
individual. This principle defined women’s marriage freedom as a powerful weapon to
not only guarantee women’s liberation but to also help women cast off the bonds of the
family. In this spirit, the Marriage Code called for both abolition of the 'feudal' marriage
system and a gradual abolishment of the family system through women’s achievement of
economic independence and active participation in public affairs.
After a serious debate amongst CCP leaders, the Marriage Regulations of the Chinese
Soviet Republic were officially promulgated on December 1, 1931. Disagreement over
the proposed regulations arose between new arrivals from Shanghai, who were
indoctrinated in the radical urban love and marriage theories outlined above, and who
objected strongly to the views and practices held by the local Party groups in Jiangxi,
who themselves favored keeping restrictions on marriage and divorce rights. Eager to
modernize rural China, the radical leaders proposed strong marriage legislation that
contained no restrictions, mediation clauses or ambiguous qualifications.30 The
Regulations included seven chapters: General Principles, Contracting Marriage, Divorce,
Care and Custody of Children after Divorce, Arrangements Concerning the Property of
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the Man and the Woman after Divorce, Care of Children Born before Registration of
Marriage, and Additional Provisions.
In order to establish the principle of ‘freedom of marriage’, these Marriage Regulations
codified an individual’s rights to marry and divorce, prohibited coercion or the
interference of third parties in marriage and claimed freedom of choice as the basic
principle of every official union. The established marriage age was 20 for men and 18 for
women. Polygamy, the sale of women as wives, the practice of taking an “adopted
daughter-in-law”, and all forms of child marriage were prohibited in the statute, as was
marriage between men and women who were blood relatives within five generations.
While prohibiting the traditional aspects of a marriage ceremony (such as the exchange of
betrothal gifts, a dowry or a feast), the regulations still required the registration of any
marriage or divorce with the local government. For the first time, a Chinese government
attempted to transform its citizens’ marriages from an affair of family or society into one
that fell under the control of the state.31
The 1931 law granted an individual the complete freedom to seek divorce in a terse and
simple provision: “When one party, either the man or the woman, is determined to claim
a divorce, it shall have immediate effect (Article 9).” The only legal procedure required
was to “register the divorce with the xian [county] or municipal soviet” (Article 10). The
provision for post-divorce arrangements obviously took the side of women under the
recognition that “although women have obtained freedom from the feudal yoke, they are
still laboring under tremendous physical handicaps (for example the binding of the feet)
and have not obtained complete economic independence. Therefore, on questions
concerning divorce, it becomes necessary to protect the interests of women and place the
greater part of the obligations and responsibilities entailed by divorce upon men.”32
Following this recognition, the official guarantees provided for divorced women were
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attractive: although the rearing of children born prior to the divorce is recognized by the
law as the responsibility of the man, if both the man and the woman wish to raise the
children, they shall be entrusted to the custody of the woman (Article 11). When the
children have reverted to the woman’s custody, the man shall be responsible for twothirds of their living expenses until they are sixteen years of age (Article 14). Another
regulation benefiting women stipulated that “if the woman has not remarried after
divorce, the man must provide for her, or cultivate land on her behalf, until she remarries
(Article 15).”
However attractive the new law was to some, others did express concerns about these
guarantees. In February 1932, a local cadre leader from Yongding 永定 county named
Xiang Rong 向荣 wrote to the central government regarding the divorce regulations. He
thought the regulations were unfair to men, that they would not only impose groundless
and unwilling divorce on some men but also burden divorced husbands with their exwives' living expenses. In his reply to Xiang Rong, central committee member Xiang
Ying 项英 (1895-1941) explained that the absolute freedom to divorce was a basic
principle that distinguished the proletarian marriage law from that of the bourgeoisie;
giving more freedom to women in divorce rights was an effective measure in prohibiting
men from marrying too easily, which is what had happened in the past. “The spirit of the
marriage law”, Xiang Ying stressed, lay in “fundamentally exterminating the old ritual
teachings of the feudal society that fettered women, and annihilating men’s oppression
over women” Therefore, he argued, it was normal that more women than men sued for
divorce, which was actually a positive sign of women’s liberation. 33 To encourage this
tendency, Xiang Ying pointed out that refusing to grant a woman’s application for
divorce because her request was groundless could not be considered in keeping with the
ideals that were the foundations of the new law. As the pious followers of Engels’
marriage theory and as the dedicated students of the New Culture and May Fourth
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Movement’s revolution, the lawmakers of the Soviet Jiangxi were so eager to get rid of
the old customs that they refused to take into the consideration the possibility that “under
the present circumstance that the education of the masses was still very weak, love and
marriage disturbance would be inevitable.”34 As Xiang Ying wrote: “this is what the
Confucian pedant fabricated to insult women. Our cadres should completely clean these
feudal thoughts out of our minds, and uphold divorce freedom.”35
Although the urban-centered Communist law-makers intended to benefit and protect the
female population with these laws, the section of the leadership with rural origins
believed that the Marriage Code should serve as a means to help poor male peasants to
obtain wives. Mao Zedong, for example, pointed out in his investigative report of 1930
that one of the cruelest aspects of the old Chinese society was that many of the lower
class peasant men were unable to find wives under its rules. These men were thereby
unable to meet the basic, minimal criteria for achieving manhood in traditional society.
Mao argued that marriage reform would help improve the situation for these men because
it undermined the ‘purchase marriage system’ that allowed the wealthy class to control
more than its equal share of women, while making marriage a ruinous financial burden
for even middle class peasants. Mao and the Soviet government, therefore, invited poor
and unmarried men to use the new marriage freedoms in order to find women and get
married, despite being unable to meet traditional requirements.36

4.3.2

Dilemma of Application

After the Marriage Code was officially promulgated at the end of 1931, newspapers and
magazines in the Soviet-controlled region, as well as educational classes of all kinds,
were organized and engaged in a large-scale propaganda campaign focused on the new
law. The propaganda aimed at ensuring that both husbands and wives understood the
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new marriage policies of the Party and the Soviet Government, and how these served to
further the cause of the revolution.
For most rural women, who had long been living under the absolute authority of their
natal families, husbands and in-laws, the benefits brought about by the Marriage Code
were obvious: it provided a strong legal defense against physical violence and spiritual
abuse and guaranteed the right for women to pursue careers and personal happiness. For
example, within a three-month period from April to June of 1932, there were a total of
809 divorce cases and 656 marriage cases in the northeast part of Jiangxi.37 Most of these
new couples were married under their own will and chose their own partners. In the
divorce cases, more than half of the wives were so eager to end their unhappy marriages
that they sued for divorce without asking for equal division of property. The local
government regarded this as a clear sign of women’s liberation from fengjian lijiao 封建
礼教 [feudal ritual teachings].38
In the official discourse of the CCP, this law was boasted about as “one of the great
victories in the history of humanity [which] has burst the feudal shackles that have bound
human beings, especially women, for thousands of years [and] won support for the
soviets from the broad masses of people.”39 However, a very different kind of sentiment
is found in the contemporary local reports and records, which reveal just how naïve the
Communist enthusiasm for women’s liberation appeared to be in the face of the
complicated and conservative environment of wartime rural Chinese society. The
attractive divorce guarantees provided by the new legislation became the source of a
great deal of trouble and disturbance, as it gave women unprecedented opportunities to
separate from unwanted spouses: under the excuse of devoting herself entirely to
revolutionary work, a woman could easily divorce her husband and leave her children to
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him; the husband would then pay the family debts, raise the children, tolerate her in his
house and even financially support her for as long as she wanted, provided she did not
marry anyone else. This so-called ‘complete divorce freedom’ instead of balancing the
scales, “practically undid the freedom of divorce for men, and thus impaired that equality
of the sexes.”40 Consequently, local women’s abuse of divorce rights became a common
practice. It was not unusual to see a woman file for a divorce immediately after a fight
with her husband or in-laws, only to retract the claim two days later. Marriage and
divorce became so easily obtained for women that some of them married over three times
in one year in the frivolous pursuit of romantic love. According to a December 1933
investigation in the Changgang xiang 长冈乡, in an area where the marriage law
propaganda was hailed by the CCP as a huge success, one percent of women revealed
they had gotten married three times within four and half years.41 Furthermore, contrary to
the Party’s expectation that these pro-woman regulations could earn widespread women’s
support for Red Army recruitment, in some cases divorce could actually be utilized by
the wife in order to prevent her husband from joining the armed services. Many wives of
Red Army Soldiers requested a divorce because their husbands had lost contact for more
than a couple of years. When refused, these women were reputed to “make a racket daily
or gave birth to illegitimate children.”42
This kind of manipulation of the marriage freedoms granted in 1931 inevitably provoked
growing resentment among male peasants. As Mao had anticipated, a few economically
disadvantaged men were able to find wives thanks to the abolishment of the monetized
ceremonial procedures. However, it was far more common for poor married men to lose
their wives due to their new freedom in marriage choices, and to the convenience of
divorce procedures. In the rural area of Jiangxi in the 1930s, where the average living
condition was at a subsistence level and where most women were incapable of achieving
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economic independence, a husband who could provide for his family was highly
preferable to one who could not.
A directive issued by the Soviet central government in 1932 acknowledged that the
Marriage Regulations had not been well followed by the population at large. There were
still many cases of buying and selling marriages, forced unions and child brides and both
the physical and verbal abuse of women was still common everywhere. Furthermore,
many local governments resorted to the use of oppressive and interventionist measures in
order to deal with marriage problems. For example, in Xingguo, women appealing for
marriage freedom had been imprisoned and tortured by the local cadres. Some desperate
women instead even resorted to poisoning their husbands in order to get rid of an
unwanted marriage.43 Merciless husbands who intended to pursue a new lover but who
feared the new divorce responsibilities tried various methods to reject an unwilling wife.
Examples of these methods included extreme cases of murder and the frequent use of
violence in order to drive the woman to commit suicide.44
The dogmatic Communist leadership, however, took any imposition of limitations on
marriage freedoms as being contrary to Bolshevist principles. These leaders counted any
criticism of the new laws as stemming from conservative feudal thoughts on the part of
the local cadres and the incapability of the woman workers and made it clear that these
were both the fault of invalid implementation of their policies. A report given on March
8, 1932 asserted that “the women’s work in the Soviet area was the worst of all the mass
works [because] neither the party nor the Youth League were engaged in leading women
to fight against the feudal customs and habits.” As a result, wrongdoing was everywhere:
“It is common to see the mother-in-law oppress her adopted-daughter-in-law. When the
case was reported to the local government, their neighbors helped cover their abuses …
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These phenomena proved that women in the Soviet were still dominated by feudal
thought, and we are at fault if they remain ignorant of the women’s movement.”45
Responding to this critique, some local cadres adopted harsh measures in dealing with
cases regarding marriage and divorce, in order to demonstrate their progressiveness to the
Party: lawbreakers were confined and then forced to parade in public wearing tall paper
hats. These local authorities also adopted a hard line on divorce: in one case, a woman
who wished to return to her husband was instead detained and sentenced to hard labor in
order to pressure her to follow through with her divorce proceedings.46
These harsh measures only provoked further resentment from the people. In 1932 for
example, the young wife of a middle-class peasant in east-Jiangxi returned home one day
later than expected because of a Youth League meeting. Her husband asked her at that
time to inform the family of her whereabouts should this kind of event happen again. The
following day, the woman reported to the Soviet government that her husband had
forbidden her from going out and she sued for divorce. The government subsequently
detained her husband until over three hundred male villagers petitioned the government
to release him, insisting that the woman's claims were groundless. These men threatened
to divorce their wives en masse in retaliation if the prisoner was not released. After
negotiations between the Party leaders and women workers, the husband was released,
the wife was criticized for lying to the Soviet government and her request for divorce was
declined.47 Cases like this happened everywhere within the Soviet region in the 1930s. In
the face of defiant and disgruntled male peasants, who composed the potential
recruitment source for the Red Army, the local authorities had no choice but to find
compromise in the new laws, generally at the expense of women’s marriage freedoms.
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The accumulating resentment of the new laws among the male population was blamed by
the CCP on those female workers who had emphasized the importance of dealing with
women’s marriage problems over dealing with the issue of their participation in
production. These women were criticized for leading the movement for women’s rights
away from the general communist movement, for becoming isolated from the greater
class struggle and for facilitating the emergence of a gender contradiction that could
possibly obstruct Chinese land reform.48 A female advocate of free love could be
criticized in official circles as being a “petit bourgeois young lady” who succumbed to
“romanticism” and immorality, and who was worthy of incurring the “disgust of the
masses.”49 One directive issued by the central government in 1934 struck out at such
women:
We can see everywhere that our working women cadres cut their hair, and
shorten their garments. But as to being occupied by the taste of taitai [lady] and
xiaojie [miss], they are estranged from the masses. They shout some slogans and
sing some songs, but they refuse to make friends with local women; they
scarcely try to inspire local women’s revolutionary spirit; they show little
attention to the simple-looking women, and only talk to those who are pretty.
Many women cadres are very romantic or even unprincipled in their thoughts
and activities. This tendency to romanticize work provoked a strong revulsion
among the masses…no one would willingly obey the orders of one so
unprincipled.50
Although self-determined marriage had been identified in Party doctrine as a permanent
policy, romantic love never gained official recognition as an acceptable practice. This
might have been caused by the contradiction between Engels’ love theory and traditional
Chinese sexual conceptions. Engels did suggest that the mutual affection that occurred in
a romance between the two parties be the one paramount reason for a marriage,
outweighing all other considerations.51 Yet, he also asserted that real love affairs between
free men and free women in societies other than the ideal proletarian “occurred only in
the course of adultery [because] in the first place, it assumes that the person loved returns
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the love” and thus requires that the woman have equal footing with the man; He
continued by claiming that “secondly, our sex love has a degree of intensity and duration
which makes both lovers feel that non-possession and separation are a great, if not the
greatest, calamity.”52 For the Chinese who grew up under circumstances that valued
gender separation and women’s chastity, however, female adultery was among the most
immoral and heinous crimes.
Romantic love between young people or cadres was therefore regarded by the public in
general as being a very dangerous tendency that tended to disturb people’s Party service,
cause a negative impression among the masses, damage the authority of the Party and
weaken its leadership. Ideas on marriage freedom and romantic love in Party documents
were thus intentionally to be avoided. For instance, a resolution in 1931 asserted that “the
present marriage problems [would] guarantee the freedom of marriage and divorce,
abolish the selling and buying marriage system and child brides, and explain to the
masses about the real meaning of marriage freedom, while opposing all anarchic
romantic behavior.”53 Excluding romance from love and marriage was a persistent
conception that was repeated in the CCP’s mass propaganda in order to distinguish
communist freedom from that of the bourgeoisie. While people were encouraged to make
their marriage choices freely, they were expected not to fall in love romantically. In the
CCP’s official discourse, romantic love was interpreted as a kind of abuse of marriage
freedoms, which catered to the petit-bourgeoisie inclination for absolute individual
freedom or liberalism that would inevitably lead to anarchic behavior and moral
corruption. Such a tendency, the doctrine argued, might possibly endanger the
established puritanical social order of the rural revolutionary base, and weaken the
peasants’ support of the Party and of the Revolution itself.
From 1932 onward, the Jiangxi Soviet faced increasing military pressure from the GMD
army’s fourth and fifth encirclement campaigns, which was compounded by serious
economic problems resulting from a successful GMD blockade of the region. Moreover,
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rumors that were fabricated and spread by the GMD forced the Party leadership to reexamine its marriage policies. According to these rumors, the CCP’s marriage regulations
promoted promiscuity by “forcing people to collectivize their wives among all the
Communists and their partisans.” 54 Occasional sexual wrongdoings were exaggerated by
the anti-communist propaganda as a universal phenomenon in the Soviet area. As China’s
rural society was still dominated by the patriarchal clans who had a much lower tolerance
for licentious behavior than their urban contemporaries, these rumors constituted a
serious blow to the vital CCP-peasant alliance.
At a time when the most urgent problem facing the Party was the survival of the
revolution and the expansion of the Red Army, CCP leaders had to admit that “absolute
freedom of marriage was a leftist slogan, which was apart from political reality.”55 To
correct this problem, they stated, “we must resolutely oppose the absolute freedom of
marriage, which hampers our struggle, and we firmly believe that we are able to win
freedom of marriage on this basis.”56 In order to avoid any marriages that would so
endanger the communist cause, from this point forward all Party members were required
to obtain permission from the organizations for any marriage or divorce. Non-Party
members were forced to obtain similar permission from their local Soviet.57 The Party’s
interference with an individual’s marriage rights was, in this sense, imperative for the
sake of social stability, the needs of revolution, and the Party’s reputation.

4.3.3

The Marriage Code of 1934

In the midst of the GMD’s fifth and final encirclement campaign, when the collapse of
the Jiangxi Soviet Republic was a virtual certainty, the CCP government promulgated a
new and revised marriage law in April of 1934. The rationale behind the revised law was
to reconcile the government’s official marriage policy with its urgent need to recruit more
men into the Red Army. Although the spirit of the new law did not strikingly differ from
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that of the previous regulations, two major issues distinguished the 1934 version from
that of 1931: military divorce and de facto marriage.
While sticking with the principles of divorce freedom, the 1934 marriage law took into
account the special needs of military recruitment. Women were considered especially
necessary to the recruiting process in their roles as mothers, wives, sisters and lovers to
the soldiers, who would effectively encourage their sons, husbands, brothers and lovers to
join the army.58 However, peasant women were much less progressive than the Party and
cadre leaders had expected. In some areas, women made the conscious decision not to
marry Red Army soldiers out of their fears over the helpless situation they would face
should their husband die. Some women even preferred to marry surrendered soldiers who
had served in the Nationalist army on the expectation that they would bring them to the
cities one day. Moreover, more than a few Red Army wives declared their intention to
divorce their husbands once they entered active service, or to commit adultery. Such
eventualities seriously jeopardized the morale of the soldiers, since most of them were
poor peasants and could not possibly afford a second marriage.59
This problem with soldiers’ marriages and divorces caught the attention of the Soviet
leadership long before the promulgation of the New Marriage Code. Discussions over
whether or not a divorce should be granted to army wives appeared in local reports soon
after the implementation of the 1931 Marriage Code. The solution came in April of 1933,
when a mandate from the Soviet central government finally ruled that the interests of the
soldiers on the battlefield were of the first importance to the revolution: “During the
service period, the divorce application put forward by the wife should obtain the consent
of the husband, if he disagreed, this divorce should not be granted by the government.”60
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Many of the wives who sued for divorce did so because they did not know whether their
husbands were alive or dead due to the lack of effective correspondence to and from the
frontlines. Addressing this problem, the political department of the Red Army expedited
the issue of casualty rolls and asked army officers to order every married soldier to
contact his wife at least once every three months to inform her of his current situation. 61
This spirit was repeated in a divorce provision for Army personnel in the 1934 Marriage
Code, which specified:
Wives of soldiers of the Red Army when claiming a divorce must obtain the
consent of their husbands, but in areas where communication by letter is easy
and where the husband had not returned home nor communicated by letter for
two years, the wife may approach the local government and request registration
of the divorce. In areas where communication by letter is difficult, and four
years have elapsed since the husband last communicated by letter or since he
last returned home, the wife may approach the local government and request
registration of the divorce (Article 11).62
Meijer believed this provision was very important, as it froze the matrimonial status quo
of the military and put the members of the armed forces in a separate category from the
regular citizenry. It was a concession that seems to have been aimed at placating the
peace of mind of the soldiers at war, thus freeing them from worry about the situation of
their families away from the front; even if the marriage had been concluded in the old
'feudal way' it was now protected and the woman was forced to sacrifice her freedom to
divorce to the higher interests of the State, which at that time were focused on the morale
of the army.63 This special exception to the CCP’s spirit of free divorce was subsequently
repeated in most regulations on marriage in Communist-held China and it was even
preserved in the Marriage Law of 1950.
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Although divorce provisions for common people in the Marriage Code of 1934 remained
adherent to the principle of ex parte divorce, a significant change occurred in the divorce
protection granted to women. Article 15 of the Code provided that a husband was obliged
to support an ex-spouse after a divorce only when she lacked the capacity to work or did
not have a definite occupation, and that if the man lacked that capacity himself the
provision did not apply.64 This article, therefore, put an end to the parasitic practices of
some divorced women that had been granted by the 1931 Regulations.
Another striking alteration in the 1934 Code was the legal recognition of de facto
marriage status for common-law relationships (unmarried cohabitation). Article 9
declared that “a man and a woman who cohabit are considered to be married, whether or
not they have registered.”65 This Article made it clear that registration, though still
required, was not to be understood as having constitutive force. Therefore, a marriage
was not solely constituted by the State that legalized it, but was rather constituted by the
will of the parties themselves, as evidenced by the fact of their living together. There is
little documentary evidence to explain why the Party leaders were so anxious to legally
recognize the de facto marriage at a point when the Soviet was on the edge of collapse.
However, it seems reasonable to assume this provision was on the one hand a desperate
posture made by the ruling CCP leaders in an attempt to demonstrate their faith to the
Communist ideal. On the other hand, it was a temporary concession to the traditional
marriage custom for the sake of social stability in the Soviet and to aid military
recruitment for the Red Army.
In 1933, with the support of the Comintern, the leftist faction of the CCP (as represented
by Wang Ming 王明(1904-1974) and Bo Gu 博古 (1907-1946) successfully excluded
rural-born leaders such as Mao Zedong from the decision-making circle of the Soviet
government. As the more devoted and pious followers of Marxism-Leninism, this faction
looked forward to a fundamental marriage reform that was more in accordance with
Engels’ marriage ideals and which would subsequently finally undo the family system.
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For these leaders, the Communists were destined to end the marriage institution
altogether and replace it with free consensual unions based on unconditional love.66 The
legal recognition of de facto marriage, in this sense, could be considered a demonstrative
step these individuals made in order to prove their loyalty to the Comintern and to the
communist ideal, even under dire stress.
Another consideration that led to legal recognition of de facto marriage was the fact that
the peasant masses consistently preferred the traditional way of getting married, with a
customary wedding feast, even though legal marriage registration via the state was
repeatedly emphasized by the Soviet organization at all levels. However, a marriage
without any legal registration created problems when dealing with the division of
property or child custody in the case of divorce. Through recognizing the de facto
marriage, the authorities insured that legal protection would still be extended to those
who got married without legal marriage registration.67
The Marriage Code of 1934 was never fully implemented due to the Red Army’s failure
against the GMD’s fifth encirclement campaign. As soon as the Nationalist Army
reclaimed the Soviet area in the second half of 1934, the GMD administration
immediately started working to restore its own marriage system and to bring the region in
line with the rest of Nationalist China. In dealing with marriage lawsuits that were
continuously coming forth, the Nationalists chose to re-instate the marriage system
according to the wills of the two principal parties of the marriage. For example, remarried
people who voluntarily asked to be re-united with their ex were allowed to do so without
being charged with adultery or bigamy; those who were unwilling to be re-united with
their ex were permitted to stay in their current marriages; if one party of the new couple
wanted to go back to the former marriage and the other party did not, then the current
marriage would be sustained. The ex could claim no more than one hundred yuan in
compensation. 68
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The issue of marriage reform gained unprecedented attention during the Jiangxi Soviet
period. While aiming at the large-scale mobilization of women’s productivity, communist
policy-makers and promulgators displayed an enthusiasm for the topic that was never to
be seen again in communist China. As the first practical attempt by the Chinese
communists to reform rural China, the Marriage Code was advanced, progressive and
radical enough to represent the communist ideal of social revolution. However, as an
urban creation that was modeled onto a foreign ideal, and as a reflection of the radical
May Fourth spirit, the new definition of marriage could not fit into the social context of
the 1930s rural China, where traditions and customs were still deeply entrenched.
Although the CCP was not completely ignorant about the difficulties it faced with
marriage reform, it was still overly idealistic in its expectations of a rapid and positive
outcome from the application of such a drastic change. In a patriarchal society like
China’s that was dominated by unequal gender relations, liberating women from their
suffering inevitably antagonized both sexes, since man had been recognized as the
primary oppressor of woman and as the beneficiary of such oppression.
The wartime situation in the region further intensified the difficulties the CCP faced in
pursuing immediate woman’s liberation. This was due to the need for the Party to
balance expedient wartime demands for recruitment expansion with women’s requests for
marriage freedom. This balance proved to be a long-term paradox that impeded every
step of the Chinese communists on their way to acquiring the ultimate goal of women’s
liberation. In March of 1934, Mao Zedong pointed out that the victory of liberating the
masses of women from the "barbaric feudal marriage system" and to put into effect a
marriage system of genuine equality between men and women would both come:
...as a consequence of the victory of the democratic dictatorship of workers and
peasants…it is first necessary to overthrow the dictatorship of the landlords and
the bourgeoisie and to carry out the land revolution. Only when the laboring
masses of men and women, and the women in particular, have political freedom
in the first place and considerable economic freedom in the second place, can
freedom of marriage be finally guaranteed.69
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This judgment politely suggested that marriage freedom was not of primary importance
to the CCP during the war and it was something that should wait until after the victory of
the Communist Revolution. Based on this perception, the CCP’s focus for women’s work
during this later period switched from marriage freedom to women’s education and
productive participation. Nevertheless, new marriage regulations were continually
promulgated.

4.4 Marriage of Convenience: Partner and Party
As devotees of a socialist marriage revolution, many early CCP members
‘revolutionized’ their own marriages by leaving their arranged wives, seeking romantic
lovers, or even through rejecting the entire marriage system. The simplification of the
marriage ceremony through the reforms of the 1930s largely blurred the boundaries
between marriage, cohabitation and consensual union. As a result, the married lives of
some top CCP leaders appear to have been quite chaotic before 1949. From a legal
perspective, many of these men led a life of polygamy because they seldom legally
divorced their ex-wives before they moved on to their next marital relationship.
Under the so-called condition of being ‘consensual unions’, the relationships of many
high-ranking CCP leaders turned marriage into relationships of convenience that were
consummated or dissolved in accordance with the transition of their own sexual interests
or with changes in the wartime situation. These marriages of convenience, although
against the very spirit of the CCP’s Marriage Code, were frequently arranged or dissolved
legally by the Party, through a flexible interpretation of the discourse of revolution.
An examination of the biographies of these various leaders reveals a general pattern in
their marriage practices before 1949. The young revolutionary would often get married
or engaged at an early age through a traditional third party arrangement, with which he
was ultimately never satisfied. The Party would then grant him permission to reject or
leave his arranged traditional wife for a romantic lover during the course of the Great
Revolution. This new love, however, was often short-lived due to the rapid changes of
the political and wartime situation and the two would generally be forever separated by
either death or the breakup of the relationship. Fortunately for him, the hero was seldom
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lonely with the help of considerate Party comrades. Even under hostile circumstances
such as the Jianggangshan and the Long March, he was able to meet a new lover who
was often a young local partisan. She might not be well educated or pretty, but was
definitely passionate, loyal and obedient to both her new partner and to the Communist
Revolution. Sometimes, the marriage resulting from this last union could be a permanent
one. However, there were also many cases of break ups after the CCP found a more
peaceful and stable base in northern China. In the face of the influx of much younger,
prettier and lively urban women who crowded into Yan’an at the end of the 1930s, a
veteran wife might suddenly find that she had completely lost her husband’s affections.
Under these circumstances, whether or not the leader could sue for a divorce and apply
for a new marriage was left for the Party to decide.

4.4.1

The Revolutionized Marriage

Among the early Chinese communist leaders, many were the devoted students of Engels’
radical analogy of the marriage institution as being akin to legalized prostitution. They
thereby proposed a total rejection of the matrimonial rituals and marriage system in both
the legal and customary sense. For example, Shen Zemin 沈泽民 (1900-1933), an early
CCP leader, published one impassioned indictment of the marriage system that adhered
to this extreme interpretation. He believed that the marriage system in China had a
tendency to turn women into prostitutes, forcing them to unconsciously sell their most
precious commodity, which he argued was their sexual virtue:
Money, of course, is not the only reason why women degenerate into this
deplorable status, as women do not necessarily always demand money. Women
have their own reasons for exchanging their only possession—their sexual
services. In order to avoid the isolation of remaining single, or to fulfill a desire
to become a mother, or to have their vanity indulged, women often marry men
they do not love. Emotionally their predicament is similar to the experiences of
prostitutes, for they have to painfully submit to their husbands and put up with
fondling caresses in the absence of love. 70
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Hatred of this prostitution-like marriage system consequently drove radical young people
in general, and educated young women in particular, to embrace the ideal form, as
suggested by Engels: a consensual union based on two matched revolutionary souls.
Compared to women, men were generally more inclined to accept the idea of a
consensual union, due to their natural preference for younger and healthier women over
older and weaker ones. This inclination was especially true in the context of China’s
traditional polygamous society, where women had been frequently purchased and
bestowed as gifts or trophies, and where changing wives or taking new lovers was not a
serious matter for a military commander or political leader in comparison with the
revolutionary duties he assumed.
As the avant-courier of the marriage revolution, Chen Duxiu suggested that free love
could not exist under any marriage system and was among the first CCP members to
exemplify Engels’ theory in his own marriage. 71 Chen married his first wife Gao Xiaolan
高晓岚(1876-1930) through the arrangement of their parents in 1897, immediately
following his success in the civil service exam. As the eldest daughter of a general, Gao
Xiaolan was regarded by Chen’s contemporaries as a perfect match for him, though she
was illiterate and her feet were bound. From a traditional perspective, Gao Xiaolan was a
dutiful wife who gave her husband three sons and was also a mindful daughter-in-law
who carefully took care of Chen’s family until her last day. However, in the eyes of Chen
Duxiu, Gao Xiaolan represented everything he hated about the old institution. As Chen’s
friend described at the time of his marriage: “the discrepancy in their thought is more
than one century…they often quarrel with each other…their relationship is not
harmonious.”72 In his “E Su Lun” 恶俗论 [Discussion on bad customs] which was
published in 1904, Chen ranked the marriage system at the top of all China’s bad customs
because “nothing about Chinese marriage is reasonable.”73 He especially took issue with
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the impossibility for engaged or married people to dissolve an unsatisfactory
arrangement. Chen and Gao’s relationship went from bad to worse in 1900, when Gao
refused to use her dowry to fund Chen’s plan to study in Japan. In 1911, Chen left Gao
and openly began a consensual union with Gao Junman 高君曼 (1888-1931), who was
his wife’s step-sister and with whom Chen felt real love. Their relationship was of course
intolerable to both families and Chen’s father went so far as to expel them forever from
his family.74
Gao Junman was a very different woman from her stepsister, who was more than ten
years her elder. As a graduate of Beijing Women’s Normal Institute who had made a
strong commitment to becoming a ‘new woman’ and to living her own life, Gao defied
social conventions by living with the man she loved. Influenced by the ‘love mania’
boom of the May 4th era, many pro-communist and educated young women became
followers of the teachings of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who argued that the main
issue in marriage was not about what a marriage ought to be but rather what women
ought to be. Once the latter issue was settled, he argued, the former would settle itself. 75
Women living in the USSR provided contemporary Chinese youth with a living example
of a ‘new woman’. The following statement, made by a contemporary female Soviet
activist, was taken as a motto by thousands of young Chinese women:
The new communist woman should be a liberated individual …sexually active
and living in a comradely marital union in which economic calculations should
play no part. The private family should give way to the collective; jealousy,
possessiveness, and narrow and exclusive concern for one’s own child should be
replaced by the higher value for collective love. Marriage would then lose its
bourgeois stability, and a couple, now equal workers, would stay together only
so long as their mutual love remained.76
By openly declaring their preference for a consensual union, these radical young women
adopted a posture that was designed to break up the hypocrisy of the old matrimonial
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system and to uphold the principals of love as established on the basis of real matched
personalities.77 For them, sexual experimentation was a symbol of their independence and
of their equality to men. For many of these women, the romantic notion of two idealistic
young lovers fighting together for their country became a reality.
Unfortunately, not every romance ends with a ‘happily ever after’. Chen Duxiu and Gao
Junman’s love ended with a breakup in 1925 after Gao had given birth to two children.
Shortly thereafter in 1931, Chen Duxiu began another relationship with factory worker
Pan Lanzhen 潘兰珍, who was twenty-nine years his junior. The two were not formally
married, however, until after Gao Junman’s death from cancer in 1931.78
Certainly not all communists were as desperate as Chen Duxiu to leave their first wives.
Instead of pursuing a new lover, some Party members chose to stay with their arranged
wives throughout the revolution period. One good example of this was the case of Li
Dazhao (1889-1927), who was one of the most progressive of the New Culturists and the
strongest upholder of the free love principle. In spite of his outspoken beliefs, Li spent
his entire life with his rural wife Zhao Renlan 赵纫兰, to whom he had been betrothed as
a child, in spite of her being six years his senior, illiterate and having bound feet. Li
Dazhao tried to take his wife and children with him most of time, despite traveling
extensively, and he was never reluctant to introduce his wife to his friends and colleagues,
even after he became a prestigious professor at Beijing University.79 Another communist
leader who kept loyal to his traditional marriage was Ren Bishi 任弼时 (1904-1950), who
remained married to Chen Congying 陈琮英(1902-2003) until the end of his life. In
contrast to many other communists, who were eager to isolate their arranged wives from
their revolutionary work, Ren chose to bring Chen with him when he was assigned to
work in the CCP underground, even though she was illiterate and was far from being a
shining example of a ‘new woman’. During the Great Revolution and the later
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Nationalist’s white terror periods, Chen worked as a messenger, delivering secret
documents and messages to party members.80
Just as these two examples illustrate how wives were rewarded by their husbands’
patience and loyalty, the traditional devotion and unconditional obedience these women
displayed to their husbands should be counted as an important factor that contributed to
the stability and harmony of their relationships. For example, contrary to Gao Xiaolan’s
refusal to sponsor her husband Chen Duxu’s plan to study overseas, Zhao Renlan
exhausted all her personal savings in order to sponsor her husband Li Dazhao’s study in
China and Japan, all while raising their two children alone during the ten year period
from 1906 to 1916.81 Chen Congying told her American interviewer that the solid
foundation of the love between her and her husband was made up of two main elements:
one was the friendship that had started in their teens and the other was her selfless
devotion to her husband. Chen acknowledged that she herself had had no revolutionary
leanings before Ren brought her to Shanghai. However, she had tried her best to support
Ren’s revolutionary schooling in Moscow with all her earnings from working in a
stocking factory. She explained, “the only thing I knew was to follow his lead, because I
knew whatever he was doing must be good.”82 It was her devotion and obedience to her
husband that finally transformed her into a communist revolutionary.

4.4.2

Marriage without Matrimony

Since the early twentieth century, the complicated marriage procedure of liuli had been
under constant attack from Westernized Chinese intellectuals. As early as 1904, Chen
Duxiu had identified the Chinese marriage ceremony as being the most unreasonable
ritual in the world - a situation that was constantly abused by the bride’s family’s greed in
always bargaining for more betrothal gifts and tainted by ridiculous wedding customs
such as “kujia”哭嫁[cry at the wedding], “bai tiandi”拜天地[worship Heaven & Earth]

80

Young, 66-67.
Dong Baorui, 22-25.
82
Young, 66-67.
81

141

and “nao xinfang”闹新房[play tricks in the wedding chamber].83 These customs,
according to Chen, revealed the overall contempt of traditional Chinese society for
modern conceptions of human rights, especially concerning women’s dignity. Chen
argued that these outdated practices must be rejected by more and more Chinese young
people who were “well educated and reasonable.”84
As Chen had predicted, one of the vital traits of modern marriage practice in China was a
tendency to simplify the matrimonial procedure in accordance with the New Culturist
discourses of free love and anti-feudalism. In the post-May Fourth era, it was common to
see a young urban couple get married in a simple ceremony, without any marriage
certificate or legal registration, both of which were viewed as being unnecessary for true
love. One young couple who got married but refused to sign a written marriage contract
publicly claimed that “the so-called marriage contract equals an exchange contract, which
is used to guarantee the credit of seller and buyer. But our marriage is not an exchange,
and thus requires no contract…only those who were blinded by money worship would
like to deal with marriage in the same way as they deal with business. The sacred love, in
this sense, is treated like deceiving trade!”85
Under most circumstances, the informal ceremony adopted by communists during the
pre-1949 era was a simple dinner, a tea party, a poker game or sometimes even just an
open statement. Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898-1976) and Deng Yingchao 邓颖超 (19041992) had set the precedent for simple weddings among their friends and comrades. Deng
Yingchao described her wedding in this way: “we had no marriage ceremony at all, only
inviting our friends. We promised to love, to respect, to help, to encourage, and to
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console each other, to have consideration for each other, to have confidence and mutual
understanding.”86 When Ren Bishi and Chen Congying got married, they chose to follow
Deng and Zhou’s example. On their wedding day, the couple simply invited some of their
comrades to share a meal where they raised their cups to toast one another and then took
a wedding photo.87
Mao Zedong was also a passionate advocate of the marriage revolution. His arranged
wife died in 1910, having never been truly accepted by her spouse.88 In 1920, Mao began
living with Yang Kaihui 杨开慧 (1901-1930). The two were married later that year, but
refused to hold an open marriage ceremony, which they claimed as a vulgar act [俗人之
举 surenzhiju].89 The two were separated in 1927, after Mao left to participate in the
Autumn Uprising. In October of 1930, Yang was arrested for being the wife of the
revolutionary and was executed one month later. The boasts of both Mao and his
biographers about his deep love for the late Yang seem strained, considering the fact that
Mao had publicly announced his love for a nineteen-year-old partisan He Zizhen 贺子珍
(1909-1984) years before her death. The new union was publicized in 1928 with Mao’s
open declaration that “Comrade He Zizhen and I have fallen in love! Our comradely
affection has changed to true love and from now on our life together will be devoted to
the revolution.”90
The idea of simple weddings was especially appreciated by those Chinese who preferred
consensual unions to traditional marriages. This preference might be attributed to the fact
that many advocates for consensual unions, like Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong, actually
led lives of bigamy because they seldom bothered to legally divorce their traditional
wives before beginning new relationships. Contemporary public opinion usually took the
side of wives in criticizing husbands who sued for divorce after taking new lovers, calling
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the action a case of ‘loving the new and loathing the old’. For this reason, getting
involved in an open divorce might indeed have jeopardized a man’s reputation and career.
For those who were trapped in an arranged marriage and desperate to embrace a new
love, the socialist marriage ideal of a consensual union was a way for these leaders to kill
the proverbial two birds with one stone: on the one hand, they would not necessarily
divorce their traditional wives, who could then still look after their in-laws; on the other
hand, under the auspices of a simplified marriage ceremony, they could also give their
new lovers the mingfen 名分 [identity] of being a ‘Mrs’ without provoking too much
public opposition (although theoretically, romantic love and sharing a matched passion
for the revolution should have been more than enough sentiment to develop a marital or
marital-like union). The first chapter of this work discussed how one fundamental goal of
a traditional marriage ceremony was to socially legitimize a man and a woman’s sexual
behavior through the proper performance of a series of common rituals, which followed
legal guidelines and were done with attention to public opinion. Conversely, the
simplified marriage ceremony proposed by these revolutionaries more or less blurred the
boundaries between a formal marriage and a de facto marriage by passing over the legal
process and by minimizing social attention.

4.4.3

Marriage of Convenience for Revolution

The first batch of ‘revolutionary couples’ emerged from the Chinese Communists’
underground work. These marriages, temporary or otherwise, were first made in order to
serve this underground work, according to the recollections of Ren Bishi’s wife Chen
Congying. She recounted that after the cooperation between the Nationalists and the
Communists came to a bloody end in 1927, local landlords in Wuhan had refused to rent
out rooms to single men for fear of harboring a communist. They believed that a
communist agent would never travel with a wife or family because Nationalist
propaganda had taught them that all communists were the destroyers of families who
advocated unconditional free love. Therefore, these landlords coined a saying: “No
spouse, no house.” Thus, under these circumstances, an unmarried Chen Congying had to
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accompany her future husband whenever meetings or work brought him to Wuhan, in
order to help him avoid the suspicion of the landlords.91
Unlike Ren Bishi, who chose his arranged wife as his life partner, most undercover
communists undertook the more temporary and convenient form of marriage by finding a
female volunteer who was often a young passionate partisan of the CCP, and was willing
to play the role of wife. For example, Xie Xiaomei 谢小梅(1913-2006), the wife of
revolutionary Luo Ming 罗明（1905-1987） frankly admitted that it was primarily
“Because of the requirements of our [party] work, Luo Ming and I got married.”92 Xie
and Luo were married in 1931 with “some comrades [acting] as matchmakers” after they
were assigned to live and work in the same building as husband and wife. Happily, this
marriage lasted for more than half a century until Luo passed away in 1987.
Not all revolutionary couples were as lucky as Xie and Luo, however. Many such
marriages came to a sudden end upon the death or arrest of one or both parties, such as
was the case of Zhou Wenyong 周文雍 (1905-1928) and Chen Tiejun 陈铁军 (19041928). As the leader of the workers’ movement in Guangzhou, Zhou was on the
Nationalist government’s most wanted list after 1927. To protect his real identity, the
CCP arranged for Chen to play the role of Zhou’s wife. Unfortunately, they were both
arrested in January of 1928 and executed soon after. According to official sources, their
relationship was one of pure comradeship. Although they had long harbored strong
feelings for each other, it was only on the execution grounds that they finally dared to
speak their love for one another and to declare their wedding without worrying about
interfering with their revolutionary work.93

4.4.4

Love vs. Comradeship: the Love Life of Zhu De

In the revolutionary era CCP parlance, love was seldom used to describe a relationship
between two revolutionaries who had romantic feelings for each other. The synonym of
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love in the official communist language is ‘comradeship’, meaning a relationship based
on a matched revolutionary spirit. The love life of Zhu De 朱德 (1886-1976) provides an
excellent example of how disturbing wartime love could be for high-ranking party
members in the pre-1949 era.
Thanks to Agnes Smedley and Helen Snow, two American reporters who pushed their
way into Yan’an and held interviews with the chief leaders of the CCP in the late 1930s,
Zhu De’s love story is well known to many Western readers.94 Unlike Mao, who was
often described as a womanizer who preferred new to old, Zhu gained a better reputation
both at home and abroad with his almost half-century long marriage to Kang Keqing 康
克清（1911-1992）, despite the fact that she was his sixth wife.
Zhu De first married his maternal cousin through family arrangement in 1905. Although
Zhu left her in 1906, they never formally divorced and she never remarried. Like many
other revolutionaries, Zhe De seldom mentioned his first wife in public. Zhu’s second
wife was Xiao Jufang 萧菊芳, an eighteen-year-old student at the Normal School and the
daughter of an intellectual family that had played an active role in the reform movement
and the Revolution. Zhu described her as “a sincere and fairly progressive girl, and her
feet had never been bound.”95 This second marriage lasted from 1912 until 1919, when
Xiao died of typhoid. In her talk with Zhu in the late 1930s, Smedley reported him saying
that “the marriage was not bourgeois, and that the two of them had even met and talked in
the presence of Jufang’s family, before they made up their minds. This was a
revolutionary step in those days: respectable girls, even after the Revolution, still did not
talk with their husbands before marriage.”96 Even though Smedley sensed that Zhu did
not love Xiao, his second wife did give birth to his only son, and therefore the American
concluded that “though Chu (Zhu) thought of himself as a modern man he was still in
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many respects a product of the old social system,” who married Xiao only because he
was a normal man and needed a wife. 97
Shortly after the death of his second wife, under the arrangement of his army friends and
in order to find a mother for his infant son and a hostess for his household, Zhu De
married Chen Yuzhen 陈玉珍. Like so many of the revolutionaries’ new partners, Chen
was an educated ‘new woman’ with natural feet. She had reached the advanced age of
twenty-one and, by traditional standards, was almost considered an old maid because she
had rejected every suitor that had been introduced by her family. Smedley perceived,
“when General Zhu talked of this woman who soon became his wife, his voice and
manner underwent a very great change, a change of which he seemed utterly
unconscious. The word ‘love’ never passed his lips, yet it seemed to me that he had loved
Chen Yuzhen almost from the moment of their first meeting.”98 Zhu De himself also
acknowledged that he was immediately attracted to her poise and dignity. It seems Zhu
was quite satisfied with this marriage and described his life with Chen as a “lost
paradise” of personal happiness. This happy marriage came to an end in 1922, without
any official fanfare, when Zhu De went to Germany for study. As Zhu De explained to
Smedley: “We had sometimes corresponded but she had long since known that my life
belonged to the revolution and that I would never return home.”99 Like most arranged
wives who were abandoned by their husbands, Chen Yuzhen never remarried and spent
the rest of her life taking care of Zhu De’s parents and his son.
Zhu De’s fourth wife was He Zhihua 贺治华, a pretty nineteen-year-old high school
teacher who was fluent in both English and German. She accompanied him throughout
his travels and gave birth to his daughter Zhu Min 朱敏. However, He Zhihua divorced
Zhu De in 1926 in order to marry a younger communist named Huo Jiaxin 霍家新. In
1928, when the first united front split, Huo and He betrayed the CCP by selling out Luo
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Yinong 罗亦农 to the GMD. This might explain why Zhu De seldom mentioned He
Zhihua in public in his later years.
In 1928, Zhu De entered his fifth marriage on Jinggangshan with a twenty-four year-old
local partisan named Wu Ruolan 伍若兰 who was from a leading intellectual family. He
claimed that this was not a conventional marriage, since both Wu Ruolan and her family
knew about his marriage to Chen Yuzhen but had decided not to be bound by
conventional forms. Wu was an activist who worked in the Political Department of the
Jiangxi Soviet and spent most of her time out in the villages. This marriage lasted only
one year and came to a sudden end with Wu’s capture and execution by the GMD during
the Third Encirclement campaign in 1929.
As had become his pattern, Zhu De got married shortly after Wu’s death, this time to an
illiterate peasant girl named Kang Keqing. Though at the time, Kang was only seventeen
years old while Zhu De was forty three, their marriage lasted for almost half a century
and made Zhu and Kang a model couple of the CCP. Although the couple remained
childless, Kang’s marriage to Zhu was widely regarded as a loving union between two
exemplary revolutionaries that was maintained through a consolidated comradeship.
Kang confessed to her American interviewer that “I didn’t fall in love with Zhu De in the
romantic manner when I first met him, though I liked him very much because he lived as
a common soldier and did the same work.”100 Her first reaction towards Zhu’s proposal
was outright rejection because she was anxious about the vast discrepancy in age,
experience and education between them; while she was not quite seventeen, Zhu De was
forty-three. Furthermore, while she was an illiterate peasant, he was her commanding
officer, a man admired and respected by all of his people, including Kang herself.
However, at the time none of these reasons were considered by Zhu to be valid objections
to the partnership. Finally, she bowed to the inevitable and became Zhu’s loving wife.
Smedley described a pleasant moment of domesticity between the couple at their dinner
table:
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She socked the Commander-in-Chief (Zhu De) playfully on the arm, and he
seemed to like it enormously as he beamed at his young prodigy. She never
refers to him (Zhu De) as her husband, but as “Comrade” in a sort of third
person tone of voice. I beamed at them both and thought what a marvelous pair
they were…101
Among the communists, romantic love was never a required notion, or even a vital
condition for marriage. Helen Snow was told by Chinese Soviets that “the revolutionary
women in the Chinese Soviets have no patience with any silly bohemian notions about
free love and whatnot. For them the new marriage is a serious social institution and to be
defended as such. All 'petty-bourgeois romantics' were long ago weeded out of the
revolutionary movement like noxious flowers.”102 Male Communists largely played the
role of patriarchal family head, rather than that of an affectionate husband – they took
marriage for granted as a necessity for life. As the American reporters who had personal
contact with Chinese communist leaders perceived, “it was not at all unusual for a man to
marry again shortly after his wife’s death. The family, not the individual, was still the
basis of Chinese society… Personal love was not yet the basis of marriage, though it
might develop afterwards.”103

4.4.5

The Arranged Revolutionary Match

Zhu De’s marriage experience is representative of marriages among the high-ranking
CCP leaders. All ten marshals of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had more than
one marriage.104 The wartime marriage, for both parties, was more like a convenient
relationship that served their sexual, political and revolutionary needs, and which was
often made to favor the person with the higher position.105 Sometimes, a wife would be
arranged by the Party as a measure of comfort to someone whom it believed was valuable
and precious to the communist revolution.
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Among the wives of these leaders, some were like Yang Kaihui: devoted followers of
Engels who actively embraced the idea of a free-consensual union but who dared not to
challenge social conventions by entering into a de facto marriage to an already married
man. However, the majority of them were more like He Zizhen and Kang Keqing: young
women who were raised in conservative rural societies that had never heard of the ideas
of ‘free love’ and ‘cross-gender socialization’, and who were very inexperienced in
matters of love. In her memoir, Kang reminisced about how Zhu De had proposed to her.
He had been in the habit of chatting with the young partisan women in the soviet base on
Jinggangshan whenever he had a few spare minutes, she said, but one afternoon he had
sought her out when she was alone and then asked her to marry him. She was taken aback
and asked for a little time to think it over; he had her brought to his quarters the next day
to hear her answer but she only stood quietly. She said Zhu De responded to her awkward
silence with the words: “It looks like you’re too shy to say. How about this: you don’t
have to say anything unless you’re opposed to the idea. I mean, can I take your silence as
a yes?” When Kang Keqing didn’t move a muscle, Zhu De said, “So, I’ll say it again.
Will you marry me?” Kang Keqing said she was glued to the bench, speechless. After
several minutes Zhu De concluded the one-side negotiations with: “So it looks like that’s
a yes, then.”106
As the passionate partisans of the communist revolution and admirers of their husbands,
women like Kang Keqing accepted these matches to elder Party members as being a part
of their devoted service to the revolution. Their husbands they viewed as revolutionary
comrades. Some of these matches were actually imposed on the wives and the women did
not always accept without some form of coercion from the Party. However, like the
traditional relationships between parents and children, when a match was arranged
disagreement existed but it was seldom openly antagonistic. After several rounds of talks
with their upper leaders, these wives were often persuaded to accept the match under
their own free wills.
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For instance, Jian Xianren 蹇先任 (1909-2004), the ex-wife of He Long 贺龙 (18961969) told her American interviewer how as a well-educated twenty-year-old she got
married to He, a thirty-three year old illiterate man in a high position: “He Long and I had
feelings for each other. He wanted to get married so that he could take better care of me,
since I was the only woman among 1000 men.” Even still, she was not convinced she
should marry a man who was so very different from her in temperament, background, and
education. As she stated:
I wasn’t too willing because He Long was a military man and liked to gamble,
and I was an intellectual. I was idealistic about my future and he was not my ideal
as a partner…My friends criticized me because I wanted to wait and he didn’t
want to. They reminded me that he came over from the Nationalists to the
Communists in face of great Nationalist odds. He was ‘old military’ and should be
congratulated. I said, ‘Would it be all right if I don’t marry anyone at all?’ But my
colleagues persisted, so I agreed.107
Unfortunately, like many others, He Long divorced Jian Xianren soon after the Long
March, and married a girl who was twenty years his junior named Xue Ming 薛明(1916-)
in 1942.
Compared to Jian Xianren, the fate of Xiao Yuehua 肖月华 (1907-1983) was even more
miserable. Her marriage to Otto Braun (1900-1974) , whose Chinese name is Li De 李德,
was in fact an assignment that was entirely imposed on her by the Party.108 Before Li De
was sent to China as a Comintern agent in late 1933 in order to advise the Chinese
Communist Party on military strategy, he had separated from his lover Olga Benario.109
His special position as the Comintern representative in China granted him privileges over
most Chinese Communists. One of these privileges included choosing his pick of
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bedmates. As Bo Gu suggested, “given the precious time and energy this foreign advisor
would contribute to Chinese revolution, his sexual needs should be considered a need of
the revolution.”110 In the same year, Li De married Xiao Yuehua, a nineteen-year-old
peasant girl from Ruijin, who was illiterate but also pretty and robust. This union was
undoubtedly not a free one between two equals, but was rather a marriage of convenience
that had been arranged by the Chinese Communists in order to keep their foreign advisor
happy. The Chinese sources especially detail Xiao Yuehua’s reluctance to accept this
arrangement. After her initial refusal was countered with threats of dismissal from her job
by Party bosses, Xiao agreed to enter into marriage as a part of her revolutionary
mission.111
One of the considerations that led to Bo Gu’s decision to find a lover for Li De was the
fact that to leave Braun alone would make him unequal in the Party, since “all the
Chinese leaders in Jiangxi Soviet had wives.”112 The fact that most Chinese Communist
leaders had found what was commonly referred to as their ‘second spring’ during the
Soviet Jiangxi period stood in stark contrast to the puritanical asceticism principle that
was then being taught to the common soldiers. In actuality, it was the military officers
that fundamentally decided whether or not a soldier should have a wife. All Red Army
soldiers were generally persuaded to give up their personal happiness for the sake of the
revolution and having a lover or a wife was regarded as a privilege that was allowed only
to army commanders and party leaders. The recognized superiority of the high-ranking
officers or Party members finally decided if a soldier could even have a wife, what kind
of wife he might have and how he would obtain such a wife. The Chinese Communists,
no matter how hard they tried to get rid of the traditions they labeled ‘feudal’, could not
help but build their army following a form of traditional patriarchal family organization
in order to play the role of family head themselves.
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4.4.6

Love Freedom or Sexual Liberation?

Compared to later years, relationships between men and women in the Jiangxi Soviet
were known by the public to be “rather loose”.113 Positive achievements such as gaining
women’s economic independence and the promulgation of pro-female marriage
regulations were followed by a more widespread, ‘bottom-up’ sexual liberation wave.
During this wave, unmarried cohabitation, triangle love affairs, adultery, easy breakups,
frequent divorce and sexual indulgence were common scenes in daily life.
In his memoirs, Cai Xiaoqian 蔡孝乾 (1908-1982), a Taiwanese communist and one-time
minister of the Internal Affair Ministry of the Chinese Soviet Republic, remarked on
several love triangles among the high-ranking communist members in order to
demonstrate how intriguing and disordered sexual relations in Jiangxi Soviet were.114 The
affair of Li Bozhao 李伯钊 (1911-1985), Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 (1907-1998) and Wang
Guanlan 王观澜 (1906-1982) was recounted by Cai as a typical example of this disorder.
Li was first married to Yang when she studied in Moscow. Soon after she arrived in
Jiangxi, she began living with Wang as a couple. However, she left Wang and returned to
Yang as soon as he came to the Soviet region. 115 According to Cai, this kind of love
disturbance was a sign of the discrepancy that existed between marriage legislation and
daily practice:
.… Here (in the Jiangxi Soviet) is no such thing as “jiehun”[marriage ceremony],
neither the official marriage registration (although people were required by the
Marriage Regulations to register their marriage or divorce in the xiang or shi
Soviet government). The Communist Party stressed the “fact”. In the Soviet area,
a man and a woman will be naturally recognized as “husband and wife” as long
116
as they live together. It does not matter if they registered or not.
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Such unregulated love and marriage behavior, Cai believed, was caused by a distorted
tendency towards sexual liberation among the young Chinese communists. It was a trend
that came to be called beishui zhuyi 杯水主义 [the glass of water theory], which followed
a theory of sexual ethics that had been created by Alexandra Kollontai (1872-1952). A
Bolshevik feminist from Soviet Russia, Kollontai proposed that “in communist society
the satisfaction of sexual desires, of love, will be as simple and unimportant as drinking a
glass of water.”117 As the first official female Ambassador in the world, and as the
secretary of the Women’s Department of the Comintern, Kollontai became an idol that
many Chinese female communists endeavored to follow.118 Liu Ying 刘英 (1905-2002),
a leader of the Youth League trained in the USSR, was cited by Cai as a pious follower of
Kollontai’s theory: after she lost her husband in 1927, Liu married Wu Xiuquan 伍修权
(1908-1997) via a third party introduction in Jiangxi, but then declared a divorce two
days later. In 1935, she and Zhang Wentian 张闻天(1900-1976) became lovers and were
finally married in 1936.119
Whatever Cai’s beliefs on the subject, the major disturbances concerning issues of love
that occurred during the CCP’s early years were more products of the chaotic wartime
conditions than a result of the Party’s failed marriage legislation or a general moral
decline. Before the CCP acquired the official recognition of the central government and
established a stable base in 1937, the consummation and dissolution of marital unions
between male CCP leaders and local female partisans were usually subjected to frequent
and unexpected upheaval, caused by military migration and wartime casualties. Liu
Ying’s first marriage serves as a good example of this fact: she married Lin Wei 林蔚, a
top Party leader in Hunan in 1927. One week after they were married, Liu was sent alone
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to Shanghai for a Party mission. As Liu Ying told in her memoir: “Both of us thought we
could be together soon…who knew that this brief time apart would become a permanent
separation.” 120 She was informed of Lin’s arrest and execution by the GMD not long
after he had left her.
The marriages consummated during the Jiangxi Soviet period were particularly unstable
and short-lived. Except for the case of Lin Biao, all ten future marshals of the PRC were
married at least once during the Jiangxi Soviet period. However, only two of these
couples had marriages that survived to the end: Zhu De and Kang Keqing as well as Nie
Rongzhen 聂荣臻 (1899-1992) and Zhang Ruihua 张瑞华 (1909-1995).121 When the
Red Army retreated from the Jiangxi base, only thirty women were allowed to take part
in the Long March. Most of them were the wives of high-ranking Party leaders, like He
Zizhen and Kang Keqing. This figure shrank to just nineteen women by the time they had
reached Shaanxi. All the others were left in Jiangxi, captured, executed by the Nationalist
troops or forced to remarry because of poverty.122 In the midst of a violent and
unpredictable revolution, therefore, these couples saw little point in maintaining fidelity
after becoming physically separated.

4.5 Conclusion
In the marriage revolution launched by the May Fourth elites, the Chinese cities had
heard a rising voice that was calling for unconditional marriage freedoms, the rejection of
traditional matrimony, and even the abolishment of the marriage system altogether. The
newly formed Chinese Communist Party was viewed by the common people at that time
as the most distinguished representative of these radical ideas, as exemplified in its
promise for women’s liberation and its members’ open embrace of Engels’ anarchic
marriage theories.
While the Chinese communists promoted the achievement of women’s economic
independence as an elixir for all their social problems, this elixir turned out not to have
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been as effective as promised. Chinese women, rural or urban, traditional or modern,
illiterate or educated were still largely restricted in the domestic sphere by the traditional
gender conceptions that upheld man’s social superiority even after women had gained
access to economic independence. The conflict between the socialist marriage ideal and
traditional Chinese marriage customs was made more intense when the CCP’s marriage
reform law was introduced to the Jiangxi Soviet by urban-born policy-makers. In the two
pro-women marriage codes that were promulgated in 1931 and 1934, marriage freedom
was extended in order to embrace conceptions of free love, ex parte divorce and de facto
marriage. However, because these new laws violated the deeply-rooted traditional gender
relations of China’s rural society, where a husband’s domination over his wife was
ingrained, the implementation of these laws provoked strong opposition among the
peasant masses. When this opposition eventually caused an interruption of the recruiting
schedule of the Red Army, which was universally recognized by the Party as vital to the
revolution itself, the marriage problem raised serious concern from the temporal and later
CCP leaders.
While the common Party members and Red Army soldiers were repeatedly warned not
get involved in romantic love affairs that might harm revolutionary morale, the marriage
practices within the Party leadership during this period were a tangled mixture of both
radical and conservative approaches. On the one hand, with a declared preference for
consensual union- a marriage ideal recommended by Engels, some CCP members turned
to relationships of convenience that served to challenge the traditional and ‘feudal’
marriage and family systems, cover their secret missions or simply satisfy their natural
desires; on the other hand, within the Party circles where the traditional patriarchal
hierarchy was still accepted as the norm, women were constantly assigned as trophies to
the male political leaders and generals, according to their rank. Also, from this period
forward the Party began to interfere with its members’ personal lives by applying strict
censorship to their relationships under the auspices of serving the considerations of
military safety and the Party’s impression on the local peasants, which then became a
lasting policy of the Party.
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The quick collapse of the Jiangxi Soviet regime in 1934 annulled all the cosmopolitan
marriage reforms and removed the urban-born leadership from the Party’s policy-making
inner circle. With the rise of a more pragmatic and rural-born Party leadership, the
schedule of marriage reform was minimized from the CCP’ s pre-1949 agenda of total
women’s liberation in order to avoid gender conflict and to meet the wartime expediency
for military recruitment. This change will be discussed in the next chapter.

157

Chapter 5

5

Making a Marriage for Revolution

This chapter attempts to examine the marriage policies and practices of the CCP during
the Yan’an period, from 1935 to 1949. Marriage legislation continued to be enacted by
the state during this period, and each border area promulgated its own official marriage
regulations. Due to the fact that a group of officials with rural backgrounds had taken the
place of the Comintern-supported, urban-born radicals to become the CCP’s policymakers, the focus of the Party’s marriage reforms similarly turned away from a dogmatic
pursuit of Engels’ idealized marriage freedom to a more moderate rejection of the
arranged marriage system. Many of the more radical articles on freedoms of marriage and
divorce from the Jiangxi Soviet Laws were tempered in order to accommodate the more
conservative peasant society in northern China. Nonetheless, the clash between
progressive urban ideals and conservative rural marriage traditions constantly provoked
conflict between women’s cadres and peasants. This conflict forced policymakers to
constantly adjust their standpoints in order to find a balance between the temporary needs
of wartime and the long-term goal of women’s liberation. Before the Chinese
communists were able to establish their nationwide regime in 1949, the Party’s feminist
marriage reform scheme had to yield to male interests in order to secure gains that were
deemed more vital to the cause: peasant loyalty to the Communist revolution, guarantees
of rural military recruitment, and maintaining the morale of the army. Consequently, the
CCP’s discourse on love and marriage during the Yan’an period changed from one that
emphasized personal freedoms to one that favored a more puritan, simple and ascetic
lifestyle, which urged both parties to be self-giving and obedient. Free love was allowed
only with the Party’s permission and under its direct supervision. People were taught to
give up their personal happiness and to devote themselves wholeheartedly to
revolutionary work. However, among the few top leaders and generals who were eligible
to have wives, brides were arranged as rewards by the Party under the name of
developing ‘mutual help’.

158

Through a careful examination of the CCP’s marriage policies and practices during the
Yan’an period, I argue that the marriage policy of the Chinese Communists was not a
solid or static theory, but was rather a dynamic policy that was designed to meet the
varied political requirements of the unstable wartime environment.

5.1 Women’s Work in Yan’an
During both the Anti-Japanese War of 1937-1945 and the Civil War of 1945-1949, the
CCP’s policymakers were primarily interested in organizing women with the
understanding that “the mobilization of women will inevitably lead to the mobilization of
the people of the whole country.”1 A resolution made by the Shan-Gan-Ning border Party
Committee in July 1937 indicated that its immediate goals regarding women were to
establish women’s organizations, train women’s cadres, mobilize women for
participation in political and productive work, advocate universal elementary education,
improve literacy and to discuss the daily revolutionary struggle.2 Women’s direct military
participation included various different activities: military mobilization, including
political agitation and propaganda; battlefield service, including taking charge of
outposts, guarding important passes and spying on bandits; providing comfort services
including a medical group, a washing group and a sewing group that provided clothing
supply for the army; special services for military families, including regular household
and field duties as well as school training; and finally self-protection army and
government bond purchasing.3
After the CCP acquired the official recognition of the central government and established
a stable base in Yan’an in 1937, a large number of urban female intellectuals crowded
into the region. These intellectuals promoted the women’s rights movement there to a
new level, which resulted in feminist demands for marriage reform, economic
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independence and gender equality becoming top considerations for the CCP’s women
cadres. A women’s university was founded in Yan’an in order to train the new urban
arrivals as cadres who would be qualified to do rural women’s work. The CCP’s first
women’s journal Zhongguo Funü 中国妇女 [Women of China] was established during
the Yan’an period in order to host open discussions on all sorts of issues regarding
women. Topics covered by the journal were varied, including: theoretical studies on
women’s liberation and the movement, the Party’s policies on women, the problems of
women’s work, the promulgation of marriage laws, new developments in the
international and national women’s movements, stories about ‘model’ women, biological
and physiological knowledge, and childcare.4
In order to avoid unnecessary antagonism between the sexes, the Party divided women
into several groups according to their class background: bourgeoisie, proletariat, peasants
and urban poor. Each group’s requirements for marriage freedom were examined by the
Party, which identified different individual characteristics: for the bourgeoisie, the goal
was to gain marriage freedom and to modify the Legal Regulations of Marriage; workers
were looking to focus on gaining the freedom to make marriage decisions; peasants and
the urban poor were looking to oppose the buying and selling of marriages, crack down
on marital violence, to gain marriage freedom and to abolish the ‘adopted-daughter-inlaw’ system.5 Based on a careful analysis of each class’ requirements for marriage
reform, policymakers expected to set a baseline for overall reform that could satisfy
women’s basic expectations without provoking a gender war.
Nevertheless, the gender conflict couldn’t help but become increasingly sharp once
women from urban and intellectual backgrounds were sent into the villages to propagate
the new marriage regulations. The most provocative issues they raised were not only
basic feminist demands (such as love and marriage freedom, real gender equality in both
the domestic and public spheres, and women’s economic independence) but also the
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radical working methods that many progressive woman cadres used. The women’s
liberation advocated by these activists was paradoxical to the goals of the peasant
revolution that was then occurring in northwest China. On the one hand, the Party
encouraged peasant women to fight against their oppressive families in order to achieve
unprecedented financial independence and individual freedom; on the other hand, the
Party also needed to accommodate the peasant men who formed the CCP’s primary
source of army recruitment, many of whom would not welcome such freedoms for their
spouses and daughters. In a society where men enjoyed absolute gender superiority,
women’s liberation inevitably conflicted with the local patriarchies and caused general
resentment toward the Party, even to the point of endangering military recruitment.
Consequently, in the early 1940s the CCP leadership tightened its policies towards
women and began to constrain the development of the women’s movement under what
was called the Rectification Campaign. The Women’s University was closed down,
female activists were removed from their positions and were severely criticized or even
subjected to legal punishment and Zhongguo funü stopped publication in March 1941
after only two issues.6 The focus of propaganda on the women’s movement turned from
advocating women’s liberation and freedom to focusing on women’s participation in
production and military recruitment.

5.2 Marriage Reform through Legislation
Like the leaders of the Jiangxi Soviet, the new leadership in Yan’an attempted to
implement their marriage reforms through adopting legislation. Each border area
promulgated its own marriage regulations in accordance with the local circumstances.
Although considerable compromises were made in order to accommodate the
conservative peasant class, the conflicts that the Soviet leaders had experienced between
men and women, cadres and the people as well as between central orders and local
practices all continued to frustrate the Yan’an leadership. Eventually, these clashes
forced the Party to switch its focus from marriage reform to the participation of women in
production for the sake of the ongoing war.
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5.2.1

The Marriage Legislation in the Border Area

Between 1938 and 1949, a number of marriage regulations and their amendments were
passed in the major Border Areas of Shan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia), JinCha-Ji (Shanxi, Ch’ahar, and Hebei), Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and
Henan), the Jin-Sui (Shanxi and Suiyuan) and Shandong, as follows:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia
(the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area), promulgated April 4, 1939;7
Revised Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Shan-Gan-Ning Border
Area, promulgated March 20, 1944;8
Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia
(the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area), promulgated April 23, 1946;
Marriage Regulation of the Border Area of Shanxi, Ch’ahar, and Hebei (the
Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area, promulgated February 4, 1943;9
The Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shanxi, Hebei,
Shandong, and Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border Area), revised version of
September 29, 1943;
The Detailed Provisions on the Enforcement of the Provisional Marriage
Regulations of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border Area of April 26, 1942;
The Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shanxi and
Suiyuan (the Jin-Sui Border Area);
The Provisional Marriage Regulations of Northwest Shanxi, promulgated
April 1, 1941;
The Provisional Marriage Regulations of Shandong Province, promulgated
March 16, 1945; 10

These regulations expressed a universal spirit of marriage rights that were summarized
into four General Principles, as outlined in a directive published by the Jin-Cha-Ji
government on July 7, 1941 called On our Marriage Regulations. These four principals
were gender equality, marriage freedom (divorce), serious gender relations (monogamy),
and the priority of the interest of anti-Japanese soldiers.11
While varying in specific details, all of the marriage regulations in the Border Areas
identically stressed gender equality in the public and domestic spheres, claiming that
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“Man and woman are completely equal in social, political, and economic respects and in
respect to their position within the family.”12 This definition of equality constituted the
theoretical foundation for monogamy for the CPP. The principle of free marriage was
identified in On Our Marriage Regulations as being “free, self-determined, mutually
willing marriage…established on the matched feelings and will of the two parties.”13
Following this spirit, each marriage law included several provisions that upheld the free
consent of the marrying parties, prohibited interference by third parties and prohibited
marriage by arrangement or by “purchase and sale”. Although betrothal was generally not
regarded as a prerequisite for legal marriage, some of the regulations contained very
elaborate provisions on the subject so as to satisfy local customs. For example, in the JinJi-Lu-Yu area, it was even required that the contract of betrothal be registered and no less
than seven Articles out of a total of twenty-four were devoted to the question.14
In contrast to the Jiangxi Soviet period, when family needs were held to be secondary to
Engels’ socialist ideal, in Yan’an the CCP policymakers emphasized “the spirit of a new
democratic, dignified family system”, and especially focused on constructing a new
social order on the basis of monogamy.

15

This monogamous principle along with serious

gender relations, in this sense, were described by policymakers as constituting the
necessary premise for marriage freedom, the essential guarantee of healthy offspring, the
revolutionary social order and the overall future of the Border Area. Stressing the value
of monogamy was also the legal basis used by officials to oppose the liberal tendency of
“beishui zhuyi”杯水主义 [the glass of water theory], consensual adultery, rape and
16

promiscuity.

In all of the Border Areas the condition for the conclusion of a marriage was the formal
registration of a contract with the relevant authority, either the xiang or qu [village or
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agglomeration of villages] government. However, even the fulfillment of this procedure
was generally not compulsory: “As long as the relations of husband and wife exist in fact,
the marriage is certainly not invalid because the prescribed procedure has not been
complied with.”17 This did not, however, constitute an official recognition of de-facto
marriage; any marriage that proceeded without either public ceremony or official
registration was considered not valid and offenders were subject to punishment by the
local government. The basic argument was that such marriages corrupted relations
between men and women and furnished the enemies of the CCP and saboteurs with an
excuse to spread rumors.18 The marriageable age was set at 20 for men and 18 for
women, which was identical with the age limit set in the Civil Code of 1931. The only
exception to this age among the different areas was in Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu, where it was 18 for
men and 16 for women (Article 11).
Unlike the provisions examined above, the chapters on divorces in the Yan’an period
codes demonstrated a radical break from the divorce provisions of the Jiangxi period.
There was no longer any provision that permitted divorce on the simple grounds of
request by either party in any of the resolutions. Divorce could only be obtained either by
mutual consent or by an ex parte application. The applicant would have to list the reasons
for divorce and address himself (or herself) to the responsible authorities. The acceptable
grounds for divorce were bigamy, adultery, cruelty, desertion in bad faith, attempt at
physical injury by spouse, impotence, incurable or contagious mental or venereal
diseases, uncertainty as to whether the spouse had been alive for a period varying from
one to three years, or finally conviction of spouse to imprisonment for a certain number
of years. Besides these universal foundations, there were variations in the individual
codes of certain Areas that permitted divorce for reasons such as collaboration with the
enemy (in the Jin-Cha-Ji and the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Regulations), and drug addiction (in the
Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Regulations). According to the Revised Shan-Gan-Ning Regulations, a
divorce would be granted “when one party does not engage in a regular occupation and
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warning had no effect, while his behavior endangers the other party’s livelihood” (Article
8 and 9).
Apart from the grounds mentioned above, the Yan’an Regulations also allowed “any
other important reason” to be given as acceptable grounds for divorce “when the
sentiments and wills [hearts and minds] of the parties fundamentally do not harmonize
and there is no way of continuing to live together” (Shan-Gan Ning Regulations of 1939
article 14 and 1944 Article 16). When the laws acknowledged that incompatibility and
the breakdown of mutual affection were acceptable bases for divorce, the whole spirit of
marriage was changed; it was no longer just a solid and legal bond, but was instead now
something that was dependent on the feelings and affections of the individuals involved.
Nevertheless, not every unhappy couple could obtain an easy divorce, as having ‘no way
of continuing to live together’ was an inexplicit term that easily led to distorted
interpretations and indiscreet divorces. On Our Marriage Regulations specifically
elaborated on this point:
Marriage must be based on profound love, only then it can work well.
Fundamental conflicts in sentiments will cause great pain to both parties.
However, the expression ‘disharmony in sentiments’ only refers to cases where
it is ‘impossible to continue living together’. Therefore in applying this Article
you must not grant divorce simply because of an occasional quarrel between
husband and wife. 19
Therefore, an easier and more common criterion was introduced by officials in order to
deal with any divorce application that fell into this more ambiguous category: “the
comrades of the various levels of government, especially those of the judicial sector
should understand these problems from the political point of view.”20 Following this
spirit, the acceptable grounds for divorce were interpreted by officials in the light of the
class struggle and the anti-feudal front whenever the occasion arose. Political factors such
as an individual’s class background and political tendencies replaced love or affection as
the top factors under consideration when a judge was ruling over a divorce.
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Policymakers granted certain privileges to some people in order to take care of the
interests of the military men in service, declaring “Our Regulations are permeated by the
spirit of the needs of anti-Japanese war, which are beyond everything.” 21 The provisions
in the Border Area Regulations for divorce among army personnel were very similar to
those in the Marriage Code of 1934: women generally had to wait four to five years
before they were permitted to apply for divorce. The Order on Protecting the Army
Personnel’s Marriage, issued by the Jin-Sui Border Government in 1946 went so far as
to state that “divorce cases of army dependents should be dealt with great caution,
generally they cannot be divorced.”22 Another document issued in the same year by the
administrative office of the Southern Hebei Area supplemented this regulation with the
statement that “even under the condition that the divorce application of the army
dependent meets the legal ground for divorce, and the principal refuses to be conciliated,
the granting of the divorce should be intentionally prolonged.”23
The Yan’an period, as Delia Davin perceived, served as a laboratory for a transition in
CCP practice from a feminist approach toward a socialist one. Marriage legislation in the
Border Areas is of great importance in understanding the development of marriage
legislation and policy in the People’s Republic. The social changes and experiments that
took place there were later to determine the course of Chinese women’s history.24

5.2.2

Marriage Regulations in Practice

Introducing marriage reforms to the peasant masses was a difficult and frustrating job.
Official reorganization in the Yan’an period was generally incomplete in both scope and
depth. Complicating things was the fact that the distribution of marriage freedoms was
regionally unbalanced. While in some more progressive areas totally or partially free
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marriage were popular, in other places arranged marriage still dominated.25 The
advocates and supporters of free marriage were primarily Party members, Youth League
members and partisans. Even among the most progressive peasants, the practice of
marriage freedom was far more reserved and the practices of using a matchmaker as ‘gobetween’ and obtaining familial consent were still considered important, if not
imperitive.26
Ineffective as they were, these Marriage Regulations seldom appeared in official CCP
documents and addresses. When they were mentioned, the language used to describe
them was often rather ambiguous. For instance, when Kang Keqing concluded lessons on
women’s work in Huabei in July 1940, she politely expressed her dissatisfaction with the
results of marriage reform over the previous three years:
The marriage problems had been partly solved. Individual cases were properly
handled. Selling and purchasing marriage, adopted-daughter-in-law, domestic
violence started to be prohibited in some areas. The Women’s Salvation
Association [Fujiuhui 妇救会] had helped many women with their unhappy
marriages.27
The conservative situation in northern China and the offences of local cadres were cited
as the primary causes behind this ineffective implementation. As soon as the female
communist workers had arrived in Yan’an, they realized that they were confronting “a
region characterized by barren land, sparse population, insufficient food, backward
culture, a lagging economy and transportation, occlusive social customs and thick feudal
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thoughts.”28 After a couple of years’ work experience, Kang’s perceptions about reform
developed into a fuller understanding that “the ethics and social customs derived from the
semi-feudal economy [was] the biggest impediment against the development of women’s
movement.”29 She argued that liberating women from their feudal oppression required a
long and tough fight, which was inseparable from the victory of the anti-Japanese war.
Betrothal gifts, early marriages, adopting daughters-in-law and divorce were the major
issues in struggle for marriage freedom. According to government reports of 1930-1931,
the disparity in gender in the population of northwest China was a remarkable 100
women to every 135 men.30 This scarcity of women in the region made them especially
valuable, which caused the selling and purchasing of marriages to be a much more
popular practice in this area than in any other place in China. It was especially popular
among the poorest peasant families who expected to realize financial benefits from
marrying out their daughters. The process of obtaining a wife was still a potentially
crippling financial blow to a groom’s family. In dealing with cases that were assumed to
be one of these marriages for sale, the women cadre officers often chose to simply
confiscate all the betrothal gifts and dowries exchanged by the two families, regardless of
their protests and without return or compensation.
Early engagement and marriage had been another very popular practice among the
peasants, who were too poor to afford an extra daughter or to raise a proper betrothal gift.
It was common practice for a girl to be sent to her future husband’s household as an
orphan at a very early age due to the poverty of her natal family. Especially in areas
frequently swept by the Japanese troops, the families tended to send their daughters to
their in-law’s houses in less active areas in order to avoid unexpected rape or killing. To
meet the Marriage Regulations’ stipulation for marriage age, some women cadres
forcefully sent daughters-in-law who were not older than eighteen back to their natal
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families and annulled their underage marriages. Tragedies happened sometimes. In one
instance, a daughter-in-law who had been living with her mother-in-law for many years
and was treated like a close family member was forced to return to her poorer natal
family, where she did not even get enough food to survive. Her mother-in-law went
insane over missing her.31
The threat of divorce was used by the women cadre leaders as a main motivator in
dealing with family conflicts. In some districts of Jin-Cha-Ji, measuring the number of
divorce cases was used as an important standard for evaluating the cadre’s work. Divorce
even became fashionable in some villages. The village authorities encouraged women to
sue for divorce whenever their conditions met the acceptable grounds listed in the divorce
regulations. In some areas, couples with a pronounced age gap were even divorced
against their will.32
The feminist tendencies of local woman cadres were the primary causes of these
examples of abuses of power. For example, Cai Chang 蔡畅(1900-1990) who was
secretary of the CCP’s Central Women’s Movement Committee and the Chairman of the
All-Women’s Federation of the PRC, pointed out in 1943:
Many of our female Party members and cadres lack the spirit of seeking truth
from facts and the viewpoint of the masses. Their work is neither in-depth nor
steadfast enough. Although those intellectual cadres always speak of the slogans
such as ‘marriage freedom’, ‘economic independence’, ‘against the suppression
of the four systems’, they actually know nothing about how to put them into
practice…when dealing with women’s family problems, they often take the side
of wife and daughter-in-law, blaming husband and parents-in-law. This made our
woman’s work isolated from the social support… ”33
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This critique was repeated by Tian Xiujuan 田秀涓(1917-2006), the director of Jin-ChaJi Women’s Salvation Association in 1945. In her summary on women’s work before
1943, Tian attributed the stagnation of the movement in the early 1940s to the impractical
working methods of the local cadre authorities. She concluded that “for the majority of
the peasant masses whose first concern is survival, the overemphasis of liberating women
from their suffering marriages could not help but alienate the masses from the Party.”34
The peasant population’s rising resentment towards marriage reform forced the Party to
transfer the focus of its propaganda in 1943. The participation of women in economic
production was recognized by the Party as “women’s biggest contribution to the antiJapanese war, and their best work,” and further stated that the primary work of women’s
associations should be to “organize women’s individual and collective production.”35
After the change in focus, marriage reform was not considered a central issue anymore by
Party officials and it was excluded from further wartime businesses. Cai Chang told her
American interviewer:
“Our slogans in the rural districts are no longer ‘free marriage’ and ‘women’s
equality’, but ‘save the babies’ and ‘for a prosperous family.’ We made a
mistake when we emphasized women’s rights to such an extent that we
antagonized the peasants. The conflict between men and women weakened the
united struggle against the Japanese enemy and against the landlord. Besides,
equality of women and freedom of marriage cannot be secured in this
manner.”36

5.3 Socialization, Love, and Marriage in Yan’an
After the establishment of the United Front, thousands of passionate young people
crowded into Yan’an from around the country, expecting to contribute to the antiJapanese war, and the Communist Revolution. Among these, about thirty percent were
educated young women from all walks of life.37 Their arrival at Shaanbei injected fresh
modern blood into this barren, conservative and traditional rural society, and inevitably
attracted the interest of men there, and consequently provoked the resentment of the
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senior women cadre leaders. Filled with the romanticized idea of revolution, these young
people tried to reform the conservative, closed and seemingly backwards Chinese peasant
society into a progressive, open and modern one that emulated the “progressive” West.
How to bring love into the marriage context of the rural society became one of their first
challenges.
Talks about love and marriage among the Chinese communists were going on throughout
the Yan’an period. With the Rectification Campaign that started in 1941 as a turning
point, public opinion regarding cross-gender socialization, free love and marriage
freedom became increasingly conservative. As outlined above, this change reflected a
shift in the Party to fit the social context of rural northwest China and to compromise
with the more urgent need for wartime recruitment. Caught between the contrasts
between modern ideas of romanticism and freedom with more conservative rural social
realities on the ground, many people began to feel confused and frustrated in dealing with
their personal lives and Party service. How to find a balance between modern ideals and
traditional society became a central concern of every marriage discussion.

5.3.1

Cross-gender Socialization in a Puritan Society

Unlike the Jiangxi Soviet era, where the relationships between men and women were
“rather loose” and people could “live together as a couple at will”, the social lives of
most communists and soldiers during the Yan’an period was much more puritan. 38 The
morale and discipline of the Red Army from its founding until 1949 had been based upon
a policy of total abstinence from women for male soldiers. Edgar Snow was told by an
army officer that “General opinion is very strongly against anyone playing with women.
In our army men are taught a stern moral code…An army with socialist ideals won’t dirty
its own nest.” 39 The officer said he had never had a case in five years where a soldier got
a local girl into trouble. In Yan’an, most female cadres, married or unmarried, lived under
strict gender segregation in the dormitories of the Women’s Section of the former Red
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Academy or within their work departments.40 According to a report by Harrison Forman,
an American visitor living among the Communists in Yan’an during the last year of the
anti-Japanese war:
Most of Yan’an University’s thirteen hundred students are married. However,
school regulations forbid husbands and wives to live together, except on
Saturday nights when special “Guest caves” are made available by the school
authorities. “Keeping them apart during the week not only enables boys and
girls to study better, with fewer distractions, but at the same time sweetens love
between married couples,” I was told by Chow Yang [Zhou Yang], the president
of the university. When I questioned the students about this rule they would not
discuss it.41
In these puritanical circumstances, individual desires regarding love and marriage were
easily marginalized by the demands of serving the public good. Not only was sexual
behavior outside of marriage considered by the state to be heinous and was often
officially defined as a “conspiracy composed by the nation’s enemy to contaminate our
countrymen and to disturb the democratic order.”42 Under such circumstances, even
innocent contact between the sexes could attract scandal and gossip.43
Young people were generally encouraged and expected not to talk about love [谈恋爱
tan lian’ai]. In a speech at the opening ceremony of the Women’s University, Mao
Zedong suggested “the comrades making up the teachers and staff of the Women’s
University set their minds to their work, and be resolved to work for a long time.”44
During wartime, love was considered taboo for the men and women serving at both the
front and in the rear areas. Exposed lovers would be severely criticized in public for their
‘petit bourgeois tendencies’, forced to admit their mistake and to profess their willingness
to break up.45 The only way to secure a romantic relationship that had occurred was to
apply to the Party for permission, though this was often difficult to obtain if the match
was not intentionally arranged by the Party. According to the memoirs of Mo Wenhua 莫
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文骅 (1910-2000), the deputy director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route
Army, in order to avoid being distracted from their studies the students in Kangda 抗大
[the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University] were prohibited from falling in love
and getting married by school regulations. A school leader once violated this regulation
by getting married to a student without reporting it to the Party in advance. He was
subsequently removed from his position and demoted on a written order from Mao
Zedong.46
Nevertheless, before the Rectification Campaign entered a Party-wide stage in the spring
of 1942, the political circumstances and public opinion in Yan’an were relatively free,
open and less politicized. 47 An open forum on how to socialize between the two sexes
without provoking scandals was held in late 1941. The paper Jiefang Ribao 解放日报
[Liberation Daily] contributed a special column in order to discuss this question on
December 13, 1941. The column called for answers to the question “what was crosssocialization in the New Democratic Society”?48 Nine participants gave their opinions on
socialization in Yan’an, recognizing that ideal socialization in a socialist society should
be a completely free and equal communication between the two sexes, which should be
established on the basis of women’s equal participation in production. The forum took
particular note of the problems introduced by the bourgeoisie: on the one hand, a few
young men who came from the big cities were known to treat women like play toys,
dating different pretty girls every day. Some young women, on the other hand, were very
particular about their friends and only chose to associate with those who could satisfy
their material needs. In rural circumstances, where free love was regarded as equal to
licentiousness, the forum warned that this tendency could easily harm the Party’s
reputation and provoke misunderstanding and antagonism from the local population.
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The forum tried to advocate a healthy and normal socialization between the two sexes
that was comradely, serious, and wide-ranging and trans-class in nature. In reality,
however, having a normal social life in Yan’an was more difficult than the easy solutions
offered by the forum suggest, due to the unpredictable wartime conditions where
individuals were constantly required to sacrifice their personal needs for the greater good
of the war and the revolution. The burdens of study and work, limited transportation, and
economic difficulties left people little room to think about socialization.
The fundamental reason for the difficulties concerning socialization lay in the
disproportionate ratio between men and women in Yan’an. Among the 4000 survivors of
the Long March who arrived in Shaanbei, only 50 were female. From the end of 1937 to
early 1938, the sex ratio of men to women rose slightly to 30:1, reached 18:1 in 1941 and
finally settled at 8:1 in the summer of 1944.49 Despite the fact that women were in the
vast minority, many married females in Yan’an were very possessive about their partners.
When Helen Snow first arrived in Yan’an in 1937 she encountered a conflict between the
senior women cadres and the population of new arrivals from the big cities. Most of these
women were the wives of the high-ranking Party and military men and were themselves
veterans of the Long March. Snow found that these women were in fear of losing their
husbands to the younger, prettier and better educated urban girls. Led by Agnes Smedley
and Ding Ling, these young partisans attempted to introduce some modern urban
socialization practices such as ballroom dancing into Yan’an’s social life.50 Their
attempts ended with Smedley’s reluctant departure at the end of 1937, and Ding Ling’s
temporary dispatch to the front, leading to accusations of her ‘bourgeois tendency’ in the
coming Rectification campaign.
This kind of open discussion on cross-gender socialization and love was definitely novel
and bold for the local masses and especially for those Chinese with a northern and rural
background, where most couples still met each other for the first time on their wedding
day. The arrival of groups of urban young partisans in Yan’an in the late 1930s and early
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1940s, and their vague anarchist ideas of ‘free love’ rapidly intensified the antagonism
between the conservative local population and the progressive reformers. As the
Rectification Campaign entered into its full term in the second half of the 1942, formal
talks regarding gender relations were intentionally avoided by the CCP, and they
subsequently disappeared from public attention altogether.

5.3.2

The Politicized Discourse on Love and Marriage

In the official discourse of the CCP, love and marriage were always considered
subordinate to Party work. On March 2, 1942, Deng Yingchao published an article
entitled “Nannü qingnian wenti” 男女青年问题（Questions on Young men and Young
women）in the paper Xinhua ribao 新华日报 [New China Daily] in order to give official
advice on what was appropriate regarding love and marriage. She pointed out that it was
very important for Party members to have correct views on love and marriage not only
for the sake of an individual’s personal life and happiness, but also for the development
of social advancement and revolutionary work. The so-called ‘correct’ viewpoint on love,
according to Deng, included two major points: first, a love relationship must be
established on the basis of mutual will and matched personalities. This match required
that the two parties’ mutual affection surmount sexual attraction, that their common
interests still served the public good and that the couple have lasting devotion to each
other. Second, although love and marriage were important and necessary parts of one’s
life, the quest for free socialization, love and marriage should not impede one’s
revolutionary work, studies or health. The bourgeois tendencies to seek passionate love
and irresponsibility should be opposed and the individual should not sacrifice politics and
revolution for love and marriage.51 In other words, work first and love second!
These kinds of principles also applied to the mate-selection criteria. In the same article,
Deng Yingchao advised young people to select their mates carefully by examining a
prospect’s political beliefs and thoughts in order to ensure they were in accordance with
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the Party’s political and revolutionary requirements. The best match, according to Deng,
should be one in which the two parties have common ideals and beliefs so that they could
work together to achieve their life and work goals. Of course, she admitted that not
everyone would be lucky enough to find a perfect match. The best choice for those that
were less lucky was to make a choice from among the prospects with clean and reliable
political backgrounds, which had a clear desire for advancement.52
Ding Ling mentioned in her “Thought on March 8th” that people were taught to look for
marriage prospects based on 1) political purity, 2) age and physical compatibility, 3)and
finally ‘mutual help’. However, she also suggested that most of the officially sanctioned
mate-selection criteria made no practical sense in contemporary Yan’an: “Even though
everyone is said to fulfill these conditions—as for (1), there are no open traitors in
Yan’an; as for (3), you can call anything ‘mutual help’, including darning socks, patching
shoes and even feminine comfort—everyone nevertheless makes a great show of giving
thoughtful attention to them”.53
While people were taught to reject the traditional idea of mendi 门第 [matched family
background], matching individuals’ class background was particularly emphasized by the
CCP’s marriage advisers for the sake of the revolution. During wartime, it was dangerous
to have a life partner from a different background as evidenced by numerous reported
cases in newspapers like Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], and Jinchaji ribao 晋察冀日报
[Jin-Cha-Ji Daily]. In one common example, a landlord’s daughter would conspire to
marry a poor peasant in order to penetrate and breach the Party organization or to find
shelter for her and her family.54 The poor peasant man who engaged or married such a
woman because of her good looks, education or dowry was forced to self-criticize his
insubstantial stance and to divorce his wife immediately. One such a case was reported in
the early 1940s in the village of Hanjiayu 韩家峪 in the Quyang 曲阳 area. After hearing
the news of impending land reform, a landlord named Zhang Laiyu married his daughter
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to Zhang Qingtai, a CCP member of poor peasant origins. When the working group heard
this news, they offered Zhang two choices: keep the marriage and large dowry and be
recognized as the protector of a landlord and enemy of the masses or divorce the bride
immediately and return to the embrace of the Party. After serious self-rectification, Zhang
realized his mistake, drove the bride out of his house and surrendered the dowry to the
local peasant organization.55
As in traditional Chinese society, where finding a partner with a matched family
background was supposed to provide the bride with better insurance against poverty,
domestic violence and political persecution, a progressive Party member from the poor
peasant class was regarded as the safest prospective spouse because such a person could
protect his or her family from the CCP’s constant political maneuvering. The transition
that had occurred in women’s mate-selection criteria was summed up by a Hebei cadre
member as follows:
Today, women no longer pick their future husbands among the wealthy men, but
tend to choose those who are politically progressive and capable of doing good
work; Benefited by the land reform, those who obtained good labor capacity and
good personalities are preferred[by women] to those from the exploitative
56
class.
The politicization of the social circumstances in the CCP’s border areas led to a similar
politicization of love and marriage views, through which political ideology, or more
precisely, loyalty to the Party became the paramount consideration in mate-selection
criteria. When journalist Zhao Chaogou 赵超构 (1910-1992) visited Yan’an in 1944, he
found that people’s love and marriage practices in Yan’an were standardized by the Party,
which outlined its views in teaching a ‘correct love view’ and the ‘correct mate-selection
criteria’. As Zhao perceived at the time: “it seems no big difference whom you marry
[since] all people had been stereotyped by the Party’s doctrines, and individual difference
had diminished…The only conditions one can take into consideration when making a

55

“Zhang Qingtai buzhong meirenji, jianjue ba dizhu nüer gan chu men” 章清泰不中美人计，坚决把地主女儿赶出
门[Zhang Qingtai drove out the landlord’s daughter], Jin-Cha-Ji ribao, no.35 (1940).
56
Originally seen in “Hunyin zhengce tigang” 婚姻政策提纲 [Outline of the Marriage Policies], in Hebei Archive
Center, file No. 572-1-180-15. Quoted in Zhang Zhiyong, 78.

177

marriage choice are age and appearance…Of course, this will save us a lot of trouble
from making selections.”57

5.3.3

The Rectified Official Discourse on Love and Marriage

The open discussion on love and marriage that had come to its peak in early 1942 came
to a sudden stop when Mao Zedong gave his “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature
and Art” to the literary and art workers in May of that year. In this well-known speech
Mao set the basic tone of the CCP’s attitude toward intellectuals and their works: “in a
class society there can be only class love”, those who were seeking “a love transcending
classes, love in the abstract and also freedom in the abstract, truth in the abstract, human
nature in the abstract” “have been very deeply influenced by the bourgeoisie” and
“should thoroughly rid themselves of this influence and modestly study MarxismLeninism”.58 In February 1943, Ou Mengjue 区梦觉 (1906-1992), a member of the
Central Women’s Movement Committee of the CCP (1941-1943), published an article in
Jiefang ribao to inject the new spirit of the Rectification Campaign into the love and
marriage theme. In this article, Ou demanded that women cadres in Yan’an, especially
those with bourgeois backgrounds, switch their concerns from trivial personal issues such
as marriage and divorce to more significant issues such as the revolution and the war. She
demanded that personal emotions like friendship and love were always secondary
compared to the needs of Party. Ou especially criticized those “weak” women who put
more faith in friends and lovers than in the Party, and selected their lovers or life partners
based on personal compatibilities instead of harmonized political adamancy.
Furthermore, she criticized wives who often expected attention from their husbands who
were working for the Party and those who were incapable of balancing domestic
housekeeping and Party work. To conquer these negative feelings, Ou suggested that
women cadres always put the CCP’s interests first and resolve personal problems through
thinking about Party interests. For example, love and marriage should be allowed only
under the condition that it would not impede Party work in any way. For a woman, she
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argued that a choice should be made between being either a good wife and wise mother
or a good politician; the two could not co-exist simultaneously.59
Such a strong emphasis on the priority of the Party’s work and the adversities of marriage
created great pressure on the women in Yan’an as they struggled to balance public
service with private lives and to preserve the precarious equalities they had achieved in
the public sphere. This concern was intensified as the war drew to a close and as many
demobilized soldiers and work cadres returned to the home front, demanding to re-take
positions that had been held by women. A large number of married CCP women were
persuaded to withdraw from their leadership positions in order to cede them to male
candidates who would ‘not be distracted’ by their domestic duties. This could not help
but provoke strong despair and depression among these women, aggravating the already
intensified problems in gender relations.
Ding Ling complained in 1942 that “all kinds of women comrades are often the target of
deserved criticism” because of their inevitable inclination to become “backward” [luohou
落后].60 Marriage was believed to be the original sin behind all backwardness, once
public opinion reached a consensus that under no condition should people’s public
service be impeded. Few women in Yan’an could escape from being publicly derided as
‘Noras who have returned home’ once they got married and had children. Those who
gave up public work and returned home to be a full-time housewife were particularly
detested by the radical female activists. These women were subject to severe criticism
and were referred to in such terms as “the dregs of Yan’an women” who “lacked the
resolution and confidence to create her own fate, and spent all her life on raising several
children.”61
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In these circumstances, the women in Yan’an were unexceptionally engaged in a
desperate effort to get rid of their gender identities by behaving progressive and
remaining single. Like one journalist who visited Yan’an in the early 1940s perceived:
the female comrade’s ambition is usually stronger than that of the males. In
order to avoid being criticized as ‘weak’, they were particularly eager to
demonstrate their strong minds and progressiveness...these women comrades
tried in every way to get over their feminine side: they could engage in an
earnest open discussion on the Party and state affairs; although love and
marriage were inevitable for them, they seemed very reluctant to talk about
them, not to mention the topics about makeup, clothing and fashion. 62
When a woman cadre was jeered at with the criticism “you are nothing like a woman”,
she refuted immediately: “Why must I be like a woman?”63
Outside of these women’s expectations, however, their progressiveness and devotion
were not appreciated by the Party. In a women’s colloquium held in March of 1945,
Zhang Yun 章蕴 (1905-1998), the minister of the Women’s Department of the Suzhong
area (Jiangsu province) blamed the gender tension that existed on these female cadres.64
The first fault Zhang pointed out was the unrealistic political ambitions of some women
and their pessimism at the failure of such ambitions, which in return further blinded them
to the real situation. The real situation, as addressed by Zhang, included two “facts”: first
that women should recognize that they are biologically inferior to men due to the
disadvantages caused by marriage and childbearing, which would more or less impede a
woman’s political career. She argued that because women were naturally incapable of
competing with men on the battlefield, it was impossible for them to assume leadership
during wartime. Therefore, Zhang persuaded women to give up competing with men for
leadership when wartime conditions required a rapid reduction of women’s political
duties at all levels. Secondly, Zhang demanded that women recognize that in the rural
social context of northwest China, the population was not prepared to accept woman’s
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leadership because of the popular conception of men’s superiority to women, which was
still deeply rooted in local people’s minds. Until peasant women were well-organized
into a competitive force, men’s conceptions about women could not be expected to
change. Under the condition that ‘feudal thoughts’ still occupied the minds of most men,
it was impossible for them to take orders from a woman, no matter how progressive she
might be. Only after Chinese women had risen as a force and when the majority view on
women was automatically transformed, could women seize high leadership positions with
the support of the masses.
The second fault Zhang pointed out for women comrades was their groundless fear of
marriage. This fear, according to Zhang, mostly came from incorrect views on marriage
that antagonized women’s domestic and political duties, which led to a contradiction
between their political ambitions, worries about family and their natural sexual and
emotional needs. Again, Zhang acknowledged that a marriage meant both happiness and
catastrophe for a woman comrade, but insisted that it should not become an excuse for
celibacy, which went against human nature. The solution Zhang suggested was to “take
things as they come, and not fight them off.”65 That is, people needed to accept the
biological divergence between men and women as a fixed natural law, while keeping the
importance of progress in mind by recognizing that the need for consensual love and
marriage was inborn. In other words, women should give up on unrealistic political
ambitions and assume their natural duties as wives and mothers.
From Zhang’s advice, one can easily trace the transition of the CCP’s gender discourse in
the mid-1940s. The language Zhang employed was much less radical than the one used
by Ou Mengjue, who earlier had upheld women’s wholehearted devotion to work and
equal competition with men in the work field. In this renewed gender discourse, women
as a whole were politely persuaded to accept their biological limitations as giving them
an irreversible inferiority to men, to accept marriage as a natural duty and to voluntarily
give up competing with men for Party leadership at all levels. The revolution required a
stable and peaceful home front constituted by harmonious families. This was not only a
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compromise to the Party’s wartime conditions, but also to the social realities of northwest
China.

5.4 Red Marriage: The Romanticized Revolutionary
Marriage Pattern
Since the Jiangxi Soviet era, it had been a tradition in the CCP that all Party members
must first obtain permission from the official organizations before engaging in marriage
or divorce. This tradition was expanded to cover any love relationship during the Yan’an
period, which effectively sanctioned the Party’s, and later the Communist state’s, open
interference with individual’s marriage for the sake of national security. Furthermore, the
CCP went beyond merely permitting or dissolving relationships and marriages, and began
actively engaging in matchmaking and background investigation.

5.4.1

Love on the March: The Marriage Stories of the Red Soldiers

Soon after arriving in Shaanbei in November of 1935, the Red Army began to experience
a wave of ‘red marriages’- a term used specifically to refer to the marriages of high-level
CCP and military leaders. Mo Wenhua, the deputy director of the Political Department of
the Eighth Route Army, recalled that when the Red Army arrived in Shaanbei, many Red
Army cadres were in their thirties, single, widowed, divorced or forever separated from a
spouse by war.66 Once they had settled down, these veterans were eager to look for new
wives; as Mo explained, “since the Red Army had found its home, wouldn’t its cadres
want a home too?”67 Before the urban women began to arrive in Shaanbei, the few female
Long March survivors and the local women cadres formed the primary pool of potential
brides, although their scarcity meant that not everyone could find a satisfactory match.
For the sake of army morale and social stability, most matches were arranged by Party
leaders at different levels so as to show concern for its hard-working cadres on the one
hand, and to balance the disparity between supply and demand, on the other. Mo Wenhua
mentioned in his memoir that Luo Ronghuan 罗荣桓 (1902-1963) was a kind General
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who cared about his subordinate’s marriages. In order to find them wives, he not only
played the role of matchmaker, but also actively sought out new brides. At his request,
more than ten women were collected and sent to Yan’an, all to be married to senior
leaders.68
However, due to the disparity in numbers of men and women, not every man could be
allowed to marry. Therefore, this privilege was largely decided by military rank. While
this fact does not appear in the official record, it was well known among the veterans that
there were certain prerequisites for marriage, including that the applicant must be over
twenty-five years of age, have been in service for at least eight years and most
importantly, to have reached a minimum rank of colonel [tuanzhang 团长].69 The first
batch of grooms to be married under the auspices of the Party were thus high-rank party
cadre leaders and generals, including Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 (1898-1969), Zhang Wentian 张
闻天 (1900-1976), Xie Juezai 谢觉哉 (1883-1971), Song Renqiong 宋任穷 (19092005), Luo Ronghuan 罗荣桓 (1902-1963)，Tan Zheng 谭政（1906-1988）and several
others.70 Their brides were primarily female veterans of the Long March who remained
single. The senior CCP leaders and their wives played the roles of matchmaker in setting
up these unions. For example, Xie Fei 谢飞 (1913-), who was working for the Security
Office in Ruijin during the retreat from Jiangxi, was matched by Deng Yingchao to Liu
Shaoqi at the end of 1935 in Wayaobao. This was Liu’s third marriage, but Xie’s first.
She recollected the experience in her later years: “One day, Deng Yingchao showed me a
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letter from Liu Shaoqi. In this letter, he reminded Deng of her promise to be his
matchmaker. He told her that he had found the lady of his heart - me. He asked Deng to
match us.” 71 Xie accepted this match, although she and Liu had met only once during the
Long March.
While most of these matches were arranged by the Party in the groom’s favor, the brides
were seldom reluctant. As Wang Dingguo 王定国 (1913-) admitted, though her marriage
to Xie Juezai, then thirty years her senior, was “completely arranged by the Party for the
sake of the Revolution”, she accepted this arrangement as an expression of “giving love
to the Revolution”.72

5.4.2

The Match the Party Dissolved

In the first month of 1937, the central government of the CCP moved to Yan’an and
settled there for the following ten years until the outbreak of the civil war in 1945. Since
the establishment of the Second United Front in 1937, a large number of urban women
and students had crowded into Yan’an in pursuit of their revolutionary ideals. The arrival
of these younger, prettier and smarter women brought a wave of divorces from the end of
the 1930s to the early 1940s. In the face of these much younger, prettier and lively urban
girls, the more senior female veterans began to lose the devotion of their husbands. As
Ding Ling observed in 1941, even those women who were “capable of working to
sacrifice their careers for the joys of motherhood” had no way of escaping the tragedy of
‘backwardness’ (i.e. divorce) when they lost their last traces of attractiveness, which had
been an invariable pretext for a husband to sue for divorce.73 Although the Party had the
final power to grant or deny a divorce, the decision on whether a divorce would be
granted was actually decided by the rank and political position of the principals. Among
the numerous divorce proceedings that occurred, two cases were particularly
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representative of this group; one was Mao Zedong’s divorce from He Zizhen and the
other was Otto Braun’s divorce from Xiao Yuehua.
When the ten-year marriage of Mao Zedong and He Zizhen came to an end in 1937, He
had been pushed to the edge of mental collapse by frequent childbirth and Mao’s
numerous extramarital affairs. In retrospect, it seems this divorce was inevitable due to
her unstable mental condition and her ‘backwardness’. When speaking to American
reporter Helen Snow, Kang Keqing once used her as an example of how a woman’s
revolutionary work could be dragged down by childbearing.74 After the divorce was
sanctioned by the Central Government, He Zizhen went (or was sent) to Russia for
medical treatment at the end of 1937. She narrowly escaped a German air attack in 1941
and returned China in 1948, long after Mao Zedong and Jiang Qing had been married.
Another well-known divorce case was the one between Otto Braun and Xiao Yuehua.
This marriage ended in 1937 with a Party-approved divorce. Although most Chinese and
a few Western sources insist that it was Xiao who filed for divorce because she could not
bear Braun’s constant beating, Helen Snow gave a passionate alternate account, noting
that it was actually Braun who had requested the divorce after growing tired of his
marriage.75 The pretext, as usual, was a charge of ‘backwardness’. Although almost all
the senior Yan’an women stood on the side of Xiao Yuehua, the men in power generally
supported Braun and finally granted him the divorce. Shortly thereafter, Braun declared
his love for Li Lilian, a pretty Shanghai actress who had just arrived in Yan’an. The two
were married in April, 1938. This marriage, however, came to an end in August, 1939
when Braun was suddenly recalled to the USSR.
He Zizhen and Xiao Yuehua were not the only wives who were deserted by their highranking CCP husbands. More than a few wives shared the same misery. Xie Fei, after a
four-year marriage to Liu Shaoqi, was sent by the Party to work in southern China in
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1939. This geographical separation subsequently became grounds for divorce.76 Jin
Weiying, the ex-wife of both Deng Xiaoping and Li Weihan, was sent to a sanatorium in
Russia in 1938. She was killed during German air-raids in late 1941 together with Liu
Quanxue, the wife of Bo Gu who was exiled to Russia at the same time.
Soon after getting rid of their old wives, these divorced husbands were able to find new
wives among the aforementioned new arrivals. Unlike the marriages that were
consummated in the Jiangxi Soviet and in Wayaobao that were often de facto and shortlived due to wartime conditions and anarchist tendencies, marital relationships founded
during the Yan’an period tended to last, and were trumpeted as “classic revolutionary
love” by the biographers of CCP heroes or heroines.77 Three reasons help to explain this
phenomenon. First, the relatively peaceful conditions in Yan’an and the rapid Communist
victory reduced military casualties among the top leadership circle. Second, given the fact
that northwest Chinese society was less tolerant of divorce and remarriage, the CCP
leaders had to constrain their sexual behavior for the sake of Party reputation. Finally, as
the Party leadership became more advanced in age, they were less inclined to seek new
lovers.

5.4.3

Failed Trophy: The Huang Kegong Incident

Among the young women who arrived in the border areas in the early years of the United
Front, many were educated feminists who believed in modern concepts like open
socialization, free love, gender equality within marriage, and celibacy. On arriving in
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Yan’an, however, they were seldom in full control of their own love and marriage
practices. As Ding Ling pointed out, women in Yan’an needed to get married lest they
become a target for rumors and slanderous gossip: “they can’t afford to be choosy,
anyone will do: whether he rides horses or wears straw sandals, whether he’s an artist or
a supervisor.”78 Their love, marriages, careers and futures were largely at the mercy of
the Party, which could either easily arrange a match, or dissolve one under the name of
the revolution. Under wartime circumstances, few women could avoid becoming the
‘trophy wives’ of successful military men.
In the autumn of 1937, a love affair occurred in Yan’an that eventually attracted
nationwide attention. Huang Kegong 黄克功, the captain of the Sixth brigade of the
Kangda [the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University], shot and killed his exgirlfriend. Huang was a peasant-born military commander who had joined the Red Army
as a child. As a former brigadier of the Red Army, he was highly respected by his
soldiers and comrades. When he first met Liu Qian 刘茜 he was in his mid-twenties, an
age when most Chinese men became husbands and fathers. Liu Qian was a very young (it
was said she was only 16) and pretty city girl from Taiyuan. She studied in Kangda and
came to know Huang as her instructor when they fell in love. Within a couple of weeks,
they declared that they were verbally engaged but, not long after, Liu tried to back out.
This was intolerable for Huang, who took it as a betrayal and shame that no man could
bear. On their last meeting alongside the Yan River, Huang shot Liu in the head after she
refused his plea for reunion. Although Huang Kegong tried to cover up his crime by
destroying and fabricating evidence, he was soon arrested and charged with murder. He
admitted to the murder but did not accept guilt, confessing that he blamed Liu for
“tampering with the love of the revolutionary serviceman, and playing around,” and
claiming that her decision to break up with him was “a humiliation to his reputation.”79
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How Huang Kegong should be punished became a widely debated topic. Although most
female cadres and students demanded he receive the death penalty, the general public
believed that Huang should be absolved. There were two main reasons commonly cited
for this belief: first, that Huang was an outstanding military commander who many felt
was needed for the Anti-Japanese War (Huang himself openly expressed a wish to atone
for his crimes by fighting to death on the battlefield). Second, that Liu Qian had allegedly
abused and betrayed Huang’s love, which had been publicly declared, and so she bore
responsibility for her own death.
The final decision on Huang’s sentence fell to Mao Zedong, the supreme leader of
Yan’an. In a letter to the judge of the Supreme Court on October 10, 1937, Mao stated
that:
Although Huang Kegong had a glorified revolutionary past, he should be
punished by the death penalty for the unforgivable crime he committed...Huang
had lost his standing as a Party member, a revolutionary, and a human being by
committing such despicable, merciless criminal behavior. If he was spared from
his crime, we have nothing to teach the Party, the Red Army, the revolutionaries
and the commoners since the Party members and the soldiers should have
obeyed the laws more strictly than the commoners. Therefore, Huang must be
punished with the death penalty.80
This letter was read aloud during Huang’s final sentencing in the public trial of October
11, 1937. The Supreme Court of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Area convicted Huang of
five crimes: murder, treason,81 breaking the Marriage Law,82 violating an individual’s
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free will, and destroying and fabricating evidence.83 Huang was executed immediately
after the trial and thereafter Zhang Wentian gave a closing address on “Democracy, Law
and the Communist Love View” [minzhu, fazhi yu gongchanzhuyi lian’ai guan 民主，法
制与共产主义恋爱观]. In this speech, Zhang made three points as the lesson that people
should learn from Huang Kegong’s case. Firstly, he claimed that Huang Kegong deserved
his punishment for his violation of Liu Qian’s freedoms of love and marriage. Secondly,
he suggested that it was best for young people not to fall in love, so as to avoid wasting
their energies at a time when the Chinese nation was in great danger. Thirdly, he repeated
that the most important criterion for a revolutionary life-partner was a matched ideology
and belief in communism. The fault of Huang Kegong and Liu Qian, according to Zhang,
was their incorrect views on love.84
Understanding Huang Kegong’s case requires a deeper exploration of the contemporary
social context in CCP China. Behind Huang’s fury toward his breakup with Liu was the
huge discrepancy between the progressive urban idealist young woman and the
traditional rural-born army man. Most city girls who were involved in love affairs were in
their late teens and early twenties, often had a high school education and grew up under
the influence of the Western romanticism, May Fourth anti-traditionalism and the
anarchical pursuit of freedom. Their ideals were worlds apart from the realities they later
found in Yan’an. This different mindset is suggested in one ‘love talk’ that was recorded
by Chen Xuezhao 陈学昭 (1906-1991) during her stay in Yan’an:
Saturday evening was the only time lovers were allowed to be together:
Woman: Why not go to the gate tower to enjoy the moon?
Man: What’s so fun about the moon? I’d rather stay home eating peanuts.
Woman: Let’s have a walk alongside the Yan river!
Man: Come on…You guys ran alongside the Yan river every day, aren’t you tired
of it?
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Finally, the man went to the restaurant alone for some wine.85
Their different family backgrounds, life experiences, and education levels made
communication between these two lovers difficult, if not impossible. However, the
fundamental problem of these ‘revolutionary lovers’ was their incompatible marriage
conceptions. Such observations were mentioned in more than a few contemporary
sources. Chen Xuezhao, for example, specifically described the thoughts of the average
army hero:
Although he knew that man and woman are equal, that man should pay respect
to woman, and that man should help liberate woman, it kept slipping his mind.
What did come to mind was his rural childhood memory about men’s marriage
by capture, or by adoption…how could a woman say ‘No’ to a man’s love?! 86
This kind of cultural divergence went to extremes in the case of Huang Kegong and Liu
Qian. As a city girl in pursuit of romantic and spiritual love, Liu could not tolerate her
future husband’s illiteracy, bad-temper, authoritarianism and overall peasant nature. In
the letters she wrote to Huang, Liu repeated that what she wanted in a partner was neither
marriage nor any form of financial support, but rather a spiritual love that was based on
matched ideologies, which should be beyond material matters. For an army man like
Huang, this thinking was not only perplexing but ridiculous. As Chen Xuezhao
concluded:
The elder military cadres in the Eighth Route Army, from colonels to soldiers,
usually remain single after several-years of service on the battle field…Many of
them have little contact with the capitalist society, nor its women. So its no
surprise that they are short of love experience, knowing nothing about the love
games the bourgeois women like to play. Once they fall in love, their way of
love would be very crude, very intense, and sometimes, very tragic.87
Behind the crude, intense love of Huang, who expected a quick marriage to Liu, was the
deeper notion of obtaining a ‘trophy woman’. It had long been a dynastic tradition for the
ruler to bestow beautiful women on generals and soldiers as rewards for battlefield
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victories. One contemporary folk song reveals that during the Yan’an period, having an
educated urban wife held a certain caché:
Who says our Eighth Route Army Soldiers have no wives?
When the revolution succeeds,
Everyone will have a foreign-educated [woman] [yang xuesheng 洋学生]!88
The idea of a foreign-educated wife for each army man might have been unrealistic, but it
was in fact a rather alluring slogan for army recruitment. According to Chen Xuezhao’s
observations, before the formal promulgation of the Marriage Regulations in each border
area the phenomenon of abusing women was rather common among servicemen, and the
women’s associations could do nothing about it. In her travel log, Chen told a tragic story
of a high-ranking commander who decided to marry a young urban woman whom Chen
knew well. In order to persuade this reluctant girl to be his bride, the commander stayed
by her bed every night and refused to leave. One day, this girl told Chen that she had to
marry that man for the sake of revolutionary work. Seven months later, when she was
five-months pregnant, she was kicked out by her husband who wanted a more fashionable
wife.89 There was a popular saying in Yan’an among those who obtained a good
battlefield record: “As the ones risking our lives to conquer the world, don’t we deserve a
wife?”90 Possessed by this kind of thinking, it was no wonder that as “an arrogant young
serviceman with glorious fighting record”, Huang was sure that Liu would marry him
from the day they met.91
The fact that people sympathized with Huang the perpetrator, rather than with Liu the
victim, demonstrates how this rationale was widely accepted by the public. Since Huang
and Liu had publicized their love relationship, they were already considered a couple via
de facto marriage, and thus the husband who killed his betraying wife was innocent. In
the patriarchal rural society, being ‘dumped’ was a humiliation no man could bear. As
Huang admitted during his trial, fear of losing face was his main reason for killing Liu.
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Furthermore, the fact that Huang’s death penalty was declared as an order of the Supreme
Leader, rather than as a legal sentence, indicates that Yan’an in the late 1930s was still far
from being strictly under the rule of law; public respect for the law was established on the
basis of the authorities of individual lawmakers and executors, but not necessarily on the
legal sanction of the law itself. In a patriarchal society, the law was mutable and
inconsistent, changing with the transition of rulers. In the end, people on all sides were
satisfied with the way the CCP dealt with the Huang Kegong Incident and it was deemed
“a good legal example for the future new China.”92

5.4.4

‘Mutual Help’ and the Party-arranged Match

Marriage conflicts between the predominantly rural military men and urban young
women reached its peak around the time of the Huang Kegong case. From that point
forward, with the adjustment of the CCP’s official discourse and the promulgation of the
Marriage Regulation in each border area, a more assuasive method was employed by the
Party in dealing with these kinds of love affairs. Ding Ling mentioned in her “Thoughts
on 8 March” that the marriages of young women cadres were often made in response to
sweet talk from men about ‘mutual help’. The term ‘mutual help’ was an inexplicit one
and its definition ranged from performing activities like darning socks, patching shoes or
even offering feminine comfort.93 Few official documents ventured to define the term,
but from the “red marriage stories” told by the CCP’s propagandists and from interviews
of different brides, it seems that the term ‘mutual help’ was used first in the border areas
and then in the larger Communist State to imply a Party-arranged match between a male
leader and a young woman.
Women in the CCP liberated areas were largely in a position of waiting to be chosen by
men, especially by those in high positions. It had been well established that whenever a
male leader demonstrated his interest in a particular woman, a match would be easily
arranged for this leader, so long as the woman could pass a background check. After she
was officially approved as politically clean and reliable, her senior leader would invite
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her to a talk, where she would be asked to either enter into a love relationship with the
leader in question, or to enter into a ‘mutual help’ relationship. If the woman’s consent
could be attained, the match would be immediately announced to the public, followed by
a simple wedding. If she refused the match, another round of ‘sweet talks’ would be
arranged and would continue until she either agreed or until the male gave up. In the
course of making a match, obtaining the woman’s official consent was considered vital
and necessary. Therefore, a potential bride could be pushed spiritually but not physically.
The official matchmakers assigned to such missions were usually excellent propagandists
who could effectively talk about how badly a woman was needed by the Party and for the
Revolution. The young woman was persuaded to accept the Party’s arranged match as a
contribution to the Revolution, as a way to prove her loyalty to the Party and as a way to
show respect for the senior CCP leaders.
Another example of this phenomenon is the story of Ms. Ren, who was the wife of an
army corps commander named Liang. When interviewed in 2006, Ren said that she first
met her husband in the Dongbei front. At that time, she was in her late teens and was
working as a nurse on the battlefield. “It’s funny”, Ren recalled about their brief first
encounter, “at the time I met him, I thought he was a cook because he served me a bowl
of hot noodle soup in person.” Two months later, she was asked to participate in a
‘mutual help’ relationship with Liang, in order to take care of his health. They began to
get to know each other from then on. Although everyone else seemed to realize that
Commander Liang was interested in her, Ren herself was too young to think about love.
After an exhaustive investigation into her background, family and personal history, Ren
was considered politically qualified to be a revolutionary partner of a PLA commander.
However, Ren did not want to marry a man who was fourteen years her senior: “I never
said ‘yes’ although the Party organization [zuzhi 组织] tried to persuade me to say it.”
The fact that she had many suitors at that time made her feel like she had a choice, but the
result of her opposing the Party’s arrangement was horrible: “I was criticized by all the
people all the time.” Finally, she consented to the marriage on the condition that she
would go to study in a medical school after the wedding. Soon after their application was
granted by the deputy director of the Political Department of Liang’s corps, they got
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married and became ‘revolutionary partners’. Fortunately, Liang proved to be a good
husband who respected his wife’s decisions.94
The marriage story of Ms. Ren and her husband illustrates a common model of the CCP’s
daily marriage practice. As Ren concluded, this model often included three necessary
steps: the Party’s arrangement (often at the request of the man), the development of the
love relationship, and the woman’s background check. “This kind of investigation is very
strict,” Ren told me, “if the result of the investigation is negative, the marriage
application would be immediately declined no matter what the rank of the applicant.”
Although the Party preferred to play the role of matchmaker, at times it also had to switch
to the role of match-breaker when the woman was considered by the Party to be
unqualified as the wife of a leader. When this kind of failure occurred, the woman would
be transferred to another position in a different location or sent to perform undercover
work in the GMD region. When such a decision was declared, it was inarguable and
compulsory. According to Ren’s recollection, among the nineteen girls whom she
personally knew had love relations with high-ranking servicemen, most were declined for
marriage and were subsequently purged [qingxi 清洗] due to their failure to pass a
background check. The only exception to this rule was the marriage of Mao Zedong and
Jiang Qing. Although Mao was the supreme leader of the CCP, his marriage application
provoked a debate among high-ranking party leaders due to Jiang’s disreputable
background as an actress. The sanction of the match was finally granted under Mao’s
insistence and He Long’s claim that he would shoot anyone who continued to make a
fuss over the trivial issue of “taking a woman”.95
Practically speaking, if celibacy was not a choice that they were allowed then hypergamy
to a senior leader was an appealing alternative for many young women. This was
especially true in a patriarchal and hierarchal society such as Yan’an, where living
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allowances were differentiated according to political rank.96 The few high-paying
positions available for women were in actuality only open to the wives of high-ranking
leaders. Like their contemporary urban sisters who willingly traded their independent
personalities for the luxury bourgeoisie lifestyle, many female communists utilized
hypergamy as a social ladder, which could lead to high political positions and better
living standards. Under the label of entering a ‘revolutionary marriage’ that rejected
romantic love and replaced it with passion for the communist revolution, adopting
marriage politics that were oriented by utilitarian purposes had become a popular survival
strategy for women who were forced to give up their dream of romance and love in
exchange for political security.

5.5 Conclusion
From the Jiangxi to the Yan’an periods, the CCP’s marriage policies and practices
experienced a transition from openly embracing free-consensual unions to a return to
monogamous marriages. Behind such transitions was the growing awareness of the
Chinese Communists about the difficulties in making marriage reforms fit the social
context of rural China, as well as the complications of the CCP’s wartime need for
military recruitment, expansion and survival. Learning from its ineffective promulgation
of the Marriage Regulations in the Border Areas, the CCP’s policymakers had come to an
apparent conclusion: because the interests of the two sexes always followed a pattern of
waxing and waning, the expansion of women’s interests could only be established on the
contraction of men’s interests. Therefore, before the Communist Party could be able to
utilize the power of the state machine to transform the traditional Chinese social context
along the socialist ideal, any effort aimed at changing the existing marriage system could
possibly lead to antagonism between the sexes, and would therefore put the Party’s
reputation and general peasant support at risk. This recognition on the one hand brought
on an immediate shift in the focus of CCP women from pursuing marriage freedom and
gender equality to advocating women’s participation in production. On the other hand, it
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resulted in a rapid decline of the women’s movement in Yan’an: women’s
progressiveness and ambitions, which had once been their pride, was now their mistake.
Upheld by the Party’s official discourse and administrative system, the “revolutionary
marriage” model had become the standardized love and marriage practice of CCP
members by the end of the Yan’an period. From the time of the Rectification Campaign
onward, people learned to always put their Party service as first priority, and to always
keep in mind the paramount importance of ensuring a correct political ideology, a clean
personal background and ‘comradeship’ in considering any ‘revolutionary match’. For
the high-ranking party officials and army leaders who were acquiesced by the Party, the
privilege to pick up desired trophy wives was more often an outcome of Party-arranged
‘mutual help’ than that of actual love between a pair of matched souls. For the wives of
such leaders, no matter if they were senior veterans or young urban arrivals, their
marriage was a ‘revolutionary task’ assigned by the Party, which they had no real power
to decline.
Regarding marriage, Yan’an women were largely forced into a passive position of
waiting: to be selected, to be introduced, to be proposed to, to be married and eventually,
and somewhat inevitably, to be divorced. In a patriarchal society where women had been
treated as the property of men, as physical trophies and gifts, for over two thousand years,
the only thing a woman could utilize in exchange for social recognition or to be
considered a man’s equal, was her love and her marriage.
As soon as the socialist state was founded in 1949, the Chinese Communists started a
new round of efforts to reform Chinese marriage. During this process, the “revolutionary
marriage” model was upgraded through the nationwide establishment of the danwei 单位
[work unit] system and was transformed from being a Party tradition into becoming a
national marriage practice. This transformations process will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 6

6

Making A Revolutionary Marriage

The founders of the People’s Republic of China were pious students of Karl Marx, and
believed that the marriage system, as part of the social superstructure, should change in
accordance with the economic infrastructure. As soon as China’s socialist state was
founded in 1949, the Chinese Communists started to reconstruct their marriage system.
When the new marriage law was promulgated in 1950, the marriage reforms that had
been tested in the Border Areas were expanded across the nation. By the time the
marriage campaign came to an end in 1953, most Chinese people had become devoted
adherents to these marriage freedoms. However, local archives in China suggest that the
process actually met with considerable resistance, which resulted in a range of
compromises between the state and its people.
The New Marriage Law was accompanied by a socialist discourse on love and marriage,
in which romantic love was officially excluded from considerations of matrimony and
was replaced with the importance of matched political ideals, revolutionary passions and
loyalty to the Party. At the same time, through the establishment of the danwei 单位
[work unit] system, the socialist State began to impose systematic control over its
citizens’ personal lives. In this system, marriage was not simply a matter of establishing
the matched criteria outlined above, but was also a complicated process of application,
investigation, obtaining permission and registration. Revolutionary marriage, once a
wartime expedient, was now developed into a social policy that could be applied to all
Chinese people.
This chapter examines the CCP’s women’s rights rebuilding and marriage-reforming
programs in the first three years of the People’s Republic. My argument is that although
the Chinese Communists intended to destroy China’s social traditions and replace them
with socialist models within a short period, theirs was actually an impossible mission
since the CCP leaders themselves were actually a part of the very traditions they were
trying to destroy. Compared to the dogmatic socialist doctrines, Chinese social traditions
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surrounding marriage practices were much more flexible and adaptive. This paradox
inevitably led to a hybrid society: under the coverage of the progressive socialist slogans
were the old traditions and customs that timely adapted themselves to the new social
contexts. It is not so much that the CCP ideals changed Chinese society - rather, Chinese
society transformed itself to fit the CCP ideal.

6.1 The Marriage Law of 1950
On May 1, 1950, the People’s Republic of China promulgated a new marriage law. This
was considered by leaders as a necessary step towards abolishing the old productive
relationships and superstructure and establishing new ones along socialist lines.1 Chen
Shaoyu 陈绍禹 (1904-1974), the chairman of the Commission of Legislative Affairs of
the Central People’s Government made a prediction about the change:
With a view to increasing the productive forces of the new society in the political,
economic and cultural field, and loosening the fetters that have impeded their
development, it is necessary that, together with the reform of the total social
system, the men and women, and especially the latter, be liberated from the
bondage of the old marriage system and that a completely new system be
established in conformity with the new social development.2
Other than liberating Chinese men and especially women from the thousand-year-old
“barbarian, and backward” old marriage system, the lawmakers sought to establish a
series of new marriage institutions, family relations, social life options and social norms
in order “to accelerate the collapse and death of the old feudal marriage system, to
guarantee the growth of new democratic marriage system and new-style families, to
make contributions for China’s socialism, and to promote social productivity.”3
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Cooperating with the All-China Democratic Women’s Federation,4 the Communist
legislators spent a year and a half working on the new Marriage Law, researching a
variety of materials including marriage data collected from cities and villages, the
marriage regulations of the Soviet and Border areas, the marriage laws of the Soviet
Union and those from the New Democratic Eastern European countries.5 Its spirit was
consistent with the past marriage regulations of the CCP: abolishing the feudal marriage
institution, promoting marriage freedom and gender equality and protecting women’s
interests.
The Marriage Law of 1950 included eight chapters: General principles (Articles 1-2), The
Marriage Contract (Articles 3-6), Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife (Articles 7-12),
Relations between Parents and Children (Articles 13-16), Divorce (Articles 17-19),
Maintenance and Education of Children after Divorce (Articles 20-22), Property and
Maintenance after Divorce (Articles 23-25) and By-laws (Articles 26-27). The first
Article of the General Principles (Chapter I) gave an explicit and broad definition of the
so-called “feudal marriage system”: a system based on arbitrary and compulsory
arrangements and the superiority of man over woman, which ignored the children’s
interests.6 As the scale of the feudal marriage system was expanded to include gender
inequality and parental authority over children, this definition was actually an
announcement of the official rejection of the traditional Chinese family system, as
characterized by Confucian notions of patriarchal hierarchy and filial piety. The second
article went even further to enumerate feudal marriage practices that fell outside of
arranged marriage: bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference with the
remarriage of widows and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriages.7
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Chapter II was devoted to legalizing the Marriage Contract, which included four different
articles. The concept of requiring complete willingness on the part of the two parties was
repeated, while compulsion and any third party interference were forbidden. The age for
legally entering into a marriage contract was set at 20 for men and 18 for women.
Marriage between lineal relatives was prohibited, as was marriage between collateral
relatives by blood, as measured up to the fifth degree of relationship; other prohibitions
were imposed on marriages to individuals who were generally deemed as unfit for
marriage: the sexually impotent, those with venereal diseases, sufferers of mental
disorders, or leprosy. Official registration of any marriage contract was required, and a
marriage certificate would be issued only when a marriage was found to be in conformity
with the provisions of the law.
The New Marriage Law gave the conjugal family unprecedented legal attention and
protection. On the basis of a total rejection of the old system, the General Principles
offered a new substitution: the New-Democratic marriage system, which was based on
the free choice of both partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the
protection of the lawful interests of women and children. These principles were further
specified in Chapter III: Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife. They defined the rights
and duties of the couple, where a husband and wife are duty- bound to live together and
are held jointly responsible for the living expenses and management of the household.
Similar articles appeared in the New Marriage Law with more detailed stipulations.
Article 7 emphasizes the equal status of the two parties in their home as well as their duty
to live together, which enhanced the concept of domestic gender equality to the legal
level. Article 8 went even further to set up a correlation between marriage, family and
society: “husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist and look after each
other, to live in harmony, to engage in productive work, to care for the children and to
strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building up of the new society.”8
Therefore, the duties of the spouses culminated in their joint struggle for the foundation
of the new socialist society. The law required this duty from all Chinese citizens; any
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politically backward spouse would be assisted by his or her mate back to the correct path.
In this way, love was given an ideological basis: support indeed meant not only in a
material sense, but also especially in a moral and ideological sense. The duties of spouses
towards one another were parts of their broader social duties as good citizens of the new
community. This slogan-like article, in fact, imposed the public social ideal of asking
citizens to “engage in productive work and strive for the building up of the new society.”9
Therefore, that which should have been a voluntary mission for each individual and his or
her family became a compulsory duty. In this sense, social requirements and family
needs, the personal and the public, the individual and the collective were all mixed up
under the roof of the big family of the socialist society. The rest of the articles in chapter
III (Articles 9-12) further stressed the equality of husband and wife: equality in their
choice of profession and their participation in societal activities; equal rights of
ownership and management of the family property; and the recognition of the right of
spouses to inherit from each other’s estates.
Two chapters (IV and VI) were used to regulate the relationship between parents and
children, both in marriage and after a divorce. Parents and children were bound to support
each other and inherit from each other. Children born out of wedlock would enjoy the
same rights as children born in lawful unions. A husband and wife equally shared the
duty of supporting and educating their children, even after the couple was divorced. If an
agreement on the guardianship could not be reached between the two parties, they should
wait for the decision of the People’s Court, which would be made in accordance with the
interests of the child. These two chapters distinguished the theme of family by detailing
familial relationships and the specific legal duties of each member: husband, wife and
child.
Chapter V was devoted to divorce and included three articles (17-19). Article 17
regulated the general divorce: when both husband and wife desired a divorce, it should be
granted with an official divorce certificate. In the event of either the husband or the wife
alone insisting upon divorce, one may be granted only when mediation by first the district
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People’s Government and then the state’s judicial organ had failed to bring about a
reconciliation. Article 18 specified that under circumstances where the wife was with
child, the husband was not allowed to apply for a divorce. Article 19 was established
specifically for cases of divorce for military personnel. This article was infused with the
spirit of the wartime marriage regulations on the issue, as examined above. The consent
of any member of the Revolutionary Army who was on active service and who
maintained regular correspondence with his or her family had to first be obtained before
his or her spouse could apply for a divorce. Without the consent of the military personnel
involved, there was only one circumstance under which a divorce would be granted to the
spouse: when there was no correspondence for a subsequent period of two years from the
date of the promulgation of the Marriage Law; or two years prior to the promulgation of
the law and one year subsequent to the promulgation of the present Law.
From late 1950 to 1953, several directives were issued by the central government
complementing Article 19, which sought to further maximize the protection of the marital
interests of servicemen for the sake of the ongoing warfare both inside and outside of
China.10 Basically, these directives ruled that the wife’s application for divorce should
not be easily granted without the consent of her husband, regardless of whether he was
demobilized, disabled or in service. Only under the conditions that the husband had a
tendency towards severe domestic violence, if he was sexually disabled, or when all
efforts at reunion had failed could a divorce be granted.11 This principle also applied to
the engaged couple: a fiancée could not cancel her engagement to a serviceman without
his consent, even under the circumstance when this cancellation was brought about
before the man joined the army.12 No divorce should be granted to the wives or fiancées
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of the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) who plead for a divorce on the grounds of lost
contact with their partner. Parties wishing to do so were expected to wait until the Korean
War was over, and all captives had been returned. Only then, it was argued, could it be
decisively confirmed whether or not their partners were alive. If the spouse was found
alive, the divorce had to wait for consent.13 In cases where the two parties suing for
divorce were both currently employed in the military, the methods presented in Article 19
were not to be adopted, so as to ensure that no party would be harmed. In such cases,
judgment was decided by the political department of their army, and executed by the
local court.14 A notice issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in December of 1952
contributed in particular to the law as it regarded adultery involving the wives of
servicemen, which had been a very serious phenomenon in many places. Two methods
were offered in dealing with such matters: the local government was instructed to
convince their cadres and people through state education to pay the greatest respect to the
soldiers’ families, and the wives of active servicemen were expected to learn about the
glories of being the life partner of a soldier; as for those who seduced the wives of
servicemen and convinced them to commit adultery, conviction in such cases was legally
punished as rape. Although these regulations were made with the wartime spirit, so as to
avoid influencing the morale of the soldiers at the front,15 many such stipulations
remained in place until as late as the 1980s.16
Meijer believed that the Marriage Law had a dual function: “It was an instrument for the
transformation of society and it regulated marriage and the method of solving disputes
arising from marriage. These two functions naturally run parallel: by solving disputes the
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policy is implemented in a particular case.”17 This spirit was elaborated in the last chapter
(VIII: By-laws). The penal code was emphasized in Article 26 by the claim that “persons
violating this Law shall be punished in accordance with law.”18 In cases where
interference with the freedom of marriage had caused death or injury, the person guilty of
such interference bore responsibility for the crime under the law. Article 27 authorized
the local governments of the regions inhabited by national minorities to enact certain
modifications or supplementary articles when implementing the Marriage Law, in order
to maintain conformity with the actual marriage conditions in these areas.

6.2 Promulgation and Implementation: 1950-1953
Right after the Chinese government officially promulgated the Marriage Law, a
nationwide propaganda movement was launched from the top down. The movement was
joined by several nongovernmental organizations, including the All-China Federation of
Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Youth League, the All-China Federation of
Democratic Youth, the All China Students Federation and the All-China Democratic
Women’s Federation.19 The four-year implementation period from 1950 to 1953 could be
roughly divided into two stages: 1950-1951, and 1952-1953.

6.2.1

1950-1951: A Disappointing Beginning

While the ultimate goal of this new marriage law was to construct a new type of marital
and familial relationship that was in accordance with socialist moralities, in the first year
of its promulgation the focus of the law was on adjusting ‘feudal marital relations’. As
was suggested by the central government, various methods were adopted by the state’s
propaganda organ in order to “deeply penetrate into the masses”, including literature,
broadcasting, discussions, and art performances.20 The goals at this stage were to remove
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old thoughts from people’s minds and to promote public understanding of the new
Marriage Law.
According to the All-China Democratic Women’s Federation’s annual summary, the
first-year of the Marriage Law’s implementation achieved “significant success
nationwide”, and the public consciousness of the new law had been rapidly improved.
The group was particularly satisfied with the fact that more and more young people dared
to challenge their parents’ authority in making marriage decisions for them:
In general the parental arranged marriage had been gradually transformed into a
transitional form in which the principals’ consent to their parents’ arrangement is
necessary. In some earlier liberated districts where the working circumstance are
more progressive, the marriage gradually developed into the stage of selfwillingness; in the most progressive villages, marriage freedom had been
completely implemented.21
Women’s enthusiasm for marriage reform was another success that was noted by the
report. With the support and help of the People’s Court, many women managed to get rid
of the shackles of the old feudal marriage system.22 The unprecedented increase in
marriage lawsuits was often cited in local reports as the proof of this success. For
instance, Yu county in Shanxi province reported 135 marriage cases within the one
month period starting in September of 1950, which comprised 97% of the total civil cases
this county reported in the month. According to one reporter, “the rapid growth of
marriage cases demonstrated the rise of common people’s marriage consciousness,
women in particular, since most of these cases were sued by women.”23
While the first year of the propaganda movement brought major public attention to the
social transition that the Communist Government was trying to launch, the actual
progress that the new law achieved in transforming Chinese marriage fell far short of the
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expectations of the Party and of the women’s associations. The Women’s Federation had
to admit in June of 1951 that, “the implementation of the marriage law is not without
questions…there are still many difficulties and problems.”24 The problem that evoked the
most serious concern from the Federation was the tendency to prosecute more women
than men. According to incomplete statistical data that was published by the Government
Administration Council in September, 1951, a total of 1245 women in Shandong
province had committed suicide within the first year of promulgation; in the district of
Zhongnan, more than 10,000 women were murdered or seriously abused in relation to
their marriage.25
In the official discourse, local cadres whose minds were dominated by the “remnants of
feudal thoughts” were blamed for the ineffective implementation of the law, although the
central government had shown considerable concern about the cadres’ misadministration
from the very beginning. In an official Notice from the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China (CPC) to all Party members that was issued on April 30, 1950
upon the promulgation of the Marriage Law, the misbehavior of local Party members was
condemned:
Under the influence of feudal thoughts, some members of our Party, especially
those working in the qu and xiang governments and those in the lower judicial
departments, are inclined to tolerate such illegal behaviors as interfering with
people’s marriage freedom, abusing women and children. Failing to legally
punish the wrongdoers, some local governments provided no legal and real
protection to the victims. Sometimes, such misdemeanors were committed by the
cadres themselves. These are all wrong.26
Based on this official concern, extra emphasis was attached to the importance of training
and education on the cadres. In addition, nongovernmental organizations like the
Women’s Federation and their branches at all levels were asked to assist and supervise
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the local People’s Governments and courts in dealing with marriage cases.27 The CPP
officially declared that, “any Party member who interfered with marriage freedom and
thus caused the death or injury of the interfered would not only be punished by civil and
legal legislation, but by the discipline of the Party.”28
No matter how much emphasis was put on the importance of cadre education, in the first
year of the implementation of the new regulations, local transgressions by Party members
were still the most frequently mentioned topics regarding the Marriage Law. In a
directive issued by the central government in February, 1953, the Party openly admitted
that “the implementation of the Marriage Law nationwide is uneven.”29 Whereas in some
regions the ‘feudal marriage customs’ had been successfully destroyed by those cadres
that had implemented the Marriage Law carefully and correctly, in most areas of China,
the local government leadership and cadres failed to implement the Marriage Law
correctly and seriously. Some of these groups even openly resisted the Marriage Law by
upholding traditional customs and interfering with individual marriage freedoms. As the
result of such maladministration, the practice of arranged marriage was still popular,
women were still constantly oppressed and abused, and related suicide and homicide
cases were still common.30 The Women’s Federation divided this kind of wrongdoing by
the local cadres of qu and villages into five types: 1) interfering with marriage freedom
by declining reasonable divorce applications and even threatening the female applicants
with beatings and public shaming; 2) granting divorce easily without investigation,
reconciliation, and education; 3) dealing improperly with divorced women’s property and
child custody; 4) ignoring the implementation and official propaganda of the Marriage
Law, and therefore being incapable of providing help and support to those looking for
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marriage reform; 5) misleading local people into understanding that the marriage law was
simply a divorce or a woman’s law.31
These “cadres of a different nature” were defined by Meijer as groups of men “who had
made their careers in the movement for land reform and who had enjoyed the brutality of
the elimination of the landlord class. Tough people, they were often corrupt and overly
fond of the power now placed in their hands. Against the abuses of these new village
bosses the people had no means of defending themselves.”32 As direct but unprofessional
executors of the new law, these cadres’ personal understandings and interpretations of the
Marriage Law actually decided local people’s attitudes toward the law itself. As pointed
out by the Women’s Federation’s report, for those citizens whose minds were possessed
by patriarchal ideas about male superiority and female inferiority, the greater authority of
a husband, parental order and the concept of remaining faithful to one’s husband until
death, the granting of greater marriage freedoms to women would lead to “great disorder
[because] no good people will ask for divorce and divorce is indecent…once the poor
peasant’s wife sues for divorce, the husband will lose everything, both wife and
money.”33 Some of these citizens, therefore, became the most merciless prosecutors of
women. For instance, in the Huoqu County of northern Anhui, many women were
murdered through abusive relationships in 1950. Yet, the cadres of the local Women’s
Federation not only failed to take any action to prevent such abuse, but they also
criticized the victims as being “out of their minds, death served them right!”34 Some
judicial organizations were also responsible for such violence through their intentional
delay of sentence or through a much tempered penalty. This developed into a very
misleading belief among men that “beating one’s wife to death is nothing, it is only worth
two years in prison.”35
In the official state documents, local cadres’ intentional or unintentional abuses were the
major reasons cited for the ineffective implementation of the new marriage law. Whereas
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in reality, the source of the conflict was the fact that the very ideas on which the Marriage
Law was based encountered considerable resistance among the people. In traditional
Chinese values, marriage was considered a domestic matter that excluded any possible
administrative or judicial involvement. The general belief was that all problems regarding
a marriage should be solved within the circle of family members, primarily overseen by
the family head or the senior relatives of the husband. As a popular Chinese saying goes:
‘domestic shame should not be made public’. Anyone who attempted to interfere with
other people’s family matters would be deeply resented by the public at large. From this
perspective, the government’s implementation effort was no different than an attempt to
impose totalitarian control over the family. Liang Hong 梁虹, the vice dean of the
Women’s Federation of Yunnan reported: “the masses misunderstood the Marriage
campaign as a political struggle against husband and mother-in-law…all the suffering
wives and daughters will ask for divorce…such beliefs caused popular panic and
resistance among the masses, many of them even tried to hide and escape from the
working cadres.”36
The violation of traditional Chinese family privacy, however, is not the only reason for
widespread popular objection to the marriage law. What worried the people most was not
the freedoms that it granted an individual to marry, but rather the freedom it gave for one
to seek divorce. In a caihun 财婚 [monetary marriage], a family might have to spend a
considerable sum of money in order to acquire a daughter-in-law. Once divorced,
according to the New Marriage Law, the family of the husband might not only lose the
wife and her portion of his property, but also the custody of their children without any
compensation. For those husbands who had spent money on their betrothal, divorce might
mean lifelong loneliness and, most fearfully, a break in the family line.
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6.2.2

1952-1953: An Urban Success

Disappointment with the first year of the law’s promulgation did not shake the State’s
determination to reform Chinese marriage. In September of 1951, the Central government
initiated a nationwide investigation of the Marriage Law’s implementation. The main
purpose of this investigation was to inspect the serious cases of maladministration that
had led to the death of many women.37 Based on local reports that were submitted at the
end of 1951 and early 1952, the Government Administration Council of the Central
People’s Government appointed March of 1953 as a “propaganda month for the Marriage
Law.”38
In order to avoid repeating the wrongdoing that occurred in the first year, the central
government urged promulgators of the law to recognize that unlike land reform, which
required a violent, impetuous attitude and class struggle mentality, marriage reform
required the adjustment of personal thought, which demanded long-term, careful and
patient work to gradually remove outdated marriage thinking from people’s minds.
Therefore, the cadres were asked to adhere to the principle of education, rather than
coercion, so as to destroy the feudal marriage system without disturbing general gender
relations and family relations.
According to local reports, this campaign was more effective in reforming Chinese
families, especially those living in urban areas. This second marriage campaign, which
lasted from December 1952 to April 1953, was divided into three stages. The first of
these lasted from late 1950 to mid-1951 and was a continuation of the first year of the
Marriage Law. The focus was on opposing arranged marriage and domestic abuse. The
second stage of the campaign covered the second half of 1952 and focused on improving
women’s social status, and participation in economic production. The final stage ran
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through 1953 and primarily worked to promote harmonious marital and familial
relations.39
Following the instructions of the central government, the training of qualified cadre
leaders was a vital step of this movement. While getting more training in their
propaganda skills, local leaders were constantly checked for signs of a precipitous mood.
A local reporter from Beijing observed that although some cadres used punishment more
than education, criticism more than praise, picking more bad models than good ones,
discretionarily distorting the definition of ‘abuse’, and exaggerating the boundary of
‘problem’, all these wrongdoings were “timely criticized and prevented”.40 From top to
bottom, the nature, purpose, guideline, policies, and methods of the movement were
clarified to the cadres at all levels in specific detail, so as to make their members
understand what kind of problems should be solved, and exactly what they should and
should not do. Three strategies were most effective in winning people’s support: first, by
realizing the thinking of the masses at every stage and pushing the movement forward
through solving their questions one by one; second, by erecting good models for the
masses to follow in a timely manner; finally, by trying to keep the name of the offender
from the public.41 During the movement, parents were talked out of making marriage
decisions for their children when not otherwise consulted. Meetings for contentious inlaws were regularly held. Occasional public trials of ‘bad mothers-in-law’ who violently
abused their daughter-in-law were held to show people that abusing women was against
the law. Housewives were educated about gender equality, women’s economic
independence and the glory of labour. Since the cadres managed to avoid the use of
violence, and stick to more mild methods of education, in the words of one report, they
were able to “overcome the precipitous thoughts that intend to solve all the problems in
one movement, and criticize the mechanical adoption of the ‘confession’ and ‘denounce’
methods of the past movements.”42 As a result, common people’s acceptance of the

39

“Chongwenqu Huoshenmiao paichusuo guanche hunyinfa zhixing qingkuang diaocha baogao” 崇文区火神庙派出
所贯彻婚姻法执行情况调查报告 [Investigation Report of the Huoshenmiao police station of Chongwen district on
the implementation of the Marriage Law], December, 1959. Beijing Archive center, file No. 2-8-60.
40
Ibid.
41
“Ibid.
42
“Huoshenmiao paichusuo diaocha baogao”. Beijing Archive center, file No. 2-8-60.

211

Marriage Law was made much more expedient. The demand for compulsory participation
in propaganda meetings was replaced by voluntary participation, which gave people the
freedom to decide on their own participation. ‘Free will’ was emphasized by authorities
as a necessary element in the new phase of public instruction. For example, if a model
couple were to give their marriage story in public, the personal consent from not only the
main couple but any other parties that were mentioned in the story should be obtained
beforehand. As a result, people at all levels of society gained a much better understanding
of the Marriage Law.
According to a September 1954 report from the Civil Affairs Bureau of the People’s
Government of Beijing, under the hard work of a well-trained propaganda force of
29,000 cadres and 14,000 activists, 80% of the adult population in the factories,
government departments, schools, streets and villages was involved in this campaign. The
marriage system in the municipal area of Beijing was reported to have experienced a
fundamental transition: marriage freedom had been basically achieved by young people,
cases of the abuse of women had decreased significantly, more and more adult women
participated in production and having a democratic and harmonious family had become
the common wish of the masses. Most importantly, public opinion was transformed to be
in favor of marriage freedom, and to spontaneously criticize the arrangement, buying or
selling of a marriage.43
To test the result of this campaign, some danwei were selected for a final investigation.
According to a 1953 report of the Marriage Law Implementation Committee of Beijing
[Beijing shi guanche hunyinfa weiyuanhui 北京市贯彻婚姻法委员会], the selected
testing units were divided into four groups: industrial enterprises, schools and
universities, urban sub-districts [jiedao 街道], and villages.44 The data was collected and
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calculated in terms of three periods: before liberation in 1949, from 1949 to the eve of the
promulgation of the Marriage Law and from the promulgation of the Marriage Law to the
present.45 The investigation revealed that the idea of marriage freedom had been well
accepted by urban residents, school teachers and students who demonstrated clear
preference for a self-determined marriage.46 However, among the factory workers and
students who had a rural background, as well as the village populations, a partiallyarranged marriage was much more popular.47 Many children were not confident enough
to choose life partners by themselves. Their marriages were often still arranged by their
parents, albeit with their own consent. Unlike traditional marriages, when the new couple
always met for the first time on their wedding day, couples in the new era were often
allowed to see each other once or twice before the wedding.
Moreover, many people still regarded money as the proper foundation of love and
marriage. As reported by a local police station, some girls listed economic conditions as
the top criteria they looked for in a potential spouse; when getting married, they
requested gifts and persisted in holding feasts and using bridal sedans, which were often
beyond the groom’s economic means. The cost of a wedding and gifts for bride ranged
from 100 to over 300 yuan, when the average monthly income of a groom was 30 to 40
yuan. Therefore, marriage debt was still a common occurrence.48
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Nonetheless, investigators perceived that the idea of marriage freedom was easier for the
commoner to accept than was the concept of gender equality. Not only were traditional
thoughts that reflected gender inequalities still popular, but domestic violence and abuse
were also still very common.49 The reason for this, as explained by the investigators, was
that marriage freedom primarily dealt with issues regarding young people who were
inclined to accept new things with less resistance. Gender equality, however, was an issue
that involved every member of society, as well as “the customary force of hundreds and
thousands of people”, and was thus an issue which required a long-term solution, with
women’s economic and political liberation and independence at its center.50

6.2.3

Marriage Problems after 1953

At almost the same time that the Marriage Law was officially declared to be a success,
new problems regarding love and marriage arose. A September 1954 report from the
Civil Affairs Bureau of the People’s Government of Beijing pointed out a dangerous
reflux of the old customs:
…due to the uneven development of the (marriage) movement, and the
discontinuity of the propaganda after the campaign of 1953, the new morality and
customs have not been further developed and consolidated. Not only has arranged
marriage not been terminated, but the suicide cases caused by family feuds
continue to appear. In some areas, after the old marriage system had been
overthrown the creation of new thoughts has been delayed, leading to the
incorrect marriage views that worship money and material hedonism. The feudal
idea of “matched gates” and “parental order” returned to the minds of some
parents who refused to let their children choose life-partners for themselves, and
declined all the suitors they thought not rich enough; early marriage was serious
in some regions.51
This problem of the recurrence of the old ‘feudal customs’ seemed to become worse in
the 1960s. An investigative report in 1962 pointed out that “adopted daughter-in-law and
early marriage [customs] reappeared in the rural area of Beijing [and] in some areas, with
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the support of the local cadres, parents arranged or interfered with children’s marriage,
widow’s remarriage was restricted.”52 A more popular phenomenon was the emergence
of an adapted form of buying and selling marriages, in which the bride and her parents
requested gifts and large amounts of money, as well as luxurious wedding feasts in return
for accepting a marriage proposal. In the countryside, girls generally looked down on the
‘glorious agricultural laborers’ and showed a reluctance to marry farmers, preferring
instead cadres or industrial workers. This phenomenon again caused the population of
rural men to feel frustrated and is a fact that is often attributed as partly responsible for
the general population shift to the cities. This situation was worsened by the famine that
occurred in the winter of 1960 and the spring of 1961. Many women of the affected areas
of Hebei and Shandong left their hometowns and married farmers from the outskirts of
Beijing. Such marriages were often accomplished in a very short time (several days) after
the introduction by a matchmaker or friends and relatives, which brought difficulty and
confusion for marriage and household registration.53
The official authorities determined that all of these problems were an outcome of the
discontinuity of the Marriage Law movement. Regular propaganda education and
government inspections were suggested as solutions to these problems. Responding to
this request, the danwei and the Party organization strengthened their control and
investigations of their workers and members.

6.3 Love and Marriage Disturbance
The promulgation of a socialist marriage law was the first step on the CCP’s social
revolution agenda. The transition of social customs and people’s thoughts could not be
achieved easily and the effort required a lasting and constant effort by both official and
unofficial means. Although the nationwide marriage law campaign came to an official
end in 1953, investigations in later years showed that the transition of marriage
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conceptions from old to new required a much longer time than three years. As what had
happened immediately following the May Fourth movement, the first decade of the
socialist state saw the rise of a new round of nationwide disturbance over issues of love.
People were largely confused about what to do and not to do under the socialist context,
where both ‘feudal traditions’ and ‘bourgeois tendencies’ were officially out of favor.
Stories of easy marriages, divorces, adultery, love affairs, pre-marital sex and illegitimate
children were widespread fodder for gossipmongers.

6.3.1

The Chaotic Love

After the end of the nationwide marriage campaign in 1953, the Chinese propaganda
organs proudly declared their achievement of the complete overthrow of the feudal
marriage system in most of China. However, local archival sources show that municipal
governments, especially in urban China, were still concerned with incorrect public
attitudes on love that led to frivolous marriages and divorces, general moral degradation
and distraction from production. A 1954 report mentions that “men in the factories are
only concerned with women’s appearance and women concerned only with men’s
income.”54 Misunderstanding about marriage freedom had a negative impact on
production and the comity among workers, and could even cause divorce and suicide.
Marriage and divorce were perceived as being too easy: people met, took a walk in the
park, went to a cinema, and married forthwith. If things did not work out well, they
divorced. Some young lovers were known to commit such intimate behaviors as kissing,
embracing in public or even sleeping together during the daytime.55
In 1955, an investigation was conducted among the workers of the Beijing Agricultural
Machinery Factory and the Beijing Xinhua Printing Plant.56 Both factories had more male
than female workers, and most of these were single with rural origins. Although the
official discourse claimed that the Marriage Law campaign had been effective among the
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worker population, the investigation revealed that in actuality “the education towards the
workers in these two factories was far from sufficient, especially concerning the correct
view of love and marriage.”57 Many young workers were found to be depressed and
distracted from their work. For example, 16 young workers from among the 126 from the
Beijing Agricultural Machinery Factory whose age was under 25, had started to ‘talk
love’ [tan lianai 谈恋爱] though they were younger than 18. From 1951 to 1954, 113
workers got married; among these, 24 were married earlier than the legal age. Many
workers in love were criticized for being dreamers who might stare at their lover’s photo
or read love letters for hours, thereby losing their concentration at work; others lost their
ambitions for political and technical improvement due to an early marriage and the birth
of children.
In the Xinhua Printing Plant, it was reported that ‘bourgeois thought’ had heavily
impacted the workers. The worship of money, indiscreet sexual relations, ‘love mania’,
and easy marriages and divorces were all popular among the young workers. From 1953
to 1954, there were 27 cases involving pre-marital sex, which led to 15 pregnancies;
among the 15 divorce cases, 11 were attributed to adultery. These disorders not only
caused health problems for the workers, but also distracted their attention and energy
from their daily production, which sometimes even led to serious accidents.58
Love relations on the campus were even more chaotic. Sexual behavior and liumang
xingwei 流氓行为 [hooliganism] were common among the students.59 To deal with these
problems, many universities and colleges made regulations in order to restrict love affairs
on campus. Students were prohibited from getting married during their degree term;
cohabitation of a student and his or her spouse was not permitted on campus; once a
female student got pregnant, she was suspended for one year; children of the student were
not permitted to be fostered on school grounds. Some colleges made the regulations even

57

“Beijing nongye jixiechang , Beijing xinhua yinshuachang guanche hunyinfa diaocha baogao”, Beijing Archive
Center, file No. 2-8-60.
58
Ibid.
59
“Beijing shi minzhengju guanyu benshi qunzhong hunyin qingkuang he jiaqiang hunyin gongzuo de yijian”, Beijing
Archive Center, File No. 2-14-35.

217

more rigid by demonstrating a zero tolerance for student love affairs. Any convicted
violator could be expelled, in some cases.60

6.3.2

‘Love the New and Loathe the Old’

According to the statistics of the Civil Court of Beijing for the first half of 1954, among
the 380 divorce cases heard by the court, 136 concerned the CCP cadres. These
individuals claimed lack of progress, personality changes, inconsiderate marriage
decisions, a lack of love and physical or biological inability as grounds for divorce.
However, the court found that all of these grounds were false excuses, covering the real
issue which was the unspoken and outdated principle ‘love the new and loathe the old’,
which was especially disadvantageous for rural-born wives. In order to achieve their
divorces, some cadres even used their political power to push judges to rule in their favor.
The court rulings considered this abuse to be grounded in the failure of the earlier
marriage movement to infuse the cadres with new and lawful marriage virtues.61
Compared to the vigorous performance of the Marriage Law’s promulgation, the Partystate seemed incapable of controlling its cadres’ abuses of marriage freedom. In some
areas, the practice of ‘changing wives’ [huan laopo 换老婆] even became a Partyorganized collective behavior within the local leadership circle. A contemporary observer
remembered how such a ‘fashion’ swept the county in which he lived:
Among the members of the county committee, except one district magistrate, all
the county leaders changed their wives, including two county officials, two
county secretaries, seven district secretaries and six district magistrates… Love
and marriage arranged by the party-organization [zuzhi 组织] was so popular
that ordinary people believed the organizations were distributing wives to the
cadres from on high.62
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Behind this ‘changing wives’ fad, the ‘trophy wife’ ideal continued to dominate CCP
cadres and the armed services. As mentioned in the previous chapter, ‘getting wives for
poor peasant men’ had been one of most persuasive slogans that the CCP used to
convince the rural population to support the revolution. Long before the final triumph had
been achieved, many cadres started to plan for their new urban life. As reflected in the
attitude of one senior cadre leader over breaking up with his rural girlfriend: “as the
victory of the revolution is coming soon, who still wants a countrified peasant cadre
member? Once we enter the cities we can pick and choose from among the educated
women!”63 After the founding of the PRC, these people felt that the time had come to ask
for their reward, which also helps to explain why the Party-state seemed so powerless
when dealing with such cases. It was, after all, precisely what the CCP had promised.

6.3.3

Wife as a Deserved Trophy

Immediately after the CCP seized national power its servicemen began asking for wives.
For the new PRC, the servicemen’s marriage was more or less a national security issue,
especially when this demand was from those garrisoned in the newly liberated border
areas, and those who were currently fighting at the Korean front. For the sake of military
morale, the local administrative and military authorities were frequently urged by the
central government to best protect servicemen’s marriage interest by declining divorces
and arranging marriages.
In the case of an organization-assigned military marriage, refusal on the part of the
potential partner was seldom allowed. Sometimes, such ‘assignments’ came in the form
of violent coercion. For example, a veteran of the Eighth Route Army and his reluctant
bride were locked together in one room by his commander for ‘a love talk’ until the girl
gave up.64 In most cases, the marriage arrangement took the form of an administrative
command that the bride-to-be must obey. Any hesitation or reluctance would provoke
fierce criticism or even administrative punishment by the authorities. For example, when
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a young military surgeon named Dr. Wang was informed that she had been promised to a
vice battalion commander, she told the organization that she needed time to think over
the many differences between them: she was less than twenty at that time and the man
was more than ten years older; she was a medical school graduate, and he was illiterate;
he was not good-looking and had a bad temper. However, her request incurred immediate
criticism from the authorities:
You think he is old? The older he is, the longer is his revolutionary history! You
think he is too swarthy? He has a very red heart! If such a good comrade does not
deserve your love, then who does? A bourgeois exploiter? They do have a white
face, but that’s the symbol of their unhealthy thoughts. Without these dark-faced
comrades fighting to win the state power, how can you have a good life?
Comrade, don’t let the bourgeois vainglory confuse your concept of right and
wrong. That is it! You two will marry on August 1st !65
Like many of her girlfriends who were ‘assigned’ to the commanders and leaders at
different levels, Dr. Wang dared not refuse the order, married the dark-faced commander
and stayed with him for the rest of her life. In these stories, men’s desire for wives and
women’s pursuit of political progress reached an awkward balance. While the husband
thought of his assigned wife as a reward, the wife was convinced by the socialist
marriage doctrine to regard marriage to her husband as a revolutionary duty.
Despite her lack of power in the decision, Dr. Wang acknowledged that she was more
fortunate than many of her contemporaries, at least in terms of her living conditions and
the many privileges that she had enjoyed which were available only to high-ranking
military commanders and their families. According to Ms. Yue, another of my
interviewees, whose husband was a division commissar, the monthly income of her
family in the 1950s and 1960s was over 100 yuan, which was much higher than the urban
average of 10-20 yuan. Other than the comforts of housing, free healthcare, the free
service of a private nanny, cook and guard (who were all paid by the army as soldiers),
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her family was among the few who always had enough food to live comfortably, even in
the years when living supplies were extremely scarce.66
My interview with Ms. Feng, a 1950s graduate of a finance and economic college in
Beijing where she befriended with many army wives, demonstrated how such a “Partyarranged match” was viewed by their ordinary contemporaries:
Those whose marriages were arranged by zuzhi [Party organization] led much
better lives than us commoners in terms of living conditions… Some couples
were obviously not perfectly matched, the age gap was as big as twenty or thirty
years, but it was impossible for a girl to disobey a decision of zuzhi[Party
organization]: she must accept it without resentment… anyway, people at that
time were very naive, knowing nothing about love. Once they were matched
together, they could spend a life together no matter if they were happy or not.
Besides, their marriages were blessed by a much better material life!”
Among these Party-arranged army wives, the thousands of girls who were recruited and
sent to marry garrison soldiers in Xinjiang in the 1950s were the most unfortunate. The
state had to solve the problem of finding the promised brides for the 200 000 soldiers
who were garrisoned in the newly liberated border area of Xinjiang from the early 1950s.
At the request of General Wang Zhen 王震 (1908-1993), more than 40 000 young
women had been recruited and sent to Xinjiang in the name of “constructing the new
borders”. Eight thousand girls from Hunan were among the first batch to be sent. Most of
them were immediately ordered to marry the commanders of the garrison troops of
various levels, and spent their best years or even their entire lives in that barren desert. 67

6.4 Marriage as a Social Control
Other than better training among the cadres and more effective promulgation efforts, the
relative success of the second Marriage Law campaign should be attributed primarily to
the implementation of the danwei system, and secondarily to the timely development of a
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new discourse on love and marriage. While the former imposed procedural and
compulsory controls on individual marriages, the latter convinced people to accept State
control over their personal lives as being simply a part of a citizen’s duty.

6.4.1

The Danwei system

A danwei is “a hierarchy of state-owned workplace units, including schools, factories,
hospitals, government agencies and the like.”68 It is the principal territorial form the
socialist state has employed since 1949 in order to organize the majority of China’s urban
population.69 This system provided a superior standard of living to the urban population
through such measures as granting secure jobs, affordable housing, inexpensive medical
care, a range of subsides for everything from transportation to nutrition and generous
retirement pensions. However, obtaining these benefits came at the cost of tight
restrictions and systematic social control over an individual’s public and personal
activities, including rights to job transfer, housing assignments and marriage decisions.
The mechanism of a danwei, as Andrew G. Walder perceived, “places constraints on
citizen behavior by the system of surveillance and political control… stresses the positive
incentives offered for compliance. [In this way,]…political loyalty is rewarded
systematically with career opportunities, special distributions, and other favors that
officials in communist societies are uniquely able to dispense.”70
According to the marriage registration requirements, in order to register a marriage
certificate with the danwei, a couple needed to bring forth a written introduction letter
and related documents that had been signed by their unit leader or by the local police
station if the principal was unemployed.71 To get married, the two parties had to first seek
the approval of the authorities of their danweis. If they did not acquire danwei approval,
the local marriage registration office would not allow them to register the marriage. In the
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large cities, it was this step, rather than procedures in the marriage registration office, that
was the crucial obstacle to getting married.
Unit authorities could object to or cause delays in a marriage on a variety of grounds.
Political unreliability was the most often raised official objection to a marriage from the
danwei leaders. Considerations in such cases could include past political mistakes
committed either by the individual or their family members, having a bad class
background or even having relatives overseas. In most cases, the couple would be
advised to think it over and consider the risks to their future.72
In most civilian cases a persistent couple might eventually be allowed to marry, in spite
of danwei pressures. However, Party members, people who worked in high security
danweis, or individuals in the army had considerably less latitude to pursue their own
love interests. To regulate the marriage behavior of the ‘vanguard of the Revolution’, a
specific qualification list was issued by the central government in October of 1950. In
general, the marriage application of an army man in active service would not be
permitted if he was not any one of the following: 1) a battalion commander or higher; 2)
a company leader with at least six-years’ experience as a company or platoon commander
(or equivalent); 3) a commander or soldier of the Red Army who had joined before 1938;
4) a platoon leader (or equivalent) with at least seven-years’ experience. Even after a
serviceman’s qualifications for marriage were recognized, his marriage application might
still be declined if his bride-to-be failed to meet the following qualifications: 1) clean
background; 2) politically innocent; 3) having more than one year of working experience.
These qualifications varied according to the groom’s military rank. For example, those
engaged to a Red Army soldier must 1) have a clean background; 2) be politically
innocent. The wife of an army leader at the level of the company or platoon must 1) have
a clean background; 2) be politically innocent; 3) be economically independent, or
capable of independent life. If the groom-to-be worked in a high security danwei, or was
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at the same level as a division commander, the bride must be the member of either the
CCP or the Youth League, with more than one year of work experience.73
For ordinary people, the official marriage age was of the greatest concern. Although the
Marriage Law stipulated that the legal age for marriage was 20 for men and 18 for
women, the official propaganda strongly recommended an even later marriage age,
presumably 25-27 for men and 23-24 for women. Alternatively, at least one party in the
proposed union had to have obtained some form of stable economic independence so that
the couple (and the wife in particular) could avoid being distracted from work by the
demands of childcare.74 If a couple was regarded as being too young, the unit authorities
would possibly persuade them to wait until they had passed the required ages. Any delay
imposed by the danwei was usually considered the end of the matter, since couples
depended on danwei authorities for access to housing, schools and job opportunities. If
the couple had been sexually involved and the woman became pregnant, the authorities
might approve an early marriage, although it was also possible for them to demand that
the woman get an abortion and subject both partners to criticism meetings. If an early
marriage had been approved by the danwei, the marriage registration office would
seldom refuse to issue the couple a marriage permit.
Even if a couple had satisfied the marriage requirements for age and background, and had
earned the consent of their unit leaders, they might still have to delay their marriage due
to other practical considerations. For example, unless one gained the approval of one’s
danwei, he or she could not freely transfer to a different unit. Such a transfer required an
individual to complete a series of complicated procedures that often made transferring a
long, painful and intolerable process. If a couple belonged to two different danweis in
different locations, their marriage would require a long-term separation.
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Another issue of concern to the couple at the marriage age was finding housing. Since
most housing was assigned by the danwei authorities according to the age, experience,
title, achievements, needs and even the personal relations of each individual, it was
hardly possible for a young couple without outstanding performance reviews to be
granted a place to live before or shortly after they get married. This difficulty left the two
parties no choice but to delay the wedding if they did not want to live with the groom’s
parents and share one roof with any of his unmarried siblings.
In many ways, the danwei system entitled its leaders, or the leaders of each Party branch,
to assert their direct and effective official intervention over the most personal issues of
their employees, and therefore control any undesired marriages. As Whyte and Parish
concluded, “throughout the post-1949 period average marriage ages were rising for both
urban men and women, so that by the 1970s the average marriage age for both sexes was
about five years later than in the period before 1949.” 75 This delay was largely caused by
consistent pressure from the government and the “alterations in the opportunity structure
facing young people and the extent to which they can draw on resources independently of
their parents.”76 Given the constraints presented by the official ban on school romance,
the official late marriage policy, the state labor assignment system and gender segregated
working conditions, it was fairly common for young people to wait until they were
assigned work by their danwei before they begin to seriously consider finding a partner.

6.4.2

Renewing the Definition of Love and Marriage

Except for people in the border areas who had been familiar with socialist values, most
Chinese people were under the control of two very different kinds of love and marriage
conceptions. The big cities and their large populations were under the influence of the
May Fourth spirit, which included Western ideas on romantic love, open socialization
and marriage freedom that had been well accepted by the intellectuals, and were at least
known to other urban residents. For most rural Chinese, however, the traditional arranged
marriage system was still the only way to get married. How to create a new discourse that
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followed the spirit of the ongoing Marriage Law campaign to replace the feudal and
bourgeois love discourses became a vital duty of China’s communist propagandists.
While Engel’s ‘free consensual union’ had been an ideal that was radically pursued by
the Chinese communists, who had learned from over two-decades of marriage reform
experience, the current CCP policymakers had developed a recognition that a correct love
must be a love that could lead to a lasting and happy marriage. Love without marriage, in
most minds was considered a cause of moral decline or licentious behavior. Therefore,
most discussions about love were at the same time discussions about marriage, which
suggested that young people get married without unnecessary delay if the two parties had
established a good mutual understanding and mutual love.77
To create a socialist discourse on love, the first step for the CCP leaders was to officially
reject earlier discourses that had been created by Confucian scholars and ‘bourgeois
intellectuals’. Citing Engels’ teachings, the CCP asserted that there had never been real
love relations in Chinese history prior to the Communist era, because “women in an
inferior and suppressed position were incapable of setting up any equal and beautiful love
relation.78 The feudal marriage system was therefore rejected for its ‘buying and selling’
nature, and the bourgeois model for the fact that it hid the trade between beauty and
money behind a lie of affection.79
Unlike the New Culturalists of the 1920s, who endeavored to define love as a sublime
natural human impulse that had to be balanced with reason and morals, communist love
advisors sought to define ‘correct’ love. While the moralists of the May Fourth era were
wrestling with how to control human sexual desire through a respect for spiritual love,
the first and last purpose of socialist propaganda was to help young people rid themselves
of ‘incorrect love’ and marriage values that were embedded in ‘feudal customs and
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bourgeois thoughts’, in order to establish ‘correct’ socialist values in their place. A
‘correct love’, according to an advisor in Zhongguo funü 中国妇女 [Women of China],
must have two qualifications: first, it should be established on the basis of a revolutionary
view of life that was centered on “serving for people”; second, it should emerge between
two people of matched political ideals, only when their love could be lasting and strong.
Any love between people of unmatched political values, such as progressive
revolutionary and anti-revolutionary, was not really true love but was in reality only an
illusion.80
Cheng Jinwu 程今吾, a senior educationalist and a member of the CCP’s Propaganda
Department, was invited to give advice on how to develop a ‘correct’ love relationship.
Cheng pointed out that in order to accomplish a ‘correct’ love, people first had to
overcome three bad inclinations: First, the conservative ideal of gender separation
prevented young people from speaking about their love or even having normal
socialization with those of the opposite sex; second, unrealistic love fantasies that made
people expect love at first-sight; third, the delusional and extreme bourgeois style ‘love
mania’ that extolled the benefits of unconditional love freedom. The most effective
weapon one could utilize to fight against these tendencies, Cheng suggested, was “a love
value that is consistent with the view of revolutionary life”.81 Ideally, a ‘correct’ love
should proceed as follows: the two parties happen to know each other from their studies
or work. In the process of mutual help and working cooperation, they cultivate matched
political thoughts and common interests, and eventually develop a marriage-oriented love
relationship.82
While exploring exactly how to build a love on the basis of a revolutionary view of life,
people often wondered whether love or work were more important. Ding Ling and a few
others admitted that love was a matter that could greatly influence an individual’s life and
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openly encouraged young people in their pursuit of it.83 Most relationship advisors,
however, insisted that love should never be allowed to surmount revolutionary work, just
as personal interests should never go beyond the public interest. The best way to deal
with love and work, they suggested, was to combine love with work, while always
putting work first.84
Following Engel’s teachings, which recognized love as “a matter of hierarchy and class
struggle”, the Chinese socialist moralists prefaced complementary political ideals and
class standing as the basis for any love relationship. Specific official directives were
issued in August of 1950 for the division of classes in rural areas. Article 12 was
specifically concerned with the issue of inter-class marriage.85 For example, if a daughter
from a landlord, rich peasant or capitalist family married into the family of a poor peasant
or worker from before the liberation she could not change her class identity to worker,
peasant or poor peasant until there was evidence to show that she had supported herself
through labour for at least one year. Class standing became so vital a criterion in the
1960s that it was used as “a barometer of character.”86
While mutual respect, mutual affection and gender equality were also recognized by the
communists as important conditions for a ‘correct’ love relationship, they were generally
secondary considerations. All other contemplations of appearance, status, and property
should be totally rejected, according to the new moralist viewpoint. For example, one
reader who wrote to a local paper to complain about how ugly and short her soldier
husband-to-be was faced criticism for over-reacting and being in possession of bourgeois
tastes.87 In another case, a girl who chose to marry a volunteer soldier who might
potentially have to work as a peasant after demobilization rather than a PLA lieutenant
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that had been introduced to her by her parents was praised for her “liberation from the
bourgeois and feudal marriage view and upholding the Communist marriage view.”88
Surprisingly, a prospective partner’s educational level, which had topped the criteria list
before 1949, was no longer a fixed standard of worth. Marriage between intellectuals and
workers or peasants was officially encouraged under the premise of political
progressiveness. Official doctrine taught that the educational gap between couples could
be overcome by common communist ideologies and couples who dared to challenge this
gap were often praised as models for successfully eliminating their discrimination
towards the working class. For example, Wang Yuling, a young female typist and highschool graduate wrote a letter to Zhongguo funü in 1959 that discussed her confusion
over declining her boyfriend’s marriage proposal despite her feelings of love for him. The
reason she gave was simple: while he was a Party member, he was a poorly educated
driver and did not match her ideal criteria of being highly educated, fully employed and
in a good political position. Frustrated and upset, Wang wrote to the journal for advice on
whether or not she should rethink his proposal.
This letter attracted more than one thousand responses from across the country, seven
hundred of which criticized Wang for her bourgeois inclinations. The editor of Zhongguo
funü concluded from these letters that “most young people in our country had learned to
use communist principles to deal with marriage and family problems. They managed to
get rid of the bourgeois bias on property, status, and their discrimination against the
working class.”89
There were, however, other points of view. One response from a reader named Wu Meide
became another target of criticism. In this letter, published in December 1959, Wu
expressed great sympathy for Wang Yuling and believed that for several reasons a young
woman should be given full freedom to select her own life partner: on the one hand,
women customarily had higher expectations for their husbands based on political and
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educational levels as well as on his social status, which was a result of thousands o years
of feudalism and which could not be changed overnight. On the other hand, Wu argued
that Wang’s preference for a better husband who could help her improve her
circumstances could not simply be defined as being a ‘bourgeois’ thought. Moreover, Wu
noted that a harmonious family required compatibility, and from this perspective Wang
and her boyfriend were not well-matched. Despite his good reputation, their hobbies and
interests were fundamentally different, and such a disparity could only grow wider
through marriage. Finding a life partner was not as simple as electing a working model,
Wu insisted, and looking only for a partner with progressive thoughts and a good work
ethic was far from enough to make a happy family. Therefore, she claimed that Wang
Yuling should be encouraged to pursue another love that better matched her ideals.90
Wu Meide’s opinion attracted its own batch of criticism from all walks of life. For most
readers, Wu’s letter was a ‘feudal-oriented’ admittance of men’s superiority and women’s
inferiority: by encouraging women to find a superior husband, and by advocating
women’s dependence and reliability, Wu not only challenged the gender equality
principles of the new society, but she also downplayed women’s autonomy or
advancement, and ignored all the help that a woman could get from modern Chinese
society.91 The editor of Zhongguo funü, however, sensed an even more basic error in
Wu’s opinion: it demonstrated ‘bourgeois tendencies’. Wu’s opinion that only a couple
with common interests and hobbies could enjoy effective communication was considered
to “obscure the difference between proletarian love and bourgeois love.”92 Moreover, the
editor pointed out that Wu erred in assuming that it would be impossible for Wang’s
boyfriend to advance his level of education. For a couple whose love was established on
the basis of common political thought, the editor believed, close communication could
naturally develop. It seems that this discussion did help Wang Yuling to make up her
mind, and the editor announced that Wang and her boyfriend were married in the end.93
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In contrast, Zhongguo funü published another love story in December of 1959 about a
female university graduate and a PLA soldier with only an elementary school education.
The two were wed in 1956 and proceeded to live a happy married life. Their love, the
paper said, was based on pure communist ideals, as the heroine of the story commented:
“I love him for his high political consciousness, loyalty to the Party, critical thinking and
strict self-discipline; he loves me for my good family background, progressive
inclination, being a good learner, hard work, good temper, and simple lifestyle.” 94 Such a
marriage was put forth as an example of a model combination of intellectual class and
working class and perfectly realized the common advancement of the couple.
While the public media kept urging intellectuals to set up a “love union with worker and
peasant”, Ding Ling suggested that such a union might be unnecessary if there were no
common ground between the two parties in life, work and thought.95 Wang Dingchang,
another dissident, went even further to argue that a comradeship that was established
through a matched political ideal could never take the place of one established through
mutual love (although he acknowledged that matched political ideals should be the
precondition of any love relationship, and that no love should interfere with one’s
work).96 However, this kind of public commentary began to disappear once the state
made a radical turn to the political left and began to identify any dissidents as being
‘counter-revolutionaries’ and ‘rightists’.

6.4.3

Love and Marriage in the Socialist Context

Socialist marriage legislation, the danwei system and the introduction of the ‘new love
discourse’ brought many fundamental changes to Chinese marriage thinking. The
immediate perceivable transition that was brought on by the introduction of the new
discourse was a change in the use of language. The term ‘comrade’ started to be used in
place of companion, which signified the fundamental transition of women’s domestic
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status and family relations. A wife working in one factory broke into tears when she
learned that her husband had called her ‘comrade’ instead of ‘my wife’ when talking to
another, because this acknowledged her independence and recognized her as another
breadwinner.97 In the urban areas, airen 爱人 [lover] became the new appellation that a
couple used to refer to each other. This gender-neutral term signified not only the
equality between husband and wife, but also distinguished the marriage as a union
between two lovers. Airen subsequently became a term that could only be used to
describe a couple, and could not be applied to unmarried lovers.
The state-controlled propaganda machine soon turned public opinion into an echo of the
official discourse. The readers’ forum held by the main-stream journals became a
showcase for this kind of trend-setting opinion. In November of 1955, Zhongguo funü
published a story about the marriage-related tragedy of Liu Lequn and the adulterous Luo
Baoyi.98 Liu was a hard-working Beijing high school teacher and active Communist Party
member. Her husband Luo was a senior Party member who had joined in 1939 and who
was then working as section chief of the Commercial Bureau. According to Liu, she was
introduced to Luo in 1946 and was soon thereafter infatuated by this “very passionate,
smart and able-minded” man who treated her with care and consideration, and gave her
love letters and generous gifts. At Luo’s insistence, the two were married after a brief
courtship in April of 1946. In the beginning, they were both satisfied with this marriage
and Luo had often boasted that “all the comrades admired me for my luck of finding a
young, pretty, well educated, and a party member wife.”99 Liu was also pleased to find
that her husband lived up to every one of her ideals. Their happiness lasted for five years
but went sour in 1952, when Luo fell in love with Miss Wang, a young and cheerful
university graduate. When Liu was pregnant with the couple’s third child, Luo sued for
divorce on the grounds that “his wife is a workaholic, reading all the time, knowing
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nothing about play, boring as a chump.”100 Liu refused and reported his adultery to the
supervisor of his working unit. Although Luo was officially criticized, he maintained his
liaison with Wang and forced Liu to grant the divorce. In the end, Liu decided to formally
sue Luo for adultery and spousal abuse.
The four issues of Zhongguo funü (1955.12-1956.3) that followed the publication of the
story contained a wide discussion about Liu and Luo’s marriage problems.101 It is no
surprise that Luo and his mistress were harshly criticized and most readers believed that
the breakup was mainly caused by Luo’s bourgeois and individualist thoughts, his pursuit
of the bourgeois lifestyle and his profligate behavior. His mistress Miss Wang was
criticized as being ‘extremely immoral’, dominated by bourgeois thoughts of vanity and
selfishness and for trying to gain at another’s expense.102 Liu was also blamed by some
readers for “neglecting her husband and family life.”103 However, in a conclusion that
was published in 1956, the editors suggested that Liu should not be blamed since the first
duty of a woman in the new society should be her work. Luo’s complaint, meanwhile,
was based on his pursuit of a degraded and immoral ‘bourgeois’ lifestyle, which should
not be satisfied lest Liu become the captive of ‘bourgeois’ thoughts.104
Some readers went even further in questioning the Liu and Luo love story. Both partners
were criticized by some readers for adopting ‘bourgeois’ marriage views. One reader
pointed out that their basis for love was rather weak, as the man only thought about
physical appearance and education, while the woman was merely satisfied with his
passion, intelligence, ability and generosity in lending her books, quilts and stamps, not
to mention the matter of his romantic love letters. The reader claimed that Liu was
infatuated by Luo’s ‘bourgeois’ solicitude without realizing his ‘bourgeois’ nature; as
revolutionaries, they should both have integrated family life and revolutionary work.
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Finally, the critic stated that only love that was established on the basis of political
mutual help, mutual encouragement and common advancement could allow a couple to
live happily ever after.105
In sum, all the readers agreed that the fundamental problem with Luo, Liu and Wang was
their ‘bourgeois’ inclinations: individualism, romanticism, vanity and selfishness. These
characteristics were all considered to be in contradiction to the values of the Communist
Party, its members and its revolutionaries. Therefore, in the words of one reader, the
family role was directly connected to the political role:
Luo is not only a disloyal husband, but an unfaithful Party member. Every word
and move of a Communist Party member should meet the supreme principle of
the proletarian interest. In this sense, the problem of life could not be separated
from the political problem. If a Party member cannot correctly handle the
relationship between personal and collective life, and allows bourgeois and
individualist thoughts to dominate his words and behaviors, it is inevitable that
he will commit a political mistake and bury himself.106
Readers unanimously suggested that the involvement of the Party-state was the best
solution to such problems. As Xie Xuegong, a secretary of the Party Branch of the
Foreign Trade Department explained,
The Party will never interfere with a Party member’s normal life and his right in
dealing with his life. But if his life violates communist virtue, discipline and law,
and blemishes the reputation of the Party, not only should Party organizations
enforce the interference, but also the masses have a right to intervene.107
A penitent husband and reader of Zhongguo funü confessed that he had once tried to
divorce his simple-looking and poorly-educated wife. Only the criticism and education of
the Party and of his comrades had finally saved his marriage and made him realize how
selfish he was being: “as our country is walking toward socialism, and everyone is
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devoted fully to the country’s construction, how can I pursue my own personal
happiness?” 108 So he corrected his attitude and repaired his relationship with his wife.
The case of Luo and Liu demonstrated the depth to which people accepted the principles
of the new marriage discourse as a standard for both their public and private lives.
Through the official intervention of the Party-state, each family and each individual was
politicized as either a cell of the socialist society, or as an element of the collective, but
not as an individual that was capable of affection, emotion and romance. Gerald Clerk, an
American journalist who visited China in the early 1950s observed “China is undergoing
a severe diet of moral reformation”:
There is prudery, a somber “asexual” quality even in the relations between young
people. China’s earnest young men and women do not indulge in cheek-to-cheek
dancing; nor do they walk arm in arm through a park. Even in quiet restaurants,
where they might be expected to reveal a soulful eye for one another, they appear
more preoccupied with work projects than with personal affairs. The Chinese still
smile, but, especially among the young in China, today all of life is serious and
sober; and romance can be given little attention in the broader scheme of building
a nation…109

6.5 Restricted Marriage Freedom: Love and Marriage
Practice in Daily Life
For most ordinary Chinese people, meeting and becoming familiar with potential spouses
was a matter that was easier said than done. Young people in China confronted a number
of obstacles in trying to find a spouse. The biggest of these was the continuing influence
of traditional cultural mores and expectations. The new socialist state had inherited the
puritan spirit of wartime Yan’an and in an atmosphere of continuing suspicion and
segregation, people were hesitant to express their affections openly, fearing that they
would become subject to gossip and rumor. It was not unknown for the Youth League to
discourage its members from openly fraternizing with the opposite sex for fear that this
might harm the reputation of the organization and draw official attention to their affairs in

108
109

Hua Nan 华南. “Women fufu hehao le” 我们夫妇和好了 [Our couple reconciled], Zhongguo funü, no.1 (1956): 9.
Gerald Clerk, Impatient Giant: Red China Today (New York, David McKay Co., 1959), 112.

235

a derogatory way.110 Maintaining a good reputation was particularly essential for the
Chinese female, since her virginity was still largely worshipped as sacrosanct by the
Chinese male. Therefore, regardless of their daughters’ personal feelings, parents often
kept girls at home and prohibited them from attending any meetings or taking part in
activities that might expose them to the attentions of members of the opposite sex. In
defense of their actions, parents argued that when young people get together “nothing
good can happen” and that young people “may not behave properly and may even ruin
family reputations.”111 Therefore, as Whyte and Parish observed:
Although China has won the acceptance of the freedom of mate choice, it did not
develop an American-style dating culture that can provide opportunities for
young males and females to mix fairly freely and to explore romantic
relationships in a relatively casual atmosphere, with no long-term commitments
expected, and this experience is seen as important in making possible eventual
choice of a mate. Young people in China, therefore confront a number of
obstacles in trying to find a spouse.112
For both urban and rural Chinese, any public sign of pairing off was not generally seen as
a preliminary and casual stage of romance, but rather as indicating a serious commitment
that was expected to lead to marriage. Once two people had been publicly identified as a
couple, any breakup between them would subsequently become very difficult and subject
to moral criticism.
The second major obstacle facing Chinese youth looking for love came from the gap
between theory and practice. While young people were theoretically encouraged to
pursue their individual love and happiness, in practice, both danweis and schools frowned
upon love relationships in the workplace or on campus. Given the potential distraction a
love affair could be from an individual’s work or studies, most schools, universities, and
danweis prohibited love affairs and publicly criticized students and apprentices who did
not obey the rules.
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For many Chinese people who were neither students nor apprentices, the biggest obstacle
to finding a partner was the considerable occupational segregation of the sexes. For those
groups living under more strictly enforced segregation, such as women textile workers
and nursery school teachers or male coal miners, there were few potential mates close at
hand. The highly involved and inclusive nature of danweis and their activities helped to
reinforce this isolation, while the absence of facilities or institutions for socialization,
such as dance halls and restaurants, meant that individuals did not have the time or
opportunity to meet eligible partners on their own. In the 1950s and early 1960s, it was
not uncommon for danweis to hold dances and parties of various types, and even the
occasional ‘mixer’ - parties jointly sponsored by a unit with extra males and a unit with
extra females that were aimed specifically at fostering romance. In later years, such
activities were seen as ‘bourgeois and decadent’, and they were rarely held after the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
In the face of such obstacles, many Chinese youths came to rely upon third-party
assistance to help find a potential spouse. According to Whyte and Parish’s field research
in the late 1950s, 56% of the surveyed couples had met directly, while 44% had relied
upon introductions from others. Of these latter cases, almost half had involved
introductions that were arranged by parents, while the remainders were based upon
introductions provided by friends or coworkers.113
In the official love discourse, only those marriages that had been initiated and concluded
without the intervention of a third party could be considered a true self-determined
marriage.114 In daily life, however, the predominant models in operation in rural areas
continued to combine elements of the old and new ideological models, and even in the
more progressive urban areas, initiation by third parties and parental consent were the
most acceptable norms of behavior. Such compromises were officially encouraged at the
beginning of the Marriage Movement. For example, one report that was published in
Zhongguo funü in 1953 presented a model xiang in implementing the marriage law. The
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author mentioned that more than twenty girls who had been betrothed under parental
arrangement before 1949 decided afterward to closely examine the condition of their
fiancé and potential in-law families. Some even went so far as to talk to their fiancés in
order to see if they met the personal standards of the individual women. These standards
at this time included being good at production, a good worker, a good learner, a Party
member or member of the Youth League, or at least having been an activist or serving in
the militia. Sometimes, the girl would even examine her potential husband’s education
level with a textbook and a quiz. 115 From the tone of the author, this kind of marriage
had been recognized as tantamount to marriage freedom.
The strong influence of filial tradition, the continuing gender segregation and the
puritanism advocated in the official Party line, all comprised the critical elements that
prevented young Chinese people from cutting themselves off from the old marriage
patterns. Like it had been for their urban predecessors in the 1930s, when marriage
freedom was first introduced to the educated youth in the 1950s, disobedience to one’s
parents over the issue of marriage was still a painful process to undertake; it was a
prospect that left one full of guilt and a sense of betrayal, even after many individuals had
obtained their economic independence. Those young men who dared to reject an arranged
marriage were often disturbed by the accusation of being an ‘unfilial son’. As one reader
of Zhongguo qingnian complained in 1963, “Am I an unfilial son because I turn my back
on an arranged marriage?...the problem weighs heavily on my mind [and] I cannot
concentrate on my studies and work.”116
While people were officially encouraged to weed out personal considerations of a
prospective spouse’s external status criteria (such as income and political position) in the
process of making a marriage decision, in the highly bureaucratized distribution system
that controlled urban resources in China at the time, people with political power,
positions as ‘gatekeepers’ or those from families with parents in such roles inevitably
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became more desirable as prospects, regardless of their personal qualities. For most
young people in the 1950s and early 1960s, determining how to pick a promising partner
was the most important consideration, while listing personal criteria, particularly for
women, was downplayed as this involved betting on a person’s future. Futures were to be
made along two paths: one political and the other professional. Some individuals were
eager to find a partner who was more likely to have a bright political future, which meant
looking for political activists, individuals who held offices in the Communist Youth
League (or various other youth and student organizations) or someone who had been able
to join the Communist Party or the People’s Liberation Army. Others might focus instead
on finding diligent and intelligent individuals who were likely to go on to university and
to promising careers as skilled personnel or intellectuals.117

6.6 Conclusion
Marriage, in the Marxist lexicon, is a flexible term that can only be defined under a
specific social system, as it is shaped by the social productivity of each individual society
and under the influence of superstructures such as political institutions and political
thoughts. To establish a marriage institution that could best fit the socialist infrastructure,
the new Chinese Party-state launched a three-year nationwide propaganda campaign in an
attempt to promulgate a marriage law that would indoctrinate Chinese people with the
ideal of a ‘revolutionary marriage’. In the spirit of the Marriage Law of 1950, such a
marriage was “a legal marital union based on the love of the two sexes who have free
wills to live and work together, which is normally confirmed by the State and creates
rights and duties for the partners towards each other and society.” 118
Implemented together with the new marriage law was a renewed love and marriage
discourse through which the Party-state tried to preach a kind of moral proletarian
heroism: in a socialist marriage, seeking a companion simply to share one’s lives together
was no longer possible- the wife and the husband are ideally staunch comrades who
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emulate each other and find the height of matrimonial happiness in mutual criticism and
self-criticism. If problems do arise between these ideal spouses they will be easily and
correctly solved by the application of proletarian principles.119 This ideal was
contextualized through the hierarchal danwei system that was widely established in the
urban areas, and through the millions of Party-trained cadres who composed the elite
among local authorities. The marriage system under the socialist context, in this sense,
was in fact a component of a bigger social control network that was comprised of every
individual, family, street, danwei, and all other administrative units. What tied them
together was the socialist marriage discourse.
Gerald Clerk described the Communist approach to reform Chinese marriage as “to slip
new wine into old familiar bottles”:
In former days, the vast majority of marriages among peasants were prearranged
by parents; bride and groom met the first time during the wedding ceremony.
Love, in the conventional Western sense, was not a factor. Now it is the Party,
through the mechanism of persuasion and propaganda, that tacitly selects the
120
partners.
While the Party-state anticipated a quick revolution in the marriage system, the
realization of this ideal was hampered by the constant incompability of “wine and bottle”.
The ongoing ‘love disturbance’ among urban youth, local cadre leaders’ intentional
abuses of marriage freedom, servicemen’s demand for ‘trophy wives’, and ordinary
people’s utilitarian use of the new marriage discourse demonstrated what was needed for
the transformation of Chinese marriage institution was not only a rapid top-down legal
revolution, but also a gradual bottom-up social evolution.
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Final Conclusion
The Chinese marriage system experienced a three-step transition within the half-century
period from the late nineteenth century to the mid- twentieth century: the rejection of
traditions, the embrace of ideals and, at last, a return to realities. Although Chinese
marriage institutions had undergone many changes in terms of definition, purpose,
institution, politics, procedure, and legislation, in the early 20th century most people still
married according to the established tradition by which the child was legally and morally
required to accept the life partner arranged by his or her parent at the matchmaker’s
recommendation. This lack of freedom seemed rather absurd and backward to those
Chinese engaged in a persistent pursuit of China’s modernization. The first generation of
Chinese marriage reformers were among the patriotic intellectuals who endeavored to
improve the Chinese race through training women to be the good wives of patriotic
husbands and wise mothers of future Chinese soldiers. To guarantee young people’s
marriage freedom while maintaining the parental authority, these moderate social
reformers suggested a middle course between the progressive free-choice model and the
customary parental-arranged practice. For the good of the children, parental supervision
and examination were encouraged to moderate the harm supposedly caused by impulsive
love passion. After all, they insisted, the first and last purpose of a marriage was to
establish a harmonious family whose members could best serve their country.
Such precautions however, were submerged by the marriage revolution launched by the
May Fourth radicals. To replace the Confucian discourse on marriage, a brand-new
marriage discourse was constructed by the intellectuals who intended to modernize
Chinese marriage around the theme of free love. Marriage, in this discourse, was defined
as a consummation of the love of two individuals. In the spirit of marriage freedom,
young people were encouraged to resist family interference and to freely pursue their true
love of matched souls through open socialization. In the big cities, simple weddings
became a fashion among those who celebrated their marriage more as a personal event
than a family occasion.
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Founded in the “Golden Age” of the May Fourth era, the CCP claimed to be the
representative of the most progressive political and social trends of its time. In terms of
marriage thinking and practice, many members of the early CCP were the enthusiasts of
unconditional love and “free-consensual union”, a socialist marriage model Engels
proposed as a final replacement of the marriage system. However, the early CCP leaders’
ambition of promulgating a socialist marriage code in the Jiangxi Soviet suffered such a
total defeat that the later Yan’an leadership had to figure out a more realistic social
reform plan that could accommodate the more conservative social context of North
China. The marriage discourse they constructed was a flexible combination of socialist
ideals and Confucian traditions: each individual, both man and woman, was requested to
submit his or her personal interest to that of the CCP for the sake of revolution. In terms
of social control, the CCP was by no means inferior to the dynastic rulers. On behalf of
the national interest of China and Chinese people, the CCP could act like the traditional
family heads that were officially and legally authorized to arrange their children’s
marriage at will, to either assign a marriage to an individual as a “revolutionary mission”,
or to force its socialist reform agenda on the Chinese people as a whole. After 1949, this
discourse was promoted through the nation-wide establishment of the danwei system,
with which the socialist Party-state effectively enforced a reform that brought many
fundamental changes to Chinese marriage.
Based on a historical examination of the relationship between state and individual,
Lucian W. Pye concluded that no regime has ever outdone the Confucian and Chinese
Communist state in ascribing moral virtues to the state, as they both went all out in
extolling the importance of rulers and society and in minimizing the rights of individuals.
“At the core of Chinese ethics and morality”, Pye pointed out, “there has always been the
ideal of depressing self-interest and glorifying self-sacrifice for the collectivity.”1
Pye’s perception is insightful at least in regards to marriage. For Chinese, marriage is
more a responsibility towards family, society, community, and state than a choice for the
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individual. In the Confucian era, around the paramount principle of filial piety, the
marriage system served as a means of social control through which the dynastic ruler
could institute his hierarchal control over his people as a father over his children. The
most widely extolled moral value of an individual was to unconditionally obey his or her
parents, superiors and rulers. In the modern era, the individual was increasingly expected
to submit his or her personal interests to the greater good of the Chinese nation-state
under the principle that “the individual has no freedom, only the group has freedom”. In
the agenda of the late-Qing reformers and Republican revolutionaries, China’s national
salvation was the first priority and became the fundamental cause for all the social
reforms. Their proposal that Chinese parents’ withdraw from involvement in their
children’s marriages was not about individual freedom or human rights, but a political
strategy intended to strengthen Chinese race.
In the May Fourth era, individualism and liberalism were embraced by Chinese
intellectuals with unprecedented enthusiasm, which eventually led to a theoretical
triumph in terms of emancipating Chinese marriage from the elder generation’s
manipulation. However, behind this enthusiasm was an eagerness to reconstruct China’s
modern image, and to address the fate of the nation: the implication being that it was
selfish and immoral for anybody to enjoy personal happiness without making a
contribution to his or her country.
Chinese women actually became the biggest consumer of this discourse. It had been a
social consensus since the late nineteenth century that women, as a whole, were the
primary victims of the traditional marriage system and so should have been the greatest
beneficiaries of a modernized marriage system. However, in the varied social reform
projects constructed by the political parties in the modern era, women’s liberation and
individual happiness were similarly preconditioned by their support and service to the
Chinese revolution. Unlike their feminist sisters in the West, from Qiu Jin to the women
of Yan’an, the most glorious goal was neither the freedom to love and to marry nor social
gender equality, but formal recognition of their equal participation and contribution to
Chinese revolution, which could often come at the price of giving up their gender
identity.
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In this sense, the Chinese Communist Party’s “revolutionary marriage” discourse was not
the Party’s unique creation, but a flexible re-interpretation of Confucian ethics in
accordance with a social context filled with radical nationalism. Labeling itself the only
savior of the Chinese nation, the CCP assumed the roles once played by the dynastic ruler
and family head, whose superiority and authority over their subordinates had been
officially, legally and ethically recognized by Chinese society for thousands of years.
When people accepted the CCP’s leadership in China’s national salvation, they at the
same time consciously or unconsciously recognized the Party’s control over their
personal lives under the name of devotion to the ongoing revolution.
To a certain extent, the revolutionary marriage model was subject to the contemporary
Chinese social context. By the time the CCP was able to utilize the state machine to
promote its social reform agenda on a national scale, individualism and liberalism had
long been known to the Chinese. However, the prevailing urban love disturbance, the
unpopularity of the Nanjing government’s Marriage Law, and the intensive gender
conflict provoked by the CCP’s pro-women marriage regulations in the 1920s to 1930s
demonstrated that these ideologies were a poor fit in the social context of China in the
early twentieth century when a majority of the population still got married in the old
ways. For them, compared to the “exotic” customs, the lifestyle offered in the CCP’s
social blueprint in the 1940s were familiar and socially acceptable.
Regarding the Chinese marriage system, moreover, there is always a gap between li
[principles] and su [customs], which was most often seen in the contradiction between the
written policies or legislations and the daily practice. No matter how many laws and
policies were made to regulate people’s marriage behaviors, and how harshly measures
were promulgated, the regime was ultimately forced to make compromises in the name of
social order and stability.
The marriage system that finally achieved nationwide recognition in China was actually a
hybrid of progressive ideals, traditional customs and daily experiences. Ideally, it is a
personal matter about love and sex, freedom and choice, equality and match,
responsibility and devotion. Customarily, it is a family matter about control and
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compliance, hierarchy and order, interest and politics, chastity and reputation, ritual and
moralities. In daily practice, it is a matter of practical thinking and rational calculation,
official permission and social recognition with the critical involvement of family,
community, neighborhood and state. In the form of “revolutionary union”, Chinese
marriage was propagandized ideally as a bond of love between two revolutionaries,
implemented officially as a social control project to secure the services for the socialist
Party-state, and practiced individually as a means to secure the continuance of the family
line.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Love and Marriage of the Ten Marshals of PRC

1

Married/
Name

engaged Age

Years

Ending

(wife vs.husband)
Zhu De 朱德 1886-1976
First

Ms. Liu

21 vs.19

1905-1906

left without divorce

Xiao Jufang

18 vs. 26

1912-1919

died of illness

21 vs. 33

1919-1927

lost contact and separated

19 vs.34

1920 (1922)-

divorced

(arranged)
Second

萧菊芳
Third

Chen Yuzhen
陈玉珍

Fourth

He Zhihua
贺治华

Fifth

Wu Ruolan

1926
24 vs. 42

1928- 1929

17 vs. 43

1929-1976

killed by GMD

伍若兰
Sixth

Kang Keqing
康克清

Peng Dehuai 彭德怀 1898-1974
First
(Engaged)

1

Zhou Ruilian

1918-1920

suicide

周瑞莲 (cousin)

This table is made with reference to Kong Qingdong 孔庆东, “Shida yuanshuai de qingyuan”十大元帅的情缘 [Love
stories of the Ten Marshals], in Kong Qingdong, Kuaizhi yingxiong 脍炙英雄[Heroes in Praise] ( Beijing: Chang’an
chubanshe, 2009), 212-270. Yang Wenyu 杨闻宇 & Ma, Xiaoxiao 马萧萧, Hongse Hunyin Dang’an 红色婚姻档案
I, II [The Archives of Red Marriage, vol.1, 2], Beijing: Kunlun chubanshe, 2005.
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Second

Liu Kunmo

12 vs. 24

1922-1928

remarried

20 vs. 40

1938-1962

divorced

刘坤模
Third

Pu Anxiu
浦安修

Lin Biao 林彪 1906-1971

First

Wang Jingyi

(arranged)

汪静宜

Second

Zhang Mei

7 vs.7

Never married

lifelong single

20 vs. 31

1937-1942

divorced

25 vs.36

1942-1971

16 vs. 18

1910-1912

lost contact

1930-1932

lost contact

张梅
Third

Ye Qun
叶群

Liu Bocheng 刘伯承 1892-1986
First

Cheng Yizhi

(arranged)

程宜芝

Second

Wu Jingchun
吴景春

Third

Wang Ronghua

19 Vs.44

1936-1986

17 Vs. 10

1906-?

died of illness

20 Vs. 33

1934-

divorced

26 Vs. 46

1942-1969

汪荣华
He Long 贺龙 1896-1969
First

Xu Yuegu

(arranged)

徐月姑

Second

Jian Xianren
蹇先任

Third

Xue Ming 薛明
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Chen Yi 陈毅 1901-1972

Lover

Hu Lanqi

1922-

胡兰畦
First

Xiao Juying

Marriage application declined
by the Party

19 vs. 29

1930-1931

suicide

18 vs.31

1932-1934

lose contact

18 vs. 39

1940-1972

萧菊英
Second

Lai Yueming
赖月明

Third

Zhang Qian
张茜

Luo Ronghuan 罗荣桓 1902-1963
First

Yan Yue’e

(arranged)

颜月娥

Second

Lin Yueqin

19 Vs.17

1919-1927

23 vs. 35

1937-1963

unilateral divorced

林月琴
Xu Xiangqian 徐向前 1901-1990
First

Zhu Xiangchan

(arranged)

朱香婵

Second

Cheng Zunxuan

18 vs. 28

1921-1924

died of illness

1929 - 1932

executed in the rectification

程训宣
Third

movement of 1932

Wang Jing

1940-1943

王婧
Fourth

Huang Jie
黄杰

36 Vs. 45

1946- 1990

divorced
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Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻 1899-1992

First

Long Shengxian

(arranged)

龙升贤

Second

Zhang Ruihua

18 vs. 16

1915-1919

18 vs. 28

1928-1992

Seperated but never remarried

张瑞华
Ye Jianying 叶剑英 1897-1986
First
(arranged)
Second

Feng Hua

1924

冯华
Third

Zeng Xianzhi

18 vs. 30

1927-1931

separated

32 vs. 40

1937-

divorced

曾宪植
Fourth

Wei Gongzhi
危拱之

Fifth

Wu Bo

1940-

吴博
Sixth

Li Gang
李刚

1948-1955

divorced
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Appendix B: Marriage Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic
(Promulgated 1st December 1931)
Chapter One. General Provisions

Article 1. The principle of freedom of marriage between man and woman is established
and the entire system of marriage arranged by persons other than the parties themselves,
forced upon the parties, or contracted by purchase and sale, is abolished. The practice of
taking a 'foster daughter-in-law' is forbidden.
Article 2. Monogamy is enforced; polygamy and polyandry are forbidden.
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage
Article 3. The contracting age for marriage is fully twenty years for men and fully
eighteen years for women.
Article 4. For a man and a woman to contract marriage, the consent of both parties is
necessary. Coercion exercised by either party or by a third person is not permitted.
Article 5. For a man and a woman to marry a person of blood relationship within the fifth
generation is forbidden.
Article 6. Persons suffering from venereal disease, leprosy, tuberculosis, and suchlike
dangerous contagious diseases are forbidden to marry, unless it is considered permissible
after medical examination.
Article 7. Persons suffering from mental disease or paralysis are forbidden to marry.

2

Originally collected in Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4 中国新民主主
义革命时期根据地法制文献选编[Selected Legal Documents of the Revolutionary Bases during China’s New
Democratic Revolution], eds. Han Yanlong and Chang Zhaoru (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1984),789-791.
Translated in Meijer, 281-282.
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Article 8. To contract marriage the man and the woman are required to approach together
the hsiang or municipal soviet to register the marriage and receive a marriage certificate.
Marriage presents, whether in money or goods, and dowries are abolished.
Chapter Three. Divorce
Article 9. Freedom of divorce is established. Whenever both the man and the woman
agree to divorce, the divorce shall have immediate effect. When one party, either the man
or the woman, is determined to claim a divorce it shall have immediate effect.
Article 10. When a man and a woman divorce, they are required to register the divorce
with the hsiang or municipal soviet.
Chapter Four. Care and Custody of Children after Divorce
Article 11. The man is to raise the children born before the divorce. If both the man and
the woman wish to raise the children, they shall be entrusted to the woman.
Article 12 . Small children who are being nursed shall during the period of their nursing
be raised by the woman.
Article 13. If a child has received land, the land goes with the child.
Article 14. When the children have reverted to the woman's custody, the man shall be
responsible for two-thirds of their living expenses until they are sixteen years of age.
Payment shall be either in money or by way of tilling the land the children have received
[at land reform].
Article 15. In the case of the woman marrying again and her new husband being willing
to care for the children [of her earlier marriage], the father may be discharged of his duty
to provide for their living expenses.
Article 16. A new husband who has agreed to care for [his wife's] children [by an earlier
marriage] must register this matter with the hsiang or municipal soviet. After registration
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he shall be responsible for caring for the children until they reach adulthood. He shall not
relinquish his duties [before that time] nor maltreat the children.
Chapter Five. Arrangements Concerning the Property of the Man and the Woman
After Divorce
Article 17. The man and the woman shall each dispose of the land and property which
they individually had acquired and settle the debts they had incurred individually. If the
marriage has lasted one full year the increase of property gained by management of the
man and the woman in common shall be divided equally between them; if there are
children it shall be divided equally per capita.
Article 18. The man shall be responsible for the settlement of common debts incurred by
the man and the woman during the time of cohabitation.
Article 19. If after divorce both the man and the woman are unwilling to leave the house
they inhabit, the man shall sell part of his house to the woman to live in.
Article 20. After divorce, until the woman marries again, the man must support her or till
the land for her.
Chapter Six. Care of Children Born Before Registration of Marriage
Article 21. The man shall bear two-thirds of the living expenses of children born before
registration of his marriage, if it is clearly proved that the children are his. The Articles
11-15 of Chapter Four shall be applicable.
Chapter Seven. Additional Provisions
Article 22. Whosoever contravenes this law shall be duly punished according to the
criminal law.
Article 23. These Regulations will be enforced as from the day of promulgation.
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Appendix C: Marriage Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic
(Promulgated 8th April 1934)
Chapter One. General Provisions

Article 1. The principle of freedom of marriage between man and woman is firmly
established and the entire system of marriage arranged by persons other than the parties
themselves, forced upon the parties, or contracted by purchase and sale, is abolished. The
practice of taking a 'foster daughter-in-law' is forbidden.
Article 2. Monogamy is enforced; polygamy and polyandry are forbidden.
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage
Article 3. The contracting age for marriage is fully twenty years for men and fully
eighteen years for women.
Article 4. For a man and a woman to contract marriage, the consent of both parties is
necessary. Coercion exercised by either party or by a third person is not permitted.
Article 5. To contract marriage with a person of blood relationship within three
generations is forbidden.
Article 6. Persons suffering from venereal disease, leprosy, tuberculosis, and suchlike
dangerous contagious diseases, are forbidden to marry, unless it is considered permissible
after medical examination.
Article 7. Persons suffering from mental disease or paralysis are forbidden to marry.
Article 8. To contract marriage a man and a woman are required to to register the
marriage with the Soviet of the hsiang or municipal ch’ü together and receive a marriage
certificate. Marriage presents, whether in money or goods, and dowries are abolished.
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Originally collected in Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 792-795. Translated in Meijer, 283-284.
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Article 9. In all cases of a man and a woman cohabiting, whether or not they have
registered marriage, they shall be considered to have contracted marriage.
Chapter Three. Divorce
Article 10. Freedom of divorce is established. When one party, either the man or the
woman, is determined to claim a divorce, divorce may immediately be effected.
Article 11. Wives of soldiers of the Red Army when claiming a divorce must obtain the
consent of their husbands, but in areas where communication by letter is easy and where
the husband has not returned home nor communicated by letter for two years, the wife
may approach the local government and request registration of the divorce, In areas
where communication by letter is dificult, and four years have elapsed since the husband
last communicated by letter or since he last returned home, the wife may approach the
local government and request registration of the divorce.
Article 12. When a man and a woman divorce, they must register the divorce with the
soviet of the hsiang and the municipal ch’ü.
Chapter Four. Arrangements Concerning the Property of the Man and the
Woman After Divorce
Article 13. After divorce the land and property originally owned by thc man and the
woman and the debts originally incurred by them shall be disposed of by themselves. If
the marriage has lasted one full year the increase of property gained by management in
common will be divided equally between the man and the woman. If there are children it
shall be divided equally per capita.To settle common debts incurred by the man and the
woman, during the time of cohabitation shall be the responsibility of the man.
Article 14. When after divorce the woman removes to a village in another hsiang she
shall receive land in accordance with the rate of allocation prevailing in that hsiang. If in
the new village there is no more land to be allocated, the woman shall retain the land she
originally owned. The way of disposing of that land, whether by renting it out, selling, or
exchanging it with another person, shall be freely decided by the woman herself. The
above-mentioned provisions on the distribution of land and disposal thereof shall be
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applicable in full to the children [of the marriage] if it has been decided that such children
shall revert to the mother's custody and they accompany the mother on her removal.
Article 15. If after divorce the woman lacks the capacity to perform work and has no
definite occupation and therefore cannot support herself, the man, unless she has married
again, shall assist her by tilling her land or by otherwise supporting her. But if the man
himself lacks the capacity to do manual work or does not have a definite occupation and
cannot support himself, this provision does not apply.
Chapter Five. Arrangements for Childrn after Divorce
Article 16. Children born and conceived of the marriage before divorce shall revert to the
woman's custody. If the woman does not wish to take custody of them, they will revert to
the man's custody, but the wishes of an elder child shall be respected.
Article 17. The man shall bear two-thirds of the living expenses of each child reverting to
the woman's custody until he or she attains the age of sixteen. Payment shall be either in
money or by way of tilling the land distributed among the children.
Article 18, Should the woman marry again and the new husband wishes to care for the
children, the father may be exempted from further bearing the responsibility for
supporting the children as provided in the last preceding article. A new husband who has
agreed to care for the children must register this matter with the soviet of the hsiang or
municipal ch’ü. On registration he must accept responsibility for caring for them until
they reach adulthood. He shall not relinquish his duties [before that time] nor maltreat the
children.
Chapter Six. Children Born Out of Wedlock
Article 19. Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy all the rights granted to legitimate
children by this Marriage Law. To maltreat or abandon such children is forbidden.
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Chapter Seven. Additional Provisions
Article 20. Whosoever contravenes this law shall be duly punished according to the
criminal law.
Article 21. This law shall be enforced as from the day of promulgation.
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Appendix D: Marriage Regulations of the Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia Border Area
(Promulgated 4th April 1939)
Chapter One. General Provisions

Article 1. These regulations have been drawn up fundamentally in the spirit of democracy
and take account of the circumstances prevailing in the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu,
and Ningxia.
Article 2. Marriage of a man and a woman is based on the principle of the free will of the
parties.
Article 3. Monogamy is enforced; concubinage is forbidden.
Article 4. Marriages arranged by other people, contracted under coercion, and marriage
contracted by way of purchase and sale are forbidden, as is the practice of taking a ‘foster
daughter-in-law’ or a ‘foster son-in-law’.
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage
Article 5. For a man and a woman to contract marriage, the wish of the parties themselves
to do so is necessary and there shall be two persons to witness the marriage.
Article 6. The contracting age for marriage is fully twenty years for the man and fully
eighteen years for the woman.
Article 7. When contracting marriage the man and the woman shall request the
government of the hsiang or the municipality to register the marriage and to issue a
marriage certificate.
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Article 8. Marriage is forbidden if one party is: (1) a linear relative by blood of the other;
(2) suffering from venereal disease, leprosy, mental disease, paralysis or suchlike
incurable disease as is attested by a physician.
Article 9. While one of the parties has a spouse and is not divorced, he or she shall not
contract marriage for a second time.
Chapter Three. Divorce
Article 10. When both the man and the woman wish to divorce they shall request the
local hsiang or municipal government to register their divorce and issue a divorce
certificate.
Article 11. When either on the man's or the woman's side any of the following
circumstances exists, the other party may apply to the government for divorce: (i) bigamy;
(ii) fundamental lack of harmony of sentiment and will between the parties, continued
cohabitation being impossible; (iii) adultery; (iv) cruelty to one party by the other; (v)
desertion in bad faith by one of the parties; (vi) intent of one party to injure the other; (vii)
impotence; (viii) malignant disease; (ix) uncertainty for a period of one year (in areas
where communication by letter is impossibie, this period shall be two years) whether the
other party is still living; (x) any other important reason.
Article 12. When either the man or the woman requests divorce on any of the grounds
provided in article 11, the hsiang or municipal government will after verification of his or
her statements allow a divorce; the other party shall be notified, and if the other party
after having received the communication does not contest the facts as stated, a divorce
certificate shall be issued. If the other party contests the statements, his or her arguments
shall be examined by the court, which shall decide whether or not divorce is to be
allowed.
Chapter Four. Marriage, Children and Property Relationships
Article 13. Children born before their parents are divorced and not yet five years of age
shall be cared for by the woman. The wishes of children who have reached five years of
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age to be cared for by their father or their mother shall be respected. Neither the father
nor the mother shall coerce the children.
Arlicle 14. If the woman before her remarriage has not the capacity to support herself the
living expenses of the children who have reverted to her care shall continue to be borne
by the man until the children have reached the age of sixteen years.
Article 15. When a woman marries again, her new husband will be responsible for the
expense of caring for and educating the children she has brought with her.
Article 16. When children are born out of wedlock and the natural mother furnishes proof
of the identity of the natural father, the natural father shall be compelled to acknowledge
his children as if they had been born in wedlock.
Article 17. Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy all rights contained in these
provisions and shall not be abandoned.
Article 18. Property owned by the woman and the man and debts incurred by them prior
to marriage shall be administered by themselves. When after marriage the man and the
woman have managed their affairs in common, the properry obtained and the debts
incurred shall be administered by both of them jointly.
Article 19. If after divorce and before her remarriage, the woman has no occupation or
property and lacks the capacity to perform work and to support herself, the man shall
assist her until she marries again, but this period shall be limited to three years.
Article 20. Whosoever contravenes these regulations shall be accuscd by the persons
affected before the court or he shall be publiciy accused by the procuratorial organs and
be dealt with as the law may require.
Chapter Five. Additional Provisions
Article 21. The right of interpretation of these regulations is with the Government of the
Border Area; the right of amendment is with the Consultative Council of the Border Area.
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Article 22. The Border Area Government shall promulgate these regulations after they
have been passed by the Border Area Consultative Council.
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Appendix E: Revised Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Shaanxi, Gansu,
5

Ningxia Border Area

(Promulgated 20th March 1944)
Article 1. Marriage is based on the principle of the free will of the man and the woman.
Article 2. Monogamy is enforced; polygamy and polyandry are forbidden.
Article 3. In the case of marriage contracted by members of national minorities, while the
principles of these Regulations shall be observed, their customary laws shall [also] be
respected.
Article 4. When a man and a woman contract marriage, they shall request registration of
the marriage from the local government of the hsiang (or the municipality) and receive a
marriage certificate.
Article 5. Marriage is forbidden under the following circumstances: (i) when one of the
Parties is suffering from venereal or any other incurable malignant disease; (ii) in the case
of forcible abduction.
Article 6. When a man and a woman have been betrothed and either of the parties before
marriage is contracted does not agree to marry, that party may approach the government
with a request that the betrothal contract be dissolved, whereupon each party shall return
whatever betrothal presents he or she has received from the other.
Article 7. When a man and a woman divorce of their own free will, they shall request
registration of the divorce from the local government of the hsiang (or municipality) and
receive a divorce certificate.
Article 8. When either on the man's or the woman's side any of the following
circumstances exists, the other party may approach the government and request divorce:
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(i) bigamy; (ii) adultery; (iii) intent of one party to injure the other; (iv) incurable,
virulent disease or impotence as certified by a physician; (v) desertion in bad faith of the
other party; (vi) ill-treatment of one party by the other; (vii) fundamental lack of harmony
of sentiment and will between the parties, continued cohabitation being impossible; (viii)
a lapse of three years of uncertainty whether the other party is still living; (ix) lack of
regular occupation by either the man or the woman, despite cautioning, the other party's
standard of living being adversely affected as a result; (x) any other important reason for
divorce.
Article 9. During the pregnancy of the woman, the man is not allowed to file a petition
for divorce. If conditions for divorce are met, such a petition may only be filed one year
after the woman has given birth to the child. (Cases where both parties agree to divorce
do not come within the provisions of this article.)
Article 10. The spouse of a member of the army engaged in the war of resistance against
the Japanese shall in principle not be granted a divorce for the duration of the war of
resistance. Before a woman may request the local government for divorce, a period of at
least five years since she last received any communication from her husband is required
to have elapsed. When the local government receives such a petition it shall examine
whether the circumstances stated therein are true, before granting a divorce. But if it is
established that the husband of this army man's dependant is deceased, or has deserted,
gone over to the enemy, or married another person, this article shall not apply. When a
member of the army engaged in the war of resistance who had entered into a contract of
betrothal with a woman but for three years has had no correspondence with her, or though
he has corresponded, the woman has passed the legal marriageable age by five years and
still cannot marry, the woman may request the local government to dissolve the betrothal
contract.
Article 11. Children born before divorce of the parents and under the age of seven years
shall be cared for by the woman. The wishes of children over the age of seven to be in the
custody of their father or their mother shall be respected. The parents shall not coerce the
children, but relations between parent and child shall be taken into account.
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Article 12. When the woman is divorced, and has not married again, and has no means to
support herself, the living expenses and education of the children entrusted to her care
shall continue to be borne by the man. When the woman has married again, the educarion
and living expenses of these children shall be borne by her new husband. If the children
wish to be in the custody of their father, the father shall accept them.
Article 13. Children born out of wedlock have the same rights as children born in
wedlock; they shall not be discriminated against. If the mother has proved the identiry of
the father, the government shall compel the father to pay for the education and living
expenses of the child.
Article 14. In matters pertaining to the contracting of marriage or divorce, whosoever
contravenes these Regulations shall be accused by the party affected and the accusation
shall be verified by the local judicial body which shall decide whether the accusation is
sustained or rejected. If the case comes within the category of criminal affairs, it shall be
adjudicated according to the criminal law.
Article 15. These regulations are promulgated and enforced by the Border Area
Government, which has right of interpretation. After promulgation the Marriage
Regulations of the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia promulgated on 4 April
1939, shall immediately be abrogated.
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Appendix F: Marriage Regulations of the Shanxi, Ch’ahar, and Hebei Border Area

Passed by the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area on
21 January 1943, and promulgated by the Administiative council of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border
Area on 4 February 1943.
Chapter One. General Provisions
Article 1. These regulations are based on the spirit of the legislation in the Book of
Family of the civil Law of the Republic of China, and are adapted to the circumstances
prevailing in the Border Area.
Article 2. When a man and a woman marry it is necessary that they act on their own
initiative and of their own free-will; no person shall exercise coercion. Marriage of
infants, the practice of taking a 'foster daughter-in-law', premature marriage, and
marriage by purchase and sale are forbidden.
Article 3. Monogamy is strictly enforced. Bigamy, concubinage, keeping slave girls and
such devices of polygamy, and all kinds of maiiage by means of which one wife has more
than one husband, are forbidden.
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage
Article 4. A man who has not attained the age of twenty, and a woman who has not
attained the age of eighteen years, shall not contract marriage.
Article 5. A marriage to be contracted requires a public ceremony and two witnesses. The
parties shall approach the marriage office of the public authority in the village where they
reside or the hsien or municipal government to register the marriage and receive a
marriage certificate.
Article 6. Betrothal is not an indispensable procedure for marriage.
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Article 7. Persons having the following family relationships to one another are not
allowed to contract marriage: (i) linear relatives by blood or marriage; (ii) collateral
relatives by blood within the eighth degree; but this provision does not apply to biao
cousins, (iii) collateral relatives by marriage within the fifth degree who are not of the
same rank.
Article 8. No marriage is permitted in any of the following circumstances; viz. when
either party is suffering from: (i) mental disease or any other grave incurable disease; (ii)
venereal or any other malignant disease; (iii) impotence due to physical defect.
Article 9. When divorce is pronounced by judicial decision as a result of the adultery of
one party, or when punishment has been inflicted on him (her) by sentence of the court
on that account, the said party shall not be allowed to contract marriage with the partner
in adultery.
Article 10. No person shall interfere with the marriage of a widow.
Chapter Three. Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife
Article 11. Husband and wife are duty bound to live together, but if there is a legitimate
reason why they are unable to do so this provision shall not apply.
Article 12. Both spouses are jointly responsible for the living expenses and management
of the household.
Chapter Four. Divorce
Article 13. When both husband and wife are willing parties to a divorce, they shall
approach the local hsien (or municipal) judicial body and request registration of the
divorce, the signature of two or more witnesses being required.
Article 14. When fundamental lack of harmony of sentiment and will between husband
and wife exists to such an extent that cohabitation is intolerable, either party may
approach the judicial body and request a divorce.
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Article 15. When either on the man's side or the woman's side any of the following
circumstances exists, the other party may approach the judicial body to request a divorce:
(i) treason;(ii) bigamy;(iii) adultery; (iv) continual ill-ireatment, oppression, or desertion
in bad faith; (v) sentence of imprisonment for three or more years for commiting a
specific criminal offence; (vi) uncertainty for more than three years whether the other
party is still living; (vii) intent of one party to injure the other; (viii) any of the
circumstances in any of the paragraphs of Article 8.
Article 16. Spouses of military personnel on active service in the war against Japan shall
not request divorce, unless it has been uncertain for a period of more than four years
whether the spouse is still living.
Article 17. While the woman is pregnant or nursing a child, the man shall not file a
petition for divorce. If there are grounds for divorce, such a petition may only be filed
three full months after the birth of the child. However, in any of the circumstances
mentioned in article 15, subsections i, ii, iii, iv, and vii, this provision does not apply.
Article 18. When both husband and wife wish to divorce, they shall determine by
agreement at the time of divorce who is to be responsible for education and custody of
the children. However, notwithstanding the terms of any such agreement, if the wife is in
financial difficulties, the husband is nevertheless obliged to provide all or part of the
expenses of caring for and educating the children, for as long as the wife has not married
another person.
Article 19. When a judicial decision has ordered a divorce, the judicial body may in the
interest of the children, and at its discretion appoint one of the parties to be responsible
for their custody and education.
Article 20. Should the wife, through a judicial decision ordering divorce, and through no
fault of her own, come into financial difficulties, the husband, even should these
difficulties arise through no fault of his, is nevertheless obliged to provide in part or in
full for her living expenses; but if he is not able to do so, this provision shall not apply.
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Article 21. When husband and wife divorce, each shall recover the property he or she
originally owned.
Chapter Five. Additional Provisions
Article 22. Except for the provisions specifically contained in these regulations, the
provisions of the Book of Family of the Civil Code concerning marriage shall also be
applied.
Article 23. These regulations shall be enforced as from the day of their promulgation. The
Marriage Regulations of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area promulgated 7th July 1941shall at
the same time be abolished.
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Appendix G: The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China
(Promulgated 1st May 1950)
Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1. The feudal marriage system based on arbitrary and compulsory arrangements
and the supremacy of man over woman, and in disregard of the interests of the children,
is abolished.
The new democratic marriage system, which is based on the free choice of partners,
on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the protection of the lawful interests
of women and children, is put into effect.
Article 2. Bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference in the remarriage of widows,
and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriages, are prohibited.
Chapter II. The Marriage Contract
Article 3. Marriage is based upon the complete willingness of the two parties. Neither
party shall use compulsion and no third party is allowed to interfere.
Article 4. A marriage can be contracted only after the man has reached twenty years of
age and the woman eighteen years of age.
Article 5. No man or woman is allowed to marry in any of the following instances: (a)
Where the man and woman are lineal relatives by blood or where the man and woman are
brother and sister born of the same parents or where the man and woman are half brother
and half sister. The question of prohibiting marriage between collateral relatives by blood
(up to the fifth degree of relationship) is determined by custom. (b) Where one party,
because of certain physical defects, is sexually impotent. (c) Where one party is suffering
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The Marriage Law of The People’s Republic of China (English edition), Beijing: Foreign Language Press,
1975, 3rd edition.
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from venereal disease, mental disorder, leprosy, or any other disease which is regarded by
medical science as rendering a person unfit for marriage.
Article 6. In order to contract a marriage, both the man and the woman should register in
person with the people’s government of the district or township in which they reside. If
the proposed marriage is found to be in conformity with the provisions of the law, the
local people’s government should, without delay, issue marriage certificates. If the
proposed marriage is not found to be in conformity with the provisions of this law,
registration should not be granted.
Chapter III. Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife
Article 7. Husband and wife are companions living together and enjoy equal status in the
home.
Article 8. Husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist, and look after each
other, to live in harmony, to engage in productive work, to care for their children, and to
strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building up of the new society.
Article 9. Both husband and wife have the right to free choice of occupation and free
participation in work or in social activities.
Article 10. Husband and wife have equal rights in the possession and management of
family property.
Article 11. Husband and wife have the right to use his or her own family name.
Article 12. Husband and wife have the right to inherit each other’s property.
Chapter IV. Relations Between Parents and Children
Article 13. Parents have the duty to rear and to educate their children; the children have
the duty to support and to assist their parents. Neither the parents nor the children shall
maltreat or desert one another.
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The foregoing provision also applies to foster parents and foster children. Infanticide
by drowning and similar criminal acts are strictly prohibited.
Article 14. Parents and children have the right to inherit one another’s property.
Article 15. Children born out of wedlock enjoy the same rights as children born in lawful
wedlock. No person is allowed to harm them or discriminate against them. Where the
paternity of a child born out of wedlock is legally established by the mother of the child
or by other witnesses or material evidence, the identified father must bear the whole or
part of the cost of maintenance and education of the child until the age of eighteen.
With the consent of the mother, the natural father may have custody of the child.
With regard to the maintenance of a child born out of wedlock, if its mother marries, the
provisions of Article 22 apply.
Article 16. Neither husband nor wife may maltreat or discriminate against children born
of a previous marriage by either party and in that party’s custody.
Chapter V. Divorce
Article 17. Divorce is granted when husband and wife both desire it. In the event of the
husband or the wife alone insisting upon divorce, it may be granted only when mediation
by the district people’s government and the judicial organ has failed to bring about a
reconciliation.
In cases where divorce is desired by both husband and wife, both parties should
register with the district people’s government in order to obtain divorce certificates. The
district people’s government, after establishing that divorce is desired by both parties and
that appropriate measures have been taken for the care of children and property, should
issue the divorce certificate without delay.
When one party insists on divorce, the district people’s government may try to effect a
reconciliation. If such mediation fails, it should, without delay, refer the case to the
county or municipal people’s court. In dealing with a divorce case, the county or
municipal people’s court should, in the first instance, try to bring about a reconciliation
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between the parties. In case such mediation fails, the court should render a decision
without delay.
After divorce, if both husband and wife desire the resumption of marriage relations,
they should apply to the district people’s government for a registration of remarriage. The
district people’s government should accept such a registration and issue certificates of
remarriage.
Article 18. The husband is not allowed to apply for a divorce when his wife is pregnant,
and may apply for divorce only one year after the birth of the child. In the case of a
woman applying for divorce, this restriction does not apply.
Article 19. In the case of a member of the revolutionary army on active service who
maintains correspondence with his or her family, that army member’s consent must be
obtained before his or her spouse can apply for divorce.
Divorce may be granted to the spouse of a member of the revolutionary army who
does not correspond with his or her family for a period of two years subsequent to the
date of the promulgation of this law. Divorce may also be granted to the spouse of a
member of the revolutionary army, who had not maintained correspondence with his or
her family for over two years prior to the promulgation of this law, and who fails to
correspond with his or her family for a further period of one year subsequent to the
promulgation of the present law.
Chapter VI. Maintenance and Education of Children Afrer Divorce
Article 20. The blood ties between parents and children are not ended by a divorce of the
parents. No matter whether the father or the mother has the custody of the children, they
remain the children of both parties.
After divorce, both parents continue to have the duty to support and educate their
children.
After divorce, the guiding principle is to allow the mother to have the custody of a
breast-fed infant. After the weaning of the child, if a dispute arises between the two
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parties over the guardianship and an agreement cannot be reached, the people’s court
should render a decision in accordance with the interests of the child.
Article 21. If, after divorce, the mother is given custody of a child, the father is
responsible for the whole or part of the necessary cost of the maintenance and education
of the child. Both parties should reach an agreement regarding the amount and the
duration of such maintenance and education. Lacking such an agreement, the people’s
court should render a decision.
Payment may be made in cash, in kind, or by tilling land allocated to the child.
An agreement reached between parents or a decision rendered by the people’s court in
connection with the maintenance and education of a child does not obstruct the child
from requesting either parent to increase the amount decided upon by agreement or by
judicial decision.
Article 22. In the case where a divorced woman remarries and her husband is willing to
pay the whole or part of the cost of maintaining and educating the child or children by her
former husband, the father of the child or children is entitled to have such cost of
maintenance and education reduced or to be exempted from bearing such cost in
accordance with the circumstances.
Chapter VII. Property and Maintenance After Divorce
Article 23. In case of divorce, the wife retains such property as belonged to her prior to
her marriage. The disposal of other family property is subject to agreement between the
two parties. In cases where agreement cannot be reached, the people’s court should
render a decision after taking into consideration the actual state of the family property,
the interests of the wife and the child or children, and the principle of benefiting the
development of production.
In cases where the property allocated to the wife and her child or children is sufficient
for the maintenance and education of the child or children, the husband may be exempted
from bearing further maintenance and education costs.
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Article 24. In case of divorce, debts incurred jointly by husband and wife during the
period of their married life should be paid out of the property jointly acquired by them
during this period. In cases where no such property has been acquired or in cases where
such property is insufficient to pay off such debts, the husband is held responsible for
paying them. Debts incurred separately by the husband or wife should be paid off by the
party responsible.
Article 25. After divorce, if one party has not remarried and has maintenance difficulties,
the other party should render assistance. Both parties should work out an agreement with
regard to the method and duration of such assistance; in case an agreement cannot be
reached, the people’s court should render a decision.
Chapter VIII. By-Laws
Article 26. Persons violating this law will be punished in accordance with law. In cases
where interference with the freedom of marriage has caused death or injury to one or both
parties, persons guilty of such interference will bear responsibility for the crime before
the law.
Article 27. This law comes into force from the date of its promulgation.
In regions inhabited by minority nationalities in compact communities, the people’s
government (or the military and administrative committee) of the greater administrative
area or the Provincial People’s Government may enact certain modifications or
supplementary articles in conformity with the actual conditions prevailing among
minority nationalities in regard to marriage. But such measures must be submitted to the
government administration council for ratification before enforcement.
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